High technology commercialisation : a real option approach by Djokovic, Djordje
Djokovic, Djordje (2011). High Technology Commercialisation: A Real Option Approach. 
(Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
City Research Online
Original citation: Djokovic, Djordje (2011). High Technology Commercialisation: A Real Option 
Approach. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1112/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
High Technology Commercialisation:
A Real Option Approach
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by
Djordje Djokovic
May 19, 2011
Faculty of Management
Cass Business School, City University London
Supervisor:
Prof. Vangelis Souitaris
Thesis Committee:
Prof. Gerard George (Imperial College London)
Prof. Ajay Bhalla (Cass Business School, City University London)
Table of Contents
2
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ........................................................................................15
2 Spinouts from academic institutions: A literature review with
suggestions for further research ................................................................19
2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................19
2.2 Spinout definition and process ......................................................................21
2.3 Methodology .................................................................................................23
2.4 Macro Level studies ......................................................................................27
2.4.1 Governmental and industrial support mechanisms .................................27
2.4.2 Technology and Market driven commercialisation..................................30
2.5 Meso Level studies ........................................................................................31
2.5.1 University support mechanisms ..............................................................31
2.5.2 University based determinants of spinout activity .................................32
2.5.3 Effectiveness of spinning out as a university technology transfer
mechanism...........................................................................................................33
2.6 Micro Level studies .......................................................................................34
2.6.1 Role of founders and founding team.......................................................34
2.6.2 Networks with University and Industry .................................................36
2.7 Directions for further research.......................................................................40
3 Real option theory...............................................................................45
3.1 Competing Theories ......................................................................................45
3.2 Types of Real Options ..................................................................................49
3.3 Applications of Real options theory ..............................................................51
3.4 Patents as real options ..................................................................................53
4 Patenting Processes and Patent Research ..........................................61
4.1 Patent Analysis and Patenting Process.........................................................61
4.1.1 Search Report.........................................................................................61
4.1.2 Patentability ..........................................................................................63
4.2 Patent citation statistics ...............................................................................64
4.2.1 National applications..............................................................................64
4.2.2 International applications.......................................................................65
4.2.3 Patent Citations and the Value of Patents.............................................67
4.3 Patenting and technology commercialization at the Max Planck Society .....70
4.3.1 Patenting and Licensing .........................................................................72
Table of Contents
3
4.3.2 Spinout Companies.................................................................................73
4.3.3 Max Planck Innovation Database...........................................................74
5 The effects of market and technological uncertainty on university
spinout formation and spinout failure .......................................................76
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................76
5.2 Theory Development and Hypothesis............................................................81
5.2.1 Uncertainty and the entry decision ........................................................83
5.2.2 Uncertainty and the exit decision...........................................................89
5.3 Methodology .................................................................................................93
5.3.1 Sample....................................................................................................93
5.3.2 Analysis ..................................................................................................94
5.4 Variables .......................................................................................................94
5.4.1 Dependent Variables...............................................................................94
5.4.2 Independent Variables ............................................................................95
5.4.3 Control Variables ................................................................................. 101
5.5 Results ........................................................................................................ 106
5.5.1 Spinout formation (INV2USO)............................................................. 106
5.5.2 Spinout failure (USO2USOTERM) ...................................................... 112
5.6 Discussion ...................................................................................................119
5.6.1 Firm formation ..................................................................................... 120
5.6.2 Firm Failure ......................................................................................... 123
5.6.3 Interaction Effects ................................................................................ 124
6 The lifecycle of a license under market and technological
uncertainty..............................................................................................126
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 126
6.2 Theory Development and Hypothesis.......................................................... 129
6.2.1 Effects of Uncertainty on Licensing and Licensing Termination........... 134
6.3 Methodology ............................................................................................... 144
6.3.1 Sample..................................................................................................144
6.3.2 Analysis ................................................................................................ 145
6.3.3 Dependent Variables............................................................................. 145
6.3.4 Independent Variables .......................................................................... 147
6.3.5 Control Variables ................................................................................. 153
6.4 Results ........................................................................................................ 157
6.4.1 Prelicensing Phase (INV2LIC).............................................................. 157
Table of Contents
4
6.4.2 Postlicensing Phase (LIC2LICTERM).................................................. 164
6.5 Discussion and Conclusion .......................................................................... 170
6.5.1 Interaction Effects ................................................................................ 172
6.6 Competing Risk Model................................................................................ 176
7 Conclusion .........................................................................................188
7.1 Summary.....................................................................................................188
7.2 Limitations and future research ..................................................................194
8 References .........................................................................................200
9 Appendix ...........................................................................................217
9.1 Robustness of Market Uncertainty Measure................................................ 217
9.1.1 Model Comparison Historical vs. GARCH ........................................... 218
9.1.2 Volatility Measurement Comparison across Industries ......................... 222
9.2 Spinout Literature Classification.................................................................226
9.3 MPS Dataset............................................................................................... 229
9.3.1 Overview .............................................................................................. 229
9.3.2 Event Frequency Summary ..................................................................231
9.3.3 Description ........................................................................................... 232
9.4 Statistical Results ....................................................................................... 248
9.4.1 Invention to spinout (INV2USO) ......................................................... 249
9.4.2 Invention to spinout interaction effects (INV2USO) ............................ 251
9.4.3 Spinout to spinout termination (USO2USOTERM)............................. 252
9.4.4 Spinout to spinout termination interaction effects
(USO2USOTERM)............................................................................................ 256
9.4.5 Invention to license (INV2LIC) ............................................................ 259
9.4.6 Invention to license interaction effects (INV2LIC) ............................... 261
9.4.7 License to license termination (LIC2LICTERM)..................................269
9.4.8 License to license termination interaction effects (LIC2LICTERM).....272
9.4.9 Competing Risk Model between Spinout and Licensing (USOvsLIC) ..276
List of Tables
5
List of Tables
Table 2-1: Content analysis of primary and secondary spinout papers ............. 26
Table 3-1: Applicability of real options in recent literature .............................. 52
Table 3-2: Comparison of financial and real options ......................................... 56
Table 4-1 Frequency of Patent Application by patent office in the Max Planck
database..................................................................................................... 66
Table 4-2 Comparison of datasets existing on lifecycle of innovatons and patents
from public research organiztions and universities ..................................... 75
Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics (INV2USO).................................................. 106
Table 5-2: Correlation Matrix (INV2USO) ..................................................... 108
Table 5-3: Cox Regression Analysis for the determinants of firm formation
(INV2USO).............................................................................................. 109
Table 5-4: Descriptive Statistics (USO2USOTERM) ...................................... 113
Table 5-5: Correlation Matrix (USO2USOTERM).......................................... 114
Table 5-6: Cox Regression Analysis for the determinants of firm failure
(USO2USOTERM) .................................................................................. 118
Table 5-7 Summary of interaction effects for the firm formation model.......... 125
Table 6-1: Descriptive Statistics (INV2LIC) ................................................... 158
Table 6-2: Correlation Matrix (INV2LIC)....................................................... 160
Table 6-3: Cox Regression Analysis for the determinants of licensing (INV2LIC)
................................................................................................................. 162
Table 6-4: Descriptive Statistics (LIC2LICTERM)......................................... 165
Table 6-5: Correlation Matrix (LIC2LICTERM) ............................................ 166
Table 6-6: Cox Regression Analysis for the determinants of licensing
termination (LIC2LICTERM) ................................................................. 169
Table 6-7 Summary of interaction effects for the licensing model ................... 173
Table 6-8 Summary of interaction effects for the licensing failure model ........ 175
Table 6-9 Overall Significance for Competing Risk Model for Spinout formation
vs. Licensing model .................................................................................. 177
Table 6-10 Competing Risk Model for Spinout formation vs. Licensing model179
Table 9-1 Overall Model significances for different time window lengths of the
historical market uncertainty measure ..................................................... 217
Table 9-2 Invention to Spinout Model Comparison (Historical vs. GARCH) . 219
Table 9-3 Spinout to Spinout Termination Model Comparison (Historical vs.
GARCH).................................................................................................. 220
Table 9-4 Invention to License Model Comparison (Historical vs. GARCH) .. 221
List of Tables
6
Table 9-5 License to License Termination Model Comparison (Historical vs.
GARCH).................................................................................................. 222
Table 9-6: Index list of the spinout papers identified ...................................... 226
Table 9-7: Descriptive Statistics of Models ..................................................... 230
Table 9-8: Model 1 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO) ............................ 249
Table 9-9: Model 1 Variables in the Equation (INV2USO)............................. 249
Table 9-10: Model 2 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO) .......................... 249
Table 9-11: Model 2 Variables in the Equation (INV2USO) ........................... 250
Table 9-12: Model 3 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO) .......................... 250
Table 9-13: Model 3 Variables in the Equation (INV2USO) ........................... 250
Table 9-14: Model of Nonlinear Technological Uncertainty (INV2USO)......... 251
Table 9-15: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO, Interaction of MU_INV) 251
Table 9-16: Variables in the Equation (INV2USO, Interaction of MU_INV and
VC_IND_REV)...................................................................................... 252
Table 9-17: Model 1 Test of Model Coefficients (USO2USOTERM) .............. 252
Table 9-18: Model 1 Variables in the Equation (USO2USOTERM) ............... 252
Table 9-19: Model 2 Test of Model Coefficients (USO2USOTERM) .............. 253
Table 9-20: Model 2 Variables in the Equation (USO2USOTERM) ............... 254
Table 9-21: Model 3 Test of Model Coefficients (USO2USOTERM) .............. 254
Table 9-22: Model 3 Variables in the Equation (USO2USOTERM) ............... 255
Table 9-23: Test of Model Coefficients (USO2USOTERM, Interaction of
MU_INV and FLG_SUPP_BSP) .......................................................... 256
Table 9-24: Variables in the Equation (INV2USO, Interaction of MU_INV and
FLG_SUPP_BSP).................................................................................. 257
Table 9-25: Test of Model Coefficients (USO2USOTERM, Interaction of
MU_INV and FLG_SUPP_BSP) .......................................................... 257
Table 9-26: Variables in the Equation (INV2USO, Interaction of MU_INV and
FLG_SUPP_BSP).................................................................................. 258
Table 9-27: Model 1 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC)............................ 259
Table 9-28: Model 1 Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC) ............................ 259
Table 9-29: Model 2 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC)............................ 259
Table 9-30: Model 2 Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC) ............................ 259
Table 9-31: Model 3 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC)............................ 260
Table 9-32: Model 3 Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC) ............................ 260
Table 9-33: Model of Nonlinear Technological Uncertainty (INV2LIC) .......... 261
Table 9-34: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, MU_INV and
NUM_CLAIMS)...................................................................................... 262
List of Tables
7
Table 9-35: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, MU_INV and
NUM_CLAIMS)...................................................................................... 262
Table 9-36: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_INV and INV_PARTNER)........................................ 262
Table 9-37: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_INV and INV_PARTNER)........................................ 263
Table 9-38: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_INV and NUM_PREV_INV) .................................... 263
Table 9-39: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_INV)............................................................................ 264
Table 9-40: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and TECH_AGE) ............................................. 264
Table 9-41: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and TECH_AGE) ............................................. 265
Table 9-42: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and INV_PARTNER) ...................................... 265
Table 9-43: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and INV_PARTNER) ...................................... 266
Table 9-44: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and NUM_PREV_INV)................................... 266
Table 9-45: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and NUM_PREV_INV)................................... 267
Table 9-46: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and NUM_PREV_LIC) ................................... 267
Table 9-47: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and NUM_PREV_LIC) ................................... 268
Table 9-48: Model 1 Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM) ................. 269
Table 9-49: Model 1 Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM).................. 269
Table 9-50: Model 2 Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM) ................. 269
Table 9-51: Model 2 Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM).................. 270
Table 9-52: Model 3 Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM) ................. 270
Table 9-53: Model 3 Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM).................. 271
Table 9-54: Model of Nonlinear Technological Uncertainty (LIC2LICTERM) 271
Table 9-55: Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of  MU_
LIC with NUM_CLAIMS ) ..................................................................... 272
Table 9-56: Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of MU_LIC
with NUM_CLAIMS).............................................................................. 273
Table 9-57: Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_LIC with NUM_PREV_TTO ) ................................. 273
List of Tables
8
Table 9-58: Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_LIC with NUM_PREV_TTO) .................................. 274
Table 9-59: Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_LIC) ............................................................................ 274
Table 9-60: Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_LIC with TECH_AGE).............................................. 275
Table 9-61: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO + INV2LIC) .................... 276
Table 9-62: Variables in the Equation (INV2USO + INV2LIC) ..................... 276
Table 9-63: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO) ........................................ 277
Table 9-64: Variables in the Equation (INV2USO)......................................... 277
Table 9-65: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC) ......................................... 277
Table 9-66: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC) .......................................... 278
List of Figures
9
List of Figures
Figure 2-1: Evolution of primary and secondary spinout literature................... 20
Figure 5-1 Nonlinear effect of market uncertainty on firm formation  (x-Axis =
Market Uncertainty, y-Axis firm formation likelihood)............................ 112
Figure 5-2 Nonlinear effect of market uncertainty on firm failure (x-Axis =
Market Uncertainty, y-Axis firm failure likelihood) ................................. 117
Figure 6-1 Effects of Market Uncertainty on Licensing ................................... 164
Figure 6-2 Effects of Market Uncertainty on Licensing Termination .............. 168
Figure 6-3 Effects of Market Uncertainty on Spinout formation and Licensing
................................................................................................................. 182
Figure 6-4 Effects of Market Uncertainty on Spinout failure and Licensing
termination .............................................................................................. 185
Figure 9-1: Historical vs. GARCH Market Uncertainty (Electrical)................ 223
Figure 9-2: Historical vs. GARCH Market Uncertainty (Mechanical)............. 224
Figure 9-3: Historical vs. GARCH Market Uncertainty (Chemical) ................ 224
Figure 9-4: Historical vs. GARCH Market Uncertainty (PharmaBio)............. 225
Figure 9-5: Historical vs. GARCH Market Uncertainty (Medical) .................. 225
Figure 9-6: Spinout and Spinout Termination Event Frequency Histogram ... 231
Figure 9-7: License and License Termination Event Frequency Histogram..... 232
List of Abbreviations
10
List of Abbreviations
AUTM Association of university technology managers
DCF Discounted cash flow
IPO Initial public offering
IP Intellectual property
IPR Intellectual property rights
MPS Max Planck Society
NPL Non patent literature
NPV Net present value
NTBF New technology based firm
PRO Public research organization
ROT Real option theory
TTO Technology transfer office
UNICO University companies association
USO University spinout
Acknowledgements
11
Acknowledgements
The writing of this dissertation has been an incredible journey and a monumen-
tal milestone in my academic life. I could not have embarked on this expedition
and travelled this far without the passionate and continued support of advisors,
colleagues, friends and family.
First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest appreciation and sincer-
est gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Vangelis Souitaris for his guidance, under-
standing, patience, and most importantly, his friendship during my thesis.  His
mentorship was paramount in providing me with valuable insights and encour-
aged me to grow as an independent thinker. For everything you’ve done for me
Vangelis, I thank you. I am also indebted to my committee members, Professor
Gerard George whose insightful suggestions helped to reduce the ambiguity of
the thesis and Professor Ajay Bhalla for his valuable advice.
Lastly, I would like to thank my family for their endless love and encourage-
ment throughout the seemingly never ending years – my mother, Dusanka, for
all her sacrifice throughout her life that gave me the opportunity and strength
to reach for the stars and pursue my dream – my father, Branislav, for believing
in me and wholeheartedly supporting me in all my pursuits and odysseys of life
– my sister, Tijana, for her unconditional love, care and affection. And most of
all for my loving, encouraging, and patient girlfriend Sarah whose faithful sup-
port during the final stages of this Ph.D. is so appreciated. I love you all dearly.
Djordje Djokovic
Cass Business School
City University London
May 2011
Acknowledgements
12
To my family, for their love
Acknowledgements
13
I grant powers of discretion to the University Librarian to allow this thesis to be
copied in whole or in part without further reference to me. This permission cov-
ers only single copies made for study purposes, subject to normal conditions of
acknowledgement.
Abstract
14
Abstract
The impact of uncertainty in the commercialization lifecycle of new technologies
is a complex phenomenon. Technologies are research intensive and exposed to
uncertainty regarding their successful development and functionality. Further
these technologies have to be absorbed by volatile markets in order to be com-
mercialized. These different forms of uncertainty are of primary importance for
decision makers but have not been thoroughly studied in previous technology
commercialization research and put under one theoretical framework. The main
focus of this thesis is to comprehend the recently growing trend among universi-
ties and public research organizations to commercialize their research activities
from an empirical and theoretical perspective. More particularly the thesis fo-
cuses on the life cycle of two main commercialization streams namely the entry
and exit of university spinouts, which are companies that evolve from intellec-
tual property developed within academic institutions as well as the licensing and
licensing termination of inventions. The main focus of the thesis therefore analy-
ses market and technological uncertainty and explains the conditions under
which spinout formation, spinout failure, licensing and licensing failure occur by
putting them under the theoretical framework of real option theory.
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1 Introduction
What do Google and an MP3 player have in common? Both are based on inno-
vations that originated from a university or public research institution. Google
began in early 1996 as a research project by two PhD students at Stanford Uni-
versity in the USA whereas MP3 is a digital audio encoding format developed at
the Fraunhofer Institute, which together with the Max Planck Society forms the
top two public research institutions in Germany. In the last decade major re-
search universities and public research organizations have undergone a tectonic
shift from ‘knowledge production’ to ‘capitalisation of knowledge’. This com-
mercial orientation and increasing commercialisation activities among universi-
ties had implications not only for the university’s financial advantage but had a
great impact of improving regional or national economic performance (Etzko-
witz et al., 2000). Commercial successes like the previously mentioned Google,
the MP3 technology and many others have created a fertile ground for the seeds
of commercial activities from public research organizations such as technology
licensing and university spinouts1. The rising number of universities involved in
commercial activities has been well documented in several surveys. The Univer-
sity Companies Association (UNICO, 2001) survey for the UK and the Associa-
tion of University Technology Managers (AUTM) survey for the US (AUTM,
2002) showed that academic institutions are creating spinouts and commercializ-
1 Spinouts are defined as new firms created to exploit commercially some knowledge, technology
or research results developed within a university
Introduction
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ing their technologies at an increasing rate and reported that the number almost
doubled in the last decade. Especially the growth of spinout activity has in-
spired a recent increase of research interest in this phenomenon (Djokovic and
Vangelis, 2008).
Public research organizations as well as universities are entirely active in the
high technology domain which is underlying very high risks in terms of techno-
logical development and completion as well as the market adaptation. We refer
to the first risk as technological uncertainty which represents the uncertainty
about the success and feasibility of the developed technology and the uncer-
tainty if the underlying technology will satisfy quality, performance and stan-
dards that were initially intended (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The second risk
that innovations in the high technology domain are exposed to is the commer-
cial risk which represents the volatility of current market and demand struc-
tures. We refer to this form of risk as market uncertainty. The question how
these forms of uncertainty impact the technology lifecycle has been recognized
by research scholars but was not put under a theoretical framework or tested
empirically (Shane, 2004b). Especially research on real options has contributed
to our understanding of entry timing of investments (Miller and Folta, 2002)
and has encouraged experimentation and the proactive exploration of uncer-
tainty (McGrath, 1999). Therefore, we will extend real option theory to tech-
nology commercialization decisions by taking the perspective that uncertainty
influences the value of the technology option as well as its investment timing.
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The aim of this research will be to explore how different conditions of uncer-
tainty, predominantly to be found in early stage technologies, affect the lifecycle
of a high technology innovation.
In particular, we will examine the effects of external (market) and internal
(technology) uncertainty on commercialization activity, as well as the timing of
innovation commercialization. The elaboration of hypothesis will be grounded
on the foundations of real option theory (ROT) in order to consolidate uncer-
tainty and timing into a theoretical framework.
Our study includes data on all inventions created in the period from 1990 to
2003 by the top German Research Institution, Max Planck Society (MPS). It is
therefore the first study to use non-US data to directly analyse technology
commercialization in form of spinout and licensing activity. The information
where, when and in what form patents are licensed or spun out was directly ob-
tained from the university technology transfer offices. Since we are looking at
the occurrence of events like the occurrence of a spinout or the licensing of a
patent and our dataset contains censored and time dependent covariates, we
will use Cox regression time dependent analysis throughout the study as the
primary statistical modelling approach. This gives us the possibility to predict
the likelihood of new firm formation, licensing initiation or licensing termination
per patent-year on the basis of several time dependent covariates that are used
in our study.
The thesis proceeds as follows. In the next chapter we will focus on the phe-
nomenon of university commercialization activities with a focus on university
spinouts by giving a comprehensive overview of the factors influencing commer-
Introduction
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cialization and spinout activity recent research has identified. Still we lack com-
prehensive studies, which critically review this literature as well as its theoreti-
cal contributions. Chapter two aims to fill this knowledge gap.
Chapter three will introduce real option theory and explain its applicability to
the commercialization phenomenon and chapter four will provide an overview of
using patents as measurement concepts to provide the setting for chapters five
and six. Chapter five will elaborate the effects of the different concepts of uncer-
tainty on spinout activity. The effects of uncertainty on innovation licensing
and licensing termination will be analysed in chapter six giving a complete
overview of the affects of uncertainty on the different commercial outcomes of
an innovation thereby comprehending the analysis of the commercialization life-
cycle.
Spinouts from academic institutions
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2 Spinouts from academic institutions: A litera-
ture review with suggestions for further research
2.1 Introduction
University spinouts constitute a complex phenomenon within the entrepreneur-
ship research field. They are companies which evolve from universities through
commercialisation of intellectual property and transfer of technology developed
within academic institutions (Birley, 2002). Despite their importance as possible
sources of wealth creation and job opportunities in the economy (Steffenson et
al., 2000), researchers started to focus explicitly on university spinouts only re-
cently.
The changing role of universities towards commercialisation activities combined
with governmental and institutional support mechanisms is creating a fertile
ground for the seeds of university spinouts. The rising number of universities
involved in commercialisation activities such as licensing and spinning out has
been well reported and documented in several surveys. The University Compa-
nies Association (UNICO, 2001) survey in the UK and the AUTM survey in the
US (AUTM, 2002) showed that academic institutions are creating company
spinouts at an increasing rate. In the US the annual number of spinouts in-
creased from 202 in 1996 to 424 in 2001. In the UK a sharp rise of spinout crea-
tion between 1996 and 2001 has also been reported from an average of 94.8 per
year in the four years up to the end of 2000 to the 175 created in 2001. The
number of patents and licenses in the last decade almost tripled whereas the
Spinouts from academic institutions
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start-up activity among universities almost doubled (AUTM, 2002). This
growth of spinout activities has inspired a recent increase of research interest on
the phenomenon (see Figure 2-1). Still we lack comprehensive studies, which
critically review the literature and its theoretical contributions. Our paper aims
to fill this knowledge gap.
Figure 2-1: Evolution of primary and secondary spinout literature
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Our literature review is mainly based on papers published in core management
journals, which we identified systematically using the ABI/INFORM, Business
Source Premier and Science Direct databases. The paper is structured as fol-
lows. We first provide an overview of existing definitions of spinouts followed by
a brief review of process studies, to help the reader ‘relate’ to the phenomenon.
We then present the methodology followed to identify the papers, categorise the
core body of the literature and provide a comprehensive review of its main
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themes. We conclude with our views about the current gaps in the literature
and directions for further enquiry.
2.2 Spinout definition and process
What is a university spinout organisation (USO)? We believe that the definition
of a USO should specify the ‘outcome’ of the spinout process, the essential ‘par-
ties’ involved in it, and the ‘core elements’ that are transferred (spun-out) dur-
ing that process.
The outcome of a USO is firm formation and all current definitions are unani-
mous in this respect (Carayannis et al., 1998; Clarysse et al., 2000; Klofsten and
Dylan, 2000). Regarding the involved parties Roberts and Malone (1996) identi-
fied the following four: (1) the parent organisation from which the technology is
extracted, (2) the technology originator, i.e. the person who brings the technol-
ogy from a basic research stage to a point at which technology transfer can be-
gin, (3) the entrepreneur who attempts to create a new venture centred on the
technology, and (4) the venture investor that provides funding for the new
company.
The core elements transferred to a USO are technology and/or people. Re-
searchers produced various definitions of spinouts depending on their approach
to the above elements. ‘Technology’ can be interpreted in two ways: a) A for-
malised piece of intellectual property such as a group of patents; in this case a
spinout is “a new company founded to exploit a piece of intellectual property
within an academic institution” (AUTM, 2002, Di Gregorio & Shane, 2003) or
b) some knowledge produced in a university, which does not necessarily have to
Spinouts from academic institutions
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be formalised; in this case “university spinouts are new firms created to exploit
commercially some knowledge, technology or research results developed within a
university” (Pirnay et al., 2003).
Regarding the transfer of ‘people’, Smilor et al. (1990) developed a narrow defi-
nition of a USO (similar to an early definition by McQueen & Wallmark, 1982)
that excludes the possibility of the technology-only spinning out, without being
accompanied by people from the parent organisation. To them a spinout is “a
new company that is formed (1) by individuals who were former employees of a
parent organisation and (2) is based on a core technology that is transferred
from the parent organisation” (Smilor et al. 1990). Radosevich (1995) differenti-
ated between inventor–entrepreneurs and surrogate–entrepreneurs who did not
invent the technology but acquired the rights to commercialise it from the uni-
versity. Nicolaou and Birley (2003a) ‘broadened’ Smilor’s strict definition ac-
cepting as a necessary condition for a USO the transfer of a technology, but not
necessarily of people from the parent organisation. According to them a USO
includes: (1) the transfer of a core technology from an academic institution into
a new company and (2) the founding member(s) may include the inventor aca-
demic(s) who may or may not be currently affiliated with the academic institu-
tion. For this paper we adopt the above spinout definition by Nicolaou and
Birley (2003a) which considers technology transfer in form of a new company,
but is inclusive of firms run by surrogate entrepreneurs without the involvement
of the academic inventors.
A few studies focused on the process of university spinout formation and evolu-
tion (Ndonzuau et al., 2002; Vohora et al., 2004; Carayannis et al., 1998; Rob-
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erts and Malone, 1996), typically describing the process with a number of
phases. Ndonzuau et al. (2002) identified four main phases of spinout creation:
(1) business idea generation from research; (2) finalisation of new venture pro-
jects out of ideas; (3) launching spin-out firms from projects; (4) strengthening
the creation of economic value. Beyond this, Vohora et al. (2004) offered an
evolutionary perspective on the process of the spinout phenomenon focusing on
the company itself. They identified four stages, which USO’s undergo during
their formation (1) research phase, (2) opportunity framing phase, (3) pre-
organisation, (4) reorientation. The model of the study focused on the transition
between the phases and identified four critical junctures with increasing com-
plexity, which a USO must pass in order to progress to the next phase; (1) op-
portunity recognition, (2) entrepreneurial commitment, (3) threshold of credibil-
ity, (4) threshold of sustainability. In general, qualitative and longitudinal proc-
ess studies on university spinouts are useful and welcome, as they explore the
new phenomenon in detail, identify constructs, spot relationships and open ave-
nues for further confirmatory quantitative work.
2.3 Methodology
We searched three major databases (ABI/INFORM, Business Source Premier
and Science Direct) for specified keywords2 since not all of the databases are
2 The main keywords we have used to screen the articles were: universit* start*, universit*
spin*, academic spin*, academic start*, academic start*, entrepreneur* universit*, universit*
commercialization, universit* ntbf, academic* ntbf. The asterisk stands for finding all combina-
tions of a word or word fragment. E.g. spin* finds spinouts as well as spinoffs.
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covering the same journals. After each query we manually searched through the
abstracts to pre-screen the relevant articles. Subsequently we reviewed the refer-
ences of each relevant article in order to identify published material not ar-
chived in the databases. After filtering and evaluating the initial pool of more
than 250 papers, we extracted 102 relevant ones that included spinouts in their
findings. We categorised these 102 papers into two groups: ‘primary’ and ‘sec-
ondary’ spinout literature. The primary spinout literature included 60 papers,
which deliberately and solely aimed to study the spinout phenomenon concep-
tually or empirically. Instead the 42 papers in the secondary literature did not
exclusively focus on spinouts, but produced relevant findings through the study
of wider phenomena, such as technology transfer and New Technology Based
Firms (NTBF’s). Table 9-6 shows the number of primary and secondary spinout
literature since 1990.
Table 2-1: Content analysis of primary and secondary spinout papers
gives aggregated descriptive statistics on the journals that the spinout litera-
ture appeared, the geographical location of the authors and the proportion of
conceptual versus empirical pieces. We also grouped the papers into phenome-
non-focused versus theory-driven; Phenomenon-focused studies either described
aspects of the spinout phenomenon or explored relationships between constructs
based on a practical/ empirical logic. Theory-driven studies instead explained
hypothesised relationships or events utilising broader theoretical frameworks.
The judgement of whether a study is theory-driven or not is often subjective
and therefore the categorisation is indicative only, illustrating our own views
(Table 2-1: Content analysis of primary and secondary spinout papers
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shows the results).
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Table 2-1: Content analysis of primary and secondary spinout pa-
pers
Journals primaryliterature
secondary
literature
International Journal of Entr. & Inn. Management 3 1
International Journal of Technology Management 1 1
Journal of Business Venturing 9 2
Journal of Technology Transfer 6 3
Management Science 4 2
R&D Management 4 3
Research Policy 9 10
Small Business Economics 3 1
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management - 2
Technovation 11 4
Others 10 13
Total 60 42
Authors
Europe 62% n/A
Other 7% n/A
USA 31% n/A
Studies 1980-2001 2002-2005
Phenomenon focused 95.2% 51.3%
Theory-driven 4.8% 48.7%
Empirical 85.7% 71.8%
Conceptual 14.3% 28.2%
Qualitative 38.9% 44.8%
Quantitative 61.1% 55.2%
We reviewed all the 103 papers listed in Table 9-6 in the Appendix. Our cita-
tion coding allows the reader to quickly identify whether a paper belongs to the
primary or the secondary literature, whether it is conceptual or empirical and
whether it is phenomenon-focused or theory-driven. Apart from the key papers
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on spinouts, this review draws from a wider spectrum of related studies in the
management field, in order to highlight theoretical contributions of the current
literature and to propose areas for further research.
We a priori categorised the literature into three clusters according to the level of
analysis, namely, macro, meso and micro level. Macro level studies focused on
the macroeconomic environment of spinouts and analysed the role of the gov-
ernment and industry in the spinout process. In this level of analysis, research-
ers looked at spinout related policies and support mechanisms, the impact of
spinouts on the regional economy as well as favourable conditions of the indus-
try and market environment. Meso-level studies focused on the university and
the Technology Transfer Office (TTO). Studies tried to identify the support
mechanisms that can be employed by the academic institution to incentivise
spinout creation, as well as to explore the effectiveness of spinning out as a uni-
versity technology transfer mechanism. Micro-level studies focused on the firms
and the individual entrepreneurs and looked at networks of spinouts and their
founders as well as human relations and interactions during the spinout forma-
tion process.
2.4 Macro Level studies
2.4.1 Governmental and industrial support mechanisms
Some academics and economists voiced concerns that the exploitation of aca-
demic knowledge will jeopardise the basic role of the university (Mazzoleni and
Nelson, 1998; Lee, 1996; Rogers, 1986), that encouraging commercialisation will
alter the institutional rules and conventions under which research takes place
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(Dasgupta and David, 1994) and that spinouts have very little impact on the
local or regional development of the economy (Harmon, et al. 1997). Others
(currently the dominant view) have positive attitudes towards university com-
mercialisation activities and believe that the economic development momentum
that has been generated at institutions in recent years should be vigorously pur-
sued in a proactive manner (Chrisman et al., 1995). A body of research docu-
mented how governments and the industry support and incentivise the creation
of new ventures from public research institutions.
Prior to 1980, the incentive structures for academics and universities induced by
government were not well developed and few universities were engaged in tech-
nology licensing and active commercialisation (Shane, 2002a). Recognising the
value of university commercialisation activities for national wealth creation, sev-
eral governments shifted their technology policy from a ‘market failure’ para-
digm (which assumes that innovation flows from and to private sector with
minimal university or governmental role) to a ‘cooperative technology paradigm’
(which assumes that governmental laboratories and universities can play a role
in developing technology) (see Bozeman, 2000 for a review of policy models in
the USA and Rothwell and Dogson, 1992 for a description of European technol-
ogy policy models).
Besides major policy changes (such as the Bayh Dole Act), other supporting
policies were created in the US, such as promoting cooperative R&D, patent
policy to expand government technology, relaxing anti-trust regulations, devel-
oping cooperative research centres and altering guidelines for disposition of gov-
ernment owned intellectual property (Bozeman, 2000). Moreover, governments
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developed support mechanisms of financial nature in the form of grants and
public funding. The First Action Plan for Innovation funded the start-up and
growth of technology-based enterprises, especially spin-outs (Klofsten and Dy-
lan, 2000). Grants in the USA like the Small Business Innovation Research and
the Small Business Technology Transfer Research, fund high-risk R&D with
commercial potential (Meyer, 2003), enabling scientists-founders to overcome fi-
nancial barriers. In the same way, the U.K. legislation has provided stimuli for
the commercialization of university-based research with programs such as the
University Challenge, Science Enterprise Challenge, and the Higher Education
Innovation Fund (Lockett et al., 2005).
Apart from describing the government support mechanisms, some studies at-
tempted to evaluate the effectiveness of governmental technology transfer policy.
Recent findings showed that the Bayh-Dole Act led universities to concentrate
their patenting in lines of business in which licensing is more effective (Shane,
2004a). Since patents precede university commercialisation activities in general
(which include not only licensing but also spinning out), one could intuitively
propose that intellectual property policies such as the Bayh Dole act would also
be indirectly correlated with spinout creation. Defining and most importantly
proving empirically these relationships between government policies, patent di-
rection and spinout creation is an avenue for future research. Goldfarb and Hen-
rekson (2003) published an interesting study towards this direction linking Swe-
den’s poor record on spinout creation, with the country’s policies, which has
largely ignored the importance of setting-up incentives for universities and aca-
demics to pursue commercialisation of technology.
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The industry can stimulate the spinout phenomenon by actively engaging in
university industry collaboration. The collaboration activities can range from
joint R&D projects with spinout companies or universities, technology consult-
ing and contract research to technology purchases (Motohashi, 2005). Further-
more, the industry can support spinouts by developing well functioning financial
markets, like the NASDAQ and NASDAQ Europe, which are essential for high
technology entrepreneurship (Van Looy et al., 2003). They provide venture
capitalists with incentives to invest in early stage technologies and to initial
public offering (IPO) their spinout ‘babies’ with immense capital gains. In addi-
tion, the importance of a well-established local industry which can provide sup-
pliers, partners and buyers to young spin-out companies is also well-documented
in the strategy literature (Porter, 1990).
2.4.2 Technology and Market driven commercialisation
This research stream focused on explaining which inventions will be successfully
commercialised by firm formation, looking at the technology and market factors
that are beneficial to spin-out creation. Shane (2001a) attempted to reconcile
earlier contradictory findings, and proposed that the tendency for an invention
to be exploited through firm creation varies with the attributes of the technol-
ogy regime (the age of the technical field, the tendency of the market toward
segmentation, the effectiveness of patents, and the importance of complemen-
tary assets), testing his framework empirically. Lowe (1993) also provided a
conceptual framework of favourable market preconditions for technology trans-
fer mechanisms in general, by revealing spinout companies are most likely to
form when complementary assets are of high availability to university and/or
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inventor and the technology used is under strong legal and technical protection.
Further, Lowe stated that spinouts are more likely to appear in emerging indus-
tries where technological trajectories are still evolving and where innovation is
radical. Empirical evidence on this framework is still missing. Generally, we be-
lieve that there is scope for more empirical work that systematically consoli-
dates, puts order and tests the predictions of current conceptual frameworks.
2.5 Meso Level studies
2.5.1 University support mechanisms
The changing role of universities from ‘knowledge production’ to ‘capitalisation
of knowledge’ with the objective of improving regional or national economic per-
formance as well as the university’s financial advantage and that of its faculty
(Etzkowitz et al., 2000) led to increasing commercialisation activities among
universities in the last two decades. Many universities introduced technology in-
cubators (see Mian, 1997, Link and Scott, 2005), science and technology parks
(usually larger, often government-funded developments to accommodate local
NTBF’s in general and not only spinouts) and subsidy programs (Shane,
2002b). Of 52 UK universities in 1987, 34 had formal science parks (Monck et
al. 1988). Cooper (1984) argued that incubators affect the spinout rate and the
patterns of success of newly found ventures by mentoring them and by provid-
ing human capital support. However, the evaluative literature on science and
technology parks is neither conclusive on their effectiveness (see MacDonald,
1987; Miller and Cote, 1987; Massey et al., 1992, Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003)
nor on a framework for their systematic understanding (Phan et al., 2005).
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Another emerging support vehicle of spinout creation is the Technology Trans-
fer Office (TTO) operated by universities. TTO’s play an active role in com-
mercializing university research by identifying, protecting, marketing and licens-
ing intellectual property developed by faculty. Studies that analysed systemati-
cally the productivity impact of TTO’s focused more on the effectiveness of
technological diffusion through licensing rather than spinning out (Siegel et al.,
2003). Spinout related studies focusing on the TTO appeared only recently by
Lockett and Wright (2005) and Powers and McDougall (2005) who found that
the size and experience of a technology transfer office has positive influence on
spinout activity.
2.5.2 University based determinants of spinout activity
Besides tangible organisational units such as incubators and TTO’s, universities
can offer a supportive organisational culture towards entrepreneurship. Henrek-
son and Rosenberg (2001) found that pertinent incentive structures that pro-
mote entrepreneurial culture can explain why an overall flourishing economy
like Sweden has modest success with academic entrepreneurship.
Recent studies debated which university related determinants of spinout activity
can explain inter-university variation of spinout creation. Lockett and Wright
(2005) examined the determinants of spinout formation under the lens of the
knowledge based view of the firm and found that the business development ca-
pabilities of technology transfer offices and the royalty regime of the universities
are positively associated with spinout formation. Feldman et al. (2002) found
that the university’s use of equity is positively correlated to prior experience
with technology transfer, to success in relation to other institutions, and to
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structural characteristics related to the type of university. Recent studies used
the resource based view to give further evidence that the resource stock of uni-
versities and the combination of resources are highly important to explain inter-
university variations of spinout activity (Link and Scott, 2005, O’Shea et al,
2005).
It is important to keep in mind that the spinout phenomenon is relatively new
for the majority of the universities especially in Europe (institutions such as
MIT and Stanford which have tradition and experience in spinning out technol-
ogy companies are the exceptions rather than the rule). Therefore, universities
are currently experimenting, creating rules and procedures and (hopefully)
learning from practice (Birley, 2002 gives an experience-based account of the is-
sues faced at Imperial College London).
2.5.3 Effectiveness of spinning out as a university technology
transfer mechanism
Rogers et al. (2001) identified 5 different technology transfer mechanisms from
universities (spin-offs, licensing, meetings, publications, and cooperative R&D
agreements) out of which technology licensing and spinning out of ventures were
the ones with the highest commercialisation value. A stream of research exam-
ined favourable conditions for universities to commercialise technology in form
of USO’s as opposed to licensing.
Universities have traditionally exhibited great reluctance to take equity posi-
tions in spin-off firms (Brown, 1985). Shane (2002a) suggested that university
inventors become entrepreneurs because of the failures in the market of knowl-
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edge, suggesting that “inventor entrepreneurship is a second-best solution to the
commercialisation of new technology”. However, agreements in which a univer-
sity takes equity position in a company in exchange for providing the right to
use university intellectual property is becoming an emerging mechanism and the
focus of interest of many universities (Feldman et al., 2002). Jensen and
Thursby (2001) argued that equity investments not only provide the same de-
velopment incentives as royalties (because both are based on output sales) but
also generate greater revenue. This is consistent with the study by Bray and Lee
(2000) who found that spinning-out is a far more effective technology transfer
mechanism compared to licensing, as it creates a 10 times higher income, and
therefore argued that license positions are only taken when “technology is not
suitable for a spin-off company”. An interesting insight into the decision making
process of commercializing an invention in form of a licensing agreement or
spinout was provided by Druilhe and Garnsey (2004). Using a case based meth-
odology they showed that the business models of commercialization can be al-
tered from licensing to spinning out and vice versa as academic entrepreneurs
improve their knowledge of resources and opportunities.
2.6 Micro Level studies
2.6.1 Role of founders and founding team
Nicolaou and Birley (2003a) proposed a trichotomous categorization of univer-
sity spinouts based on the founder role of academics, namely technological, hy-
brid and orthodox spinouts. An orthodox spinout involves both the academic
inventor(s) and the technology spinning out from the institution, a hybrid spin-
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out involves the technology spinning out and the academic(s) retaining his or
her university position, but holding a position within the company, and a tech-
nology spinout involves the technology spinning out but the academic maintain-
ing no connection with the newly established firm.
The literature generally debated the effect of the involvement and role of aca-
demic and/or surrogate entrepreneurs on the performance of spinouts. Doutri-
aux (1987) and Roberts (1991a) reported that many spinouts start on a part-
time basis (the academics keep their position at the university and “moonlight”
into the new firm) and questioned their success. In an early study, Olofson and
Wahlbin (1984) linked academic exodus with growth, finding that spinouts with
the highest growth rates were the ones involving academics who left the univer-
sity. The advantage of keeping the academics involved in the spinout process
and close to the new venture can be due to the increasing effectiveness of the
technology transfer achieved (Roberts and Hauptman, 1986).
Clarysse and Moray (2004) offered another view on the role of human capital in
spinout creation, illustrating the possibility that the academic founder and his
team evolve and learn over time during their entrepreneurial involvement. The
study suggests that instead of hiring a CEO at the start-up of the company, it
might be a more efficient choice to ‘‘coach’’ the start-up team and give them
the time and freedom to learn (Clarysse and Moray, 2004). External shocks such
as a capital increase restructure the organisation at a later stage. The study
highlights further problems of involving surrogate entrepreneurs, including their
high turnover, their problems in accepting the academics as well as their lack of
technical understanding (Clarysse and Moray, 2004).
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So do surrogate entrepreneurs contribute to the success and performance of uni-
versity spinouts and are academics (who are perceived to have limited business
knowledge and industrial experience) suitable entrepreneurs? Researchers have
argued differently in addressing this question, based on their dissimilar findings.
Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) e.g. concluded that spin-out companies in practice
are highly variable scenarios and defy any formulaic approach. In general, the
literature indicated that spinning out from academia is a complex phenomenon,
because of the number and diversity of human parties involved (academic and
surrogate entrepreneurs, research students, research sponsors, lab and depart-
ment heads, TTO professionals, members and heads of university equity com-
mittees, university-nominated directors, investors) and of the conflicts of inter-
est that arise as a result of their interdependence (Birley, 2002).
2.6.2 Networks with University and Industry
Networks can facilitate the emergence of ventures by providing four substantial
benefits namely, augmenting the opportunity identification process, providing
access to loci of resources, engendering timing advantages, and constituting a
source of trust (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003a). During their pre- and post-
formation stages, spinouts and their founders are involved in networks with two
different entities, namely their parent organisation (university) and the industry
(industry partners, investors, contractors etc.). Recognising the importance of
networking in the spinout phenomenon, researchers explored the effect of net-
works on spinouts structure and performance.
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2.6.2.1 Networks with the university
Keeping post-formation links with the parent institution, can provide spinouts
with tangible resources such as laboratory facilities and access to research
equipment (Steffenson et al., 2000) as well as intangible resources such as access
to human capital and scientific and business knowledge (Rappert et al., 1999).
Research focused on the characteristics as well as on the effects of ties between
universities and spinout companies. It was found that the proximity to parent
institutions had beneficial effect on spinout performance after the spinout for-
mation (Roberts, 1991a, Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2004), and that the network rela-
tions between USO and universities are based on small number of strong ties to
universities, with a high degree of trust and informality (Johansson et al., 2005).
In contrast, Lee et al. (2001) examined external networks of technology start-
ups (not spinouts from academic institutions) and found that only networks to
venture capital investors predicted start-up performance. Rappert et al. (1999)
confirmed that due to their origins, university spinouts had a wider range of
contacts and attached a greater importance to formal and informal contacts in
universities than similar start-ups formed independently of universities.
Perez and Sanchez (2003) focused on the evolutionary aspect of spinout net-
works, stressing that networking towards the university decreased after their
early years, with a shift of focus towards networking with customers.
2.6.2.2 Networks with industry
Interaction with industry is essential in order to gather relevant information
about the new business, to find external support and services, to access external
resources not available in-house, to promote the new company, and to look for
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business advice (Birley, 1985). As a result inter-industrial networks can have
positive impact, cultivating new venture success and growth (Van de Ven,
1984). University spinouts are networking with several industrial parties during
their pre and post start-up phase like venture capital investors, partners, com-
petitors, and customers.
Grandi and Grimaldi (2003) investigated academic founding teams, their inten-
tion to set up relations with industrial partners and the frequency of their inter-
actions. They found that when certain articulation of roles emerges in teams
and when they are incomplete, they are more likely to interact with external
agents. Further, founders of spinouts will interact (even increasingly) after spin-
out formation with their own ties of personal networks (Grandi and Grimaldi,
2003), which makes social capital endowments of founders in pre-formation
stages crucial.
Nicolaou and Birley (2003b) found a link between pre-formation networking
(the academics’ embeddedness in a network of endoinstitutional and exoinstitu-
tional ties) and the spinout structure (orthodox, technology or hybrid spinout).
They then suggested that the structure of a spinout, depending on the ties the
academic founders, could influence its growth trajectories (i.e. performance).
This logic (networks affect structure which affects performance) requires further
empirical testing.
Shane and Stuart (2002) offered empirical evidence of the network-performance
relationship, analysing how social capital endowments of the founders affect the
likelihood of three critical outcomes of spinouts: attracting venture capital fi-
nancing, experiencing IPO’s and fail. Direct and indirect linkages to investors
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were found to be constructive to receiving venture funding and reduced the like-
lihood of spinout failure. Receiving venture funding was the single most impor-
tant determinant for the spinout to experience an IPO. Therefore, personal net-
works of founders had a long-term positive effect on spinout performance.
Lockett et al. (2003) confirmed the importance of networks, at the level of the
university (meso level). In a study measuring perceptions of TTO’s, they found
that more successful universities had generally a stronger working relationship
with venture capital investors and possessed greater amount of networks to the
industry.
2.6.2.3 Performance of USO’s
Although spinout performance has been researched sporadically in the past
partly because of the relative newness of the spinout phenomenon, recent stud-
ies are increasingly researching this aspect. Performance has been studied under
a multi dimensional framework including the analysis of survival rates, profit-
ability and growth rates. It is well documented that failure rates of USO’s are
well below the national average in the USA and European countries (Degroof
and Roberts, 2004; AUTM, 2002; UNICO, 2001). Still it is inconclusive if the
higher survival rates of spinouts can be attributed to higher fitness of USO’s or
rather to support systems of their parent organization that are keeping them
‘alive’; Rothaermel and Thursby (2005) found that spinouts with strong ties to
their parent organizations were less likely to fail but also less likely to success-
fully graduate within a timely manner. Moreover, in a comparison between new
technology-based ventures and university spinouts Ensley and Hmieleski (2005)
showed that spinouts were not necessarily better performers. They showed that
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the latter were significantly lower performing in terms of cash flow and revenue
growth and that their top management teams were less dynamic and more ho-
mogenous. These findings show that survival rates might not be ideal measures
of spinout performance and that support mechanisms can as well be counter-
productive. Future research should disentangle these findings and explain under
what circumstances support mechanisms of parent institutions can be beneficial
versus detrimental.
Further studies that focused on the determinants of spinout performance looked
at the policy setting of universities and TTO’s and found that policies can have
increasing effect on the potential growth of ventures (Degroof and Roberts,
2004). Moreover, it was found that linkages to different actors, such as clients,
research labs, parent university and particularly investors are important deter-
minants of success and performance (Mustar, 1997, Shane and Stuart, 2002).
2.7 Directions for further research
We illustrated that the spinout literature is vibrant and the recent increase in
the number of studies can prove that. Although a number of scholars postulated
that the literature on spinouts has been mainly accumulative and atheoretical
(e.g. Autio, 2000), we see recently a positive trend towards theory-driven studies
(they increasing from 5% to 49% in the past four years). We showed that the
phenomenon was studied from different points of view and units of analysis
(government level, university level and firm/individual level). To give a struc-
tured picture of a rather diverse literature we organised the studies under three
broad headings (macro- meso- and micro- level studies).
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We observed a strong increase recently in primary spinout literature which
shows that the spinout phenomenon is becoming more mature. As spinout life
cycles are becoming more transparent, we expect further studies to focus more
on performance and untangle if and where differences exist between spinouts
and independent new technology based companies. This is especially important
since it defines the legitimacy to study spinouts as a phenomenon on its own.
Moreover, we think that there is scope for further research on the post-
formation product development and growth of spinout companies. How do spin-
outs develop commercial products from an initial technology, with their limited
resources? Roberts (1991b) illustrated the importance of product development
(in contrast with research work) as source of the founding technology. The new
product development literature focused more on established firms and not on
young technology companies (Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001). The broader litera-
ture on growth of new technology based firms is a good starting point (for a re-
view see Autio, 2000) as well as the literature on technology alliances (it is very
common for spinouts to look for industrial partners in order to co-develop their
technology).
We believe that the evaluation of spinning out as a commercialization strategy
of universities and their TTO’s deserves further research attention in the future.
Bozeman (2000) summarised results of the wider technology transfer literature
and developed a 5-dimensional taxonomy of the reasons for technology transfer,
which inspires some important but yet unanswered research questions related
with the university-driven commercialisation stream. What is the measure of
success for the university TTO’s? Are universities focusing on ‘quality’ spinouts
that have significant potential for success and financial gain? Or is quantity
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their target, i.e. a high ‘spinout rate’, aiming to increase their perceived reputa-
tion, attract government funding and justify the expense for their TTO’s? This
‘quantity versus quality’ question should trigger a more in-depth theory-driven
exploration of the institutional structure and strategic objectives of Universities
and their TTO’s and also of the career path and reward structure of the new
breed of technology transfer professionals. This is a good direction for future re-
search (especially as the phenomenon matures) aiming to identify the character-
istics of universities and TTO’s capable of spinning out ‘successful’ firms.
We believe that a very conducive route for further research is to untangle what
an entrepreneurial culture within the university exactly means, how it is
achieved and what effect it has on the spinout creation. From a theoretical
point of view, we suggest a link of the university spinout process with the litera-
ture on organisational culture. Moreover, we propose that future studies should
systematically evaluate the impact of entrepreneurship programmes, business
plan competitions, networking events, and incentive / reward structures. From
a theoretical angle it would be interesting to link such activities with knowledge
theory (what exactly, if any, do technical academics learn?) Also studies should
investigate the effect of the above entrepreneurship related activities on the
academics’ entrepreneurial intention and subsequent action.
We argue further that there is scope for theory-driven research on the power-
relationships between the various stakeholders and their effect on the spinout
process and outcome. For example, one of the most frustrating events for spin-
out teams is the equity split between the university, the entrepreneur, the team
of inventors (each one contributing in some way to the invention) and (often at
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a later stage) the investor. What drives the equity split? Apart from negotiating
skills, we propose that the role of the involved individuals within the academic
institution (i.e. their ‘day job’) and their power-dependence is crucial for the
outcome. Dependency relationships might influence various other decisions re-
garding university spinouts, such as whether the academic leaves or stays in the
university, the selection of the people who act as technical consultants and uni-
versity-nominated directors and the use of university resources (such as labs) by
the new company. Further research is required to define more clearly and prove
empirically such arguments.
Another interesting area for further enquiry is to explore the interaction be-
tween networks and other potential determinants of spinout structure and per-
formance, such as the personal values and behaviour of the academic entrepre-
neurs. Currently, the literature on networks in spinout research seems to treat
networking somehow independently from other factors determining the spinout
process. An interesting research question is how networks come into existence,
what fosters them and how they influence success and performance of spinouts.
In a recent review of the network literature in entrepreneurship Hoang and An-
toncic (2003) called for more process, longitudinal research, with network con-
structs as the ‘dependent’ variable.
Furthermore, there is scope for focusing on the academic entrepreneurs as the
unit of analysis, linking the spinout phenomenon with entrepreneurship theory
on opportunity identification (for the construct and theory of opportunity see
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Ardichvili et al. 2003). It would be interesting
to investigate how technological opportunities are actually identified within an
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academic environment and why some scientists do identify them and decide to
pursue them while others do not.
We claim that the complexity of the spinout phenomenon due to the different
parties, relationships and processes involved makes it an ideal context for test-
ing and extending theory and that there is plenty of scope for further work to
untangle and understand it thoroughly. We agree with Locket et al (2005) that
multi-level studies are required to increase the understanding of the spin-out
phenomenon. Overall, we propose that the key for future work is to ask the
most interesting and practical phenomenon-specific questions but then tackle
them with the most theoretical explanations.
Spinning out from academic institutions is currently a booming phenomenon,
which will probably attract increasing research attention in the coming years. In
this paper we have reviewed and organised the existing spinout literature, to
achieve a double aim a) to help newcomers into this exciting field to identify
what we already know and b) to offer fresh ideas for future research directions.
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3 Real option theory
Real option theory is derived from the financial option modelling including No-
bel Prize winning option models of Black-Scholes (1973). In contrast to their fi-
nancial counterparts, real options represent investments in (nonfinancial) assets
with an uncertain payoff that convey the right, but not the obligation, to exer-
cise the investment, should the total payoff look attractive (Damodaran, 2001).
Options are protected against downside risk, since the expiration of the option
without exercising can only lead to the loss of the right (option premium) rather
than the whole investment itself. Conversely, ordinary financial options are de-
tailed in the contract and its parameters known, whereas characteristics of real
options must be identified and specified (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999). The
underlying asset for a financial option is a publicly traded security and is easily
observable. With real options, the underlying asset is not publicly traded and
has to be calculated.
3.1 Competing Theories
Firm entry and licensing has traditionally been discussed from several theoreti-
cal perspectives. The main being addressed in literature are behavioural, re-
source based, transaction cost theory and the neoclassical investment theory.
Other forms of governance structures such as licensing were discussed under
these theoretical frameworks but not in a rigorous manner (Ziedonis, 2007).
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It was shown by Busenitz and Barney (1997) that entrepreneurs can be subject
to cognitive biases when setting up a new firm. Further personal desire to be-
come an entrepreneur will contribute to that fact (Evans and Leighton, 1989).
Access to suitable resources and the costs of those resources (including opportu-
nity cost) are heavily influencing the firm formation decision. Capital availabil-
ity (Acs and Audretsch, 1989), stronger social ties and networks (Aldrich and
Zimmer, 1986) and prior experience (Cooper et al., 1989) have been shown to be
important factors that influence the exploitation entrepreneurial opportunities.
The transaction cost economic approach within the theory of the firm (William-
son 1985, Williamson 1991) has been used traditionally to address uncertainty
and the entry decision. Therefore both real options theory and transaction cost
economics deal with similar issues in respect to the firm formation but with im-
portant differences which will be discussed in more detail. Transaction cost eco-
nomics (TCE) identifies the most transaction cost efficient form of coordination
between sellers and buyers and defines which forms of coordination (such as
markets, hierarchies or hybrid forms of coordination) is most likely to occur.
TCE moves away from the strong form of rationality and assumes bounded ra-
tionality and that cognitive constraints limit human behavior. However, indi-
viduals try to maximize their utility within their cognitive constraints (William-
son 1985) while being risk-neutral.
At the center of transaction cost economics is asset specificity which illuminates
that an investment made to support a particular transaction can have a higher
value to that transaction than they would have if they were redeployed for any
other purpose. More precisely, given the attribute of asset specificity, TCE ana-
lyzes which form of coordination is most appropriate to minimize transaction
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costs and subsequently which form of structure will be chosen to govern the
transaction. According to TCE, the transaction cost minimizing governance
structures should be chosen to protect the partners against behavioral.
At first glance it can be seen that real option theory and transaction cost theory
show several parallels. Both approaches address the important influence of se-
quential decision making under uncertainty. In contrast to that both approaches
differ in their assumptions on rationality of the agents involved. On one hand
TCE assumes bounded rationality whereas ROT uses an unbounded rationality
perspective. In the second perspective, there is no necessity to organize the
transaction within the firm. Moreover, both approaches focus on different ori-
gins of uncertainty. While TCE concentrates on the governance structure to re-
duce behavioral uncertainty, the real options approach mainly focuses on envi-
ronmental (exogenous) types of uncertainty. Further ROT can include techno-
logical (endogenous) uncertainty in its theoretical framework which will be dis-
cussed in more detail in this thesis.  Since both approaches deal with different
types of uncertainty affecting economic organization, the real option approach
can expand understanding on the types of uncertainty the TCE theory does not
focus on (i.e. environmental and technological uncertainty).
Another theoretical angle to look at the different governance structures dis-
cussed in this thesis is the neoclassical investment theory which focuses on the
new present value (NPV) of an investment and estimates the value of a project
by taking its expected value of future cash flows and discounts them at the risk-
free rate to the present. According to this neoclassical perspective, managers
should enter when the NPV is above zero or exit when the remaining value falls
below zero. The NPV approach assumes no flexibility in decision making and
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does not account for any optionality in the decision making process of the inves-
tor. It calculates the value of the investment considering that the investment is
totally reversible (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) meaning that the investment can be
totally recovered if it turns out to be worse than anticipated. If e.g. the firm is
able to recover all costs from an investment, there is no advantage of delaying
an investment. Further, if the investment were unsuccessful, the firm would
simply discontinue development and recoup its investment. An important fea-
ture of real options is therefore that the underlying investment is irreversible,
which is true for most real life investments. The ability to delay an irreversible
investment can affect the value of the investment and subsequently the decision
to invest (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Therefore NPV calculations that fail to
recognize the value of options will systematically undervalue investment oppor-
tunities. In traditional settings NPV analysis is applicable especially in situa-
tions where the analysis returns a large and positive net present value and the
results do not necessarily require any further validation. Furthermore when
there are no large uncertainties regarding the underlying investment, NPV
analysis is an acceptable approach. On the other hand real options analysis can
more accurately assess the nature of an investment if large uncertainties are pre-
sent, the future growth of the investment is a significant source of investment
value and when sequential investments are possible.
The power of real option theory compared to the neoclassical investment theory
therefore lies in the understanding of the effects of uncertainty and incorporat-
ing it into a valuation framework where other standard valuation and strategic
planning tools have limitations (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999). It is important
to grasp the key concept of option theory, irrespective if they are financial or
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real options. Option theory embraces uncertainty and sees it as a necessity that
can enhance the value of options. It appreciates that uncertainty creates oppor-
tunities and options provide companies or managers with the right to act on
them and each additional option that is embedded in an investment increases
its value.
Therefore the reason for choosing the real option framework becomes evident
from two main perspectives. The first one which is output specific enables us
to put different events like firm formation, licensing, firm failure and licensing
termination under one theoretical framework. These different outcomes previ-
ously needed to be explained by different theoretical frameworks. The exception
is neoclassical investment theory which on the other hand lacks the importance
of uncertainty on the investment entry/ exit decision in its discussion. This
brings us to the second perspective which is input specific. We have shown
that uncertainty has been put under a theoretical framework (i.e. behavioural
uncertainty in TCE approach) but ROT is the framework that enables us to
discuss exogenous and endogenous uncertainties and their respective effects at
the same time.
3.2 Types of Real Options
Different types of real options have been identified in real investment problems
and can be summarized as follows:
Option to defer or delay investment
Options to defer or delay usually exist when there is a value of waiting for some
uncertain event to resolve before committing to an investment. The option cap-
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tures the value of being able not to commit to an investment now but rather
wait until uncertainty is resolved.
Option to expand or contract
This option refers to altering operating scale depending on market conditions,
including shutting down temporarily (mothballing) and restarting when condi-
tions become favourable again.
Option to abandon or terminate unprofitable projects
Being able to terminate the project while in the phase of an investment is an
option that has value if the project turns out to have negative value during the
phase of investment. The abandonment
Option to switch, change inputs or outputs
Companies that can switch from one input to another during course of invest-
ment when one input becomes more valuable than the other possess an option
to switch use e.g. a refinery that can use both oil and electricity as inputs. If
one of the energy inputs becomes uneconomical the company can alter the in-
put.
Option to stage
A company can break up its investment into incremental phases (sequential in-
vestment) where the payoff occurs only after the project is completed e.g. in-
vesting in R&D and commercialization processes for bringing a new drug to
market.
Option to grow
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This involves investing in an initial market, product line or technology to de-
velop a platform for future growth opportunities. Even if the initial investment
might have negative value, the value of the subsequent (growth) investment can
bring value to the investment project and make it economically viable.
3.3 Applications of Real options theory
Two main application streams that use real option theory have emerged. The
first is intrinsic to financial literature and can be referred to as financial engi-
neering. In this context contracts and investments are valued using real option
theory. The aim of this research stream is to quantify the value of options. This
stream has had a great impact on investment practice and real option valuation
is emerging as a new standard for valuing, selecting and managing strategic in-
vestments and existing companies (Standard and Poors, 2004). Real options are
preferred to e.g. traditional discounted cash flow (DCF) valuations of new firms
because such firms face high degrees of uncertainty, have no track record and
have negative cash flows. This is because DCF’s tend to undervalue firms by
not considering their future options (e.g. the possibility that patents could allow
the firm to enter new markets) (Damodaran, 2001). Furthermore, real option
theory has been used to value companies that have high market to book values
by incorporating growth options of companies in their valuation.
The second application uses real option theory from a qualitative perspective to
explain decisions of firms and individuals under uncertainty. The theoretical
framework of real options has created excitement in the management literature
in recent years (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001; McGrath, 1997) and several re-
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search works have adopted real option reasoning to explain and analyse phe-
nomena by gaining new and unique insights (Miller & Shapira, 2004; O'Brien et
al. 2003; Miller & Arikan, 2004). According to McGrath (1999), real option rea-
soning can provide the conceptual foundation for new perspectives on the dy-
namics of performance, survival and choice in entrepreneurship as well as a
valuable addition to established theories of learning, decision-making, and or-
ganization.
The rather wide applicability of real option theory, due to its generality and its
scope for a wide range of applications, has caused a debate among academics
about its boundaries and what units of analysis can be modelled as real options
(Adner and Levinthal, 2004). Table 3-1 gives examples of the applicability of
real options in recent literature.
Table 3-1: Applicability of real options in recent literature
Real options as Reference
Buyouts Folta and Miller, 2001
Joint ventures Kogut, 1991
Equity stakes in partner Folta and Miller, 2002
Incremental R&D investments McGrath and Nerkar, 2004
Entrepreneurial initiatives McGrath, 1999
Firm capabilities Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001
Incremental capital investments Hurry et al., 1992
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3.4 Patents as real options
The paradox of innovation is that it does not provide the innovator with an in-
centive to commercialize it. Innovators have to make large investments in de-
veloping new technologies and knowledge which can then be almost costlessly
imitated when the innovator demonstrates the new idea to the world (Arrow,
1962). To create incentives to innovate, intellectual property rights (IPR’s) are
required to give the innovator the right to control the use of the innovation and
hence the revenues from it. One of the most common IPR’s are patents which
are government-sponsored monopolies, designed to reward the inventor by pro-
viding him with incentive to risk time, effort, and money in developing new
technologies.3 (see e.g. Lerner, 19944).
A patent provides the patent holder, or patentee, with the right to exclude oth-
ers from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing an invention for a
limited period of time without permission from the holder. The patentee then
has the option either to commercialize the patent by exploiting its features him-
self or to sell it to others in form of a license, usually for a fee known as the
royalty. The license provides the owner with the legal right to use the innova-
tion for a fixed period of time. In the UK a patent is legally protected for 20
years from the date the patent is granted but is typically far shorter as we will
show later. The monopoly regulation encourages innovation while the eventual
extinction of the rights permits diffusion. Through a governmental regulation of
3 Another important form is copyrights.
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the market of innovations, the paradox of innovation mentioned earlier is re-
solved through the possibility to protect the innovation through a patent.
Universities that have developed a patent have two possibilities open for com-
mercial gain: either set up a business itself to exploit the patent (i.e. create a
spinout company) or license the innovation to someone else. Exercise of the op-
tion then consists in the decision to make an investment in a start-up company;
non-exercise consists in waiting and deferring the exercise to a later point in
time and selling the option refers to licensing it out. We will take a similar ap-
proach to Kogut (1991) who has exemplified joint ventures as real options and
observed the exercise of the option as the acquisition of the venture (spinout).
In financial option theory, two types of options can be distinguished, namely
put and call options. A put option provides its owner with the right, but not
the obligation, to sell the underlying asset, where as the call option provides the
owner with the right to buy it within a fixed period of time called the exercise
period. Both types of options can be differentiated further into European and
American options, where European options can only be exercised at expiry date
while American options can be exercised at any point in time. In terms of real
option theory, the patent presents an American call option as it provides the
company or institution that owns it with the right to make the investment and
commercialize the patent at any point in time up to the end of the patent’s life.
The exercise period for this real option is thus the life of the patent. Licensing is
equivalent to selling the right to set up a firm to produce using the patent, and
corresponds in finance to selling the American call option.
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For an existing company that possesses a patent, the exercise of the option
would mean an investment in a commercialization project within the company,
whereas for a university exercising the option is only possible via the setting up
of a hierarchical form of governance like a new company (i.e. university spinout
company). Selling the patent to another company (licensing) can be considered
equal to selling the option and distributing the right of commercialisation to an-
other entity. Therefore, universities are faced with three possibilities, when fac-
ing the decision to commercialize a patent. They can sell the patent and gain
royalties, commercialize the patent in form of a spinout or hold the patent and
wait.
Much of the financial option theory is based on the work of Black and Scholes
(1973), who have developed a valuation method that can value European op-
tions (options that cannot be exercised before its expiration date). The value of
options prior to expiration is according to Black and Scholes (1973) given by
C = f (S, X, σ, D, T, r)
Although patents represent American options (options that can be exercised be-
fore its expiration date) the framework of Black and Scholes can also be used to
qualitatively assess the key influencing factors on real option value (Damodaran,
2001). Therefore, replicating the Black and Scholes equation and transferring it
into the university setting can provide a rudimentary starting point to value the
option. Table 3-2: Comparison of financial and real options
shows the factors that influence the spinout option.
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Table 3-2: Comparison of financial and real options
Factor Financial Options Real Options (RO) Comment
C Value of right to buy the underlying
asset at a price X within time period T
American call option value Value of selling the patent or equivalently of sell-
ing the right to commercialise the patent to an
outsider to the university
Real option value is not traded in the market and has to
be estimated.
S Value of underlying asset Current Share price Present values of the cash flows that would be ob-
tained from the spinout
Underlying value is not traded in the market and has to be
estimated
X Strike price share price on which financial
option is exercised
cost of commercializing the patent and developing
necessary technology into a spinout usually repre-
senting investment cost
Strike price for RO is time variant and follows a random
process due to input and technology uncertainty (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994)
σ Volatility of underlying asset Volatility of share price Volatility of underlying investment RO market uncertainty cannot be observed in the market
like e.g. implied volatility. Further it has to be estimated
from a ‘twin security’ that is traded in the market
 Volatility of exercise price Volatility of exercise price Volatility of technology
D Dividends Dividends to shareholders Expected dividend payments of investing in spin-
out
T Time to expiration Time to expiration of option Effective time to expiration of patent or time until
investment in spinout can be deferred
RO expiry can change due to e.g. exogenous shocks like
entry of competition
r Riskless interest rate Opportunity cost of invest-
ment
Opportunity cost of commercializing the patent
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Value of underlying asset (S)
Patents protect technologies and processes and would be of no value if the firm
has no intention to commercialise them. Universities can use patents to com-
mercialize new products, develop processes in-house that are protected, license
the intellectual property (IP) to other companies but also have the option to
spinout new companies. The value of the underlying asset (S) refers to the cu-
mulative revenues and cash flows that the patent can generate if it is commer-
cialized in form of a spinout and equals the net present value of the spinout (in-
cluding expected future cash flows as well as future growth opportunities).
Cost of investment(X)
The exercise price or strike price X is in financial terms the fixed price the un-
derlying stock can be bought with the call option or sold with the put option. In
real option terms it is the initial cost of the investment project. This cost of in-
vestment can be distinguished into the cost of commercialization and cost of
technology development (McGrath, 1997). The cost of commercialization refers
to the cost to create the necessary infrastructure, market the technology as well
as acquire the right people. Technology development costs can be considered as
investments to create a commercial technology, namely R&D efforts, design,
prototyping, testing, idea and model development expenses since patents are
usually in a premature commercial phase. Ex post the development cost can be
calculated and estimated whereas ex ante the development cost underlies differ-
ent uncertainties, which will be considered later.
Option Value (C)
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Option value C represents the value of the patent that can lead to a spinout
and therefore the value of the spinout option. Viewed from the present it is the
expected maximum of the difference at exercise between the underlying invest-
ment value (St) and the commercialization cost (X) and the return to leaving
the option to expire worthless (0). The profit from exercise at expiration is sim-
ply the difference between S and X provided this is positive (option is ‘in the
money’). This wealth increment to the university is the return to of the present
value (PV) of cash flows from the business S minus the cost of setting up the
business X.
Market and Technology Uncertainty (σ, )
Real options are susceptible to a wider range of uncertainties than e.g. financial
options, which value is only affected by the uncertainty regarding the underly-
ing asset (stock price volatility). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have shown that real
options on investments are disposed to two main uncertainties namely, price
and cost uncertainty. Price uncertainty refers to the uncertainty of the future
value of an investment. Cost uncertainty on the other hand encompasses the
uncertainty regarding the cost of the investment (opposed to its payoff) and has
different implications for the likelihood of investment and its timing. Price and
cost uncertainty are also apparent in university spinouts. Price uncertainty can
be understood as the uncertainty regarding the future value of the spinout. Cost
uncertainty on the other hand can be inferred to as the uncertainty regarding
the cost of investment. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have further divided cost un-
certainty into input cost uncertainty and technological uncertainty. Input cost
uncertainty cannot be influenced by the investor itself and arises e.g. when a
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spinout needs material and resources to build a factory and the prices of these
materials and resources vary stochastically over time. Input cost uncertainty is
therefore external as the spinout cannot take any action to influence it. On the
other hand the technological uncertainty considers how much time, effort and
resources the entrepreneurs will need to physically develop the technology into a
commercial stage and relates to the costs and probabilities of technological suc-
cess (McGrath, 1997).. Technological uncertainty can therefore be influenced di-
rectly by the entrepreneurs’ competence, experience and ability. However, it too,
will have an exogenous component.
Unlike other empirical studies that only evaluate effects of price uncertainties
like e.g. demand or market uncertainty; we will include also cost uncertainty in
our study. To accommodate uncertainty regarding underlying value (price un-
certainty) we will look at the market uncertainty (σm) of the particular indus-
try.
Expected Dividend Payments (D)
Expected dividend payments indicate the expectations regarding the earnings an
investment can generate in the future. The higher the expected dividend pay-
ments for investing now, the higher the opportunity cost of delaying commer-
cialization. Expected dividend payments are not only a financial dimension but
can also represent expected first mover advantages, gain of experience etc. In
the next chapter the dividends will be elaborated in detail.
Duration of Option (T)
In optimal case the duration T is equal to the time until expiration of the pat-
ent, which is normally 20 years from the patent publishing date. But patents do
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not exist in a vacuum and competition is agile to imitate or substitute the pat-
ent if the invention is of high value. Therefore T represents the effective patent
life, which is influenced by competition and is normally shorter than 20 years.
Mansfield et al. (1981) reported that 60 per cent of patented innovations were
imitated within 4 years. This shows that patenting has not the aim to prevent
but rather to delay imitation and substitution. It is the competition that real-
izes the value of the commercial opportunity and tries to imitate or substitute
the patent and therefore reduce its expiration date. Therefore, time to expira-
tion T is often determined by the time competitors takes to enter the market
and excess returns of the patent diminish.
Risk free rate of return (r)
R is the risk free rate of return. Although the risk-free rate of return may also
have a bearing on the optimal timing for real options, its influence is weak and
ambiguous for real options (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Similar to Folta and
Miller (2002) we may therefore neglect it in our study
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4 Patenting Processes and Patent Research
4.1 Patent Analysis and Patenting Process
Traditionally patent analysis was used for carrying out comparative research of
simple patent counts for purposes of identifying key technologies and their
origination. More recent approaches involve patent citation analysis that implies
many data-harvesting activities, ranging from simple documentary search of re-
lated papers and patents to more complex studies on trends in technology inno-
vation and development. In the last few years, patent citation analysis is being
increasingly used in technology and innovation research due to improved quality
of data as well as the availability of public databases that provide easy access to
researchers.
The patenting process can be summarized in two main steps
(http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/atoc.htm), namely producing the
search report, and checking for patentability of the invention.
4.1.1 Search Report
Upon submitting a new patent request, the patent office checks the originality
of the invention by checking relevant prior art where prior art refers to every-
thing which has been made available to the public anywhere in the world by
means of written disclosure. Patent search is the process of checking prior art to
determine if the invention involves an inventive step which requires a detailed
search of all documents publicly available before the international filling date,
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including other patents, books, journals which are categorized as non patent lit-
erature (NPL). Performed by the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) interna-
tional patent searching authority, this process analyses descriptions and draw-
ings contained in the new application and checks them against as many prior
art documents as possible, which is referred to as consulting the “minimum ref-
erences”. The result of this process is a fully documented patent search report,
which represents the outcome of the authority’s work of consulting large num-
bers of prior art documents that are in any way technically related to the pat-
ent application.
The information contained in the international patent search report must be de-
tailed and accurate and must show the classification of the technical subject of
the patent as well as cite all relevant prior art. Furthermore, for all cited docu-
ments, the relevant passages must be indicated by means of page number, line
or paragraph number in order to ensure clear identification. When documents
are linked only to specific claims it must be pointed out to which. Furthermore
the sources of the searched documents have to be documented including the
names of the databases and keywords used during the search process.
From the legal point of view, the patent search report is used to define the
scope of legal protection. By scanning all the citations, the search report allows
to set legal boundaries of the claims by establishing what knowledge was al-
ready available at the filing date. Based on the patent search report, an “as-
sessment of patentability” is created. Search reports assign grades to each cita-
tion, which divide the citations into categories of relevance. US search reports
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fall out of the general rule by not assigning relevance grades to citations and
have other diverging attributes that will be discussed later.
4.1.2 Patentability
Three different criteria need to be assessed to ensure patentability of a patent
application (Michel and Bettels, 2001):
 Novelty
 Inventive activity
 Industrial applicability
If one of these three criteria is not fulfilled, the patent application will not be
successful. Missing documents of technical importance in the patent search
process decrease therefore chances of a successful patent grant. The European
Patent Office states that a patent search report of good quality will contain
most information of technical importance in as few documents as possible. Usu-
ally the majority of important information can be obtained from 1-2 documents
(Michel and Bettels, 2001).
While all criteria have to be assessed, the difficulty of evaluation can differ
across categories. Checking for novelty can be an elaborate and complex task
but it is relatively straightforward as selected technical documents have to be
compared against the patent application. There can be much more debate over
the evaluation of the criteria of inventiveness. An answer has to be given as to
whether finding a solution to a given problem was obvious in view of the tech-
nically closest document, called the closest prior art. What is obvious or not can
be very tricky to evaluate and traditionally, different national or regional offices
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have taken different approaches to this problem. The process itself is complex
and defining what is obvious and what not can become a very delicate issue.
Various patenting offices have various policies related to inventive activity, and
each of them has different boundaries for delimiting this criterion. Due to vary-
ing requirements for the inventive steps across different patent offices, this can
result in a situation where the same patent is granted in one country and denied
in another. Industrial applicability can be usually assessed immediately without
requiring any particular further assessment.
4.2 Patent citation statistics
4.2.1 National applications
The US patent office (USPTO), the European patent office (EPO), German
patent office (DPMA) and the Japanese patent office (JPO) handle a total
share of 90% of all worldwide patent applications. A comparison of the Euro-
pean and US results reveals major differences for patent and non-patent cita-
tions. The citation numbers for the US patent office are in the order of 3 to 3.5
times higher than its European counterpart. European, UK and German offices
produce similar values of patent citations as the EPO, but less non-patent cita-
tions compared to the EPO. UK figures are a ca. 25% and German office figures
ca. 50% of the non patent citations compared to the European patent office
(Michel and Bettels, 2001).
The differences between US and European patent offices can be explained due
to differences in the legal environments. Every patent applicant in the US is
obliged by law to provide a thorough list of prior art citations upon filing for a
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patent otherwise the patent request will be rejected. This results in a very large
number of reference citations which can have both positive and negative effects
on the usefulness of patent citations. One is that selectivity of relevant patent
citations becomes more difficult but on the other hand coverage of the used
technology increases. The European patent offices on the other hand do not
bind the applicants legally to provide a list of prior art. Regardless of such a list
being supplied or not, both the EPO and the JPO thoroughly scan citations
relevant to the patentability of the invention as a part of the normal patentabil-
ity search process.
4.2.2 International applications
International applications according to the PCT permit simultaneous filing of a
patent application in more than 100 countries. The legal framework governing
the filing of international patents is subject to the PCT constituted by ten In-
ternational Search Authorities (ISA) that produce the required international
search report. All ISA’s have to respect the framework of the patentability
search report specified by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WPO).
The three major offices (EPO, JPO and USPTO) are responsible for processing
the largest number of international patent applications. Governed by a common
legal environment, the discrepancy among the number of citations of the three
offices disappears. The resulting figure of international patent applications is
approximately 4 references per application, which is close to what the same of-
fices, with the exception of the USPTO, are producing at a national scale mak-
ing the references of international patent application comparable to the EPO,
JPO and DPMA. When looking at the non patent citation (NPL) statistics for
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international applications the EPO produces one and a half times more NPL
than the USPTO.
If the same application is filed in more than one country, it will be called a pat-
ent family. The comparison will be made between average citations per patent
family and average citations per total patents (i.e. both those having and those
not having families). The USPTO is again about 3 times higher that the other
offices, with figures of 14.26 average citations per patents with families, and an
average of 12.96 citations for the total patents. The European office produces
values approximately similar for patents with families – 4.18 citations, and total
patents – 4.37 citations. Interestingly, both USPTO and EPO produce twice as
much NPL per patent families, than per total patents: EPO shows figures of
1.47 and 0.85, respectively, while USPTO is again 3-4 times higher with 6.29
and 2.98, respectively (Michel and Bettels, 2001).
Table 4-1 Frequency of Patent Application by patent office in the
Max Planck database
WPO EPO DE USPTO not applied
61.08% 15.95% 20.76% 2.21% 79.04%
Table 4-1 gives an overview of the frequency of Max Planck’s patenting fre-
quency grouped by patent office. The first decision of the technology transfer of-
fice when receiving an invention disclosure from one of its institutes is to decide
on the geographical scope of the patent application. As can be seen in Table 4-1
out of all patent applications the majority of technologies are applied to the
WPO (61%) where subsequently individual patents in individual countries can
be applied for. A relative large number of inventions are anticipated only for the
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local market (Germany, 20.7%). Max Planck has a minor fraction of patents
(2.2%) that are exclusively applied for at the USPTO. These patents were ig-
nored in the analyses in subsequent chapters in order not to skew the analysis
due to the differences in the patenting approach of the USPTO. The fraction of
invention disclosures that are not commercialized at all or are not going via the
patent route (e.g. secrecy agreements) is 79%. It should be noted that in the
analyses the patent applications rather patent grants are used as the basis for
observation of the invention.
4.2.3 Patent Citations and the Value of Patents
A limitation in assessing the trend of innovations based on patents is that not
all inventions are subject of a patent. Multiple reasons can be accounted for this
e.g. personal choice of the inventor who may not want to expose a secret, non-
compliance with the patentability conditions or the decision of the technology
transfer office to commercialize the invention via secrecy agreements. Due to
non systematic existence of data about inventions that are not patented it is
almost impossible to establish the number of inventions that are not subject of a
patent (Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse, 1998). Still economic research focuses on
patent data as it is the best obtainable measure to study the effects of invention
dynamics and innovation patterns. The first studies using patent data were
conducted by Scherer and Schmookler in the 1960s and major advances in inno-
vation research using patent data were performed by Griliches in the 1980s. In
the light of things shown earlier, the results of these studies, though are some-
what impaired by the fact that patents are the only criteria used for evaluating
innovation. In addition, different patents have different technological and eco-
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nomic value, and therefore any statistic that uses raw patent counts will not be
able to highlight the varying amount of innovation each patent brings (Griliches
et al., 1987). Further work on this subject has managed to bring more quality to
the assessment of the economic value, by using patent renewal data or patent
citations (Trajtenberg, 1990) instead of raw patent count, thus taking into ac-
count the varying levels of innovation present in patents.
Looking closer at patent citations, several pieces of information can be ex-
tracted, of which some can be extremely useful for the study of economic value.
Thus, citations reveal the existing connections, both in terms of time and geo-
graphical area, among different inventions and their respective inventors. Any
citation of an already existing patent indicates that money was invested in buy-
ing the rights to use the existing technology, and since any investment is made
with profit in mind, this is an indication that the cited patent has a certain
economic value. This creates a method to scale the otherwise hard to measure
value of patents. Moreover, a citation appearing in more and more documents
as time passes by is a clear indicator of the increased value of the cited patent,
whereas a few citations of a fresh patent may just be exceptional and of no rele-
vance to its corresponding economic value. Studies by Jaffe et al. (2000) confirm
that citations can be used as an indicator of innovation levels transmitted
among patents.
In the 1990s, Trajtenberg researched the link between social surplus and innova-
tion in medical imagery (Trajtenberg, 1990). Patents related to CT scanners
were, on one hand, roughly counted, and on the other hand, evaluated based on
citations. In both cases, a link to the social surplus brought by each innovation
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was established. In the case of raw counts, no such link could be created, but ci-
tation-evaluated patents showed a high level of linkage to the amount of social
surplus, therefore demonstrating that citations are a good indicator of the eco-
nomic value. Adding more criteria to the citation-based evaluation may create
an even better tool for value analysis. In a study, criteria like the number of
countries and the number of claims of a patent were added to the existing cita-
tion evaluation, and the subsequent results allowed researchers even to guess
which of the patents will or will not be renewed, which is also strongly con-
nected to the value of patent (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1998). In another
study, patent owners around Germany, who had property on patents originating
in the US, were hypothetically placed in the position of selling the patent as it
became three years old. A strong correlation between the selling price and the
citations was found, with values going as high as a million dollars per citation
for the patents having the most citations (Harhoff et al., 1999). Such results
were also reported by other studies focusing on the real revenue obtained by
employed patent holders under the jurisdiction of a legal frame concerning em-
ployee compensation.
An additional line of research also focuses on major companies, creating a link
between their stock exchange values and their policies concerning research and
development, knowledge investment and patents. Patent counts were tried to be
introduced to such research for extra information, but proved to be less enlight-
ening in this respect, than is the R&D itself. The results of introducing patent
citations to such research are more encouraging, even if R&D is also taken into
account. Citations provide good results when used in Tobin’s q equation. A
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study conducted by Shane (2001b) showed that patent citation generally corre-
lated well with R&D, unlike patent counts.
The amount of correlation between patent counts weighted by citations and
economic value is however highly dependent on the actual industry field the
study is conducted in and therefore it is important to control for the industry
level when conducting research based on patent data.
4.3 Patenting and technology commercialization
at the Max Planck Society
The Max Planck Society (MPS) is Germany’s largest non-profit basic research
organization which maintains its own 78 institutes (as of 1.1.2006) for the pur-
pose of performing cutting-edge basic research. Currently the institutes employ
over 12,000 people including 4,300 scientists. In addition, there are also around
10,900 doctoral candidates, post-doctoral fellows and visiting scientists from
abroad which form the base of Max Planck’s human capital.
The Max Planck Society is largely financed by federal and state grants which
amounted in 2006 to €1.38 billion. As a non-profit research organization the
scientists are obliged to make the results of their work accessible to the general
public. Industry cooperation, granting of patents and licenses, and the founding
of spin-off companies are the key elements of commercializing research at the
MPS. These tasks are handled by the technology transfer office (Max Planck
Innovation) founded by MPS.
Max Planck Innovation was founded in 1970 under the name Garching Instru-
mente GmbH and operated under the name of Garching Innovation from 1993
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to 2006. It negotiates and closes agreements on behalf of the Max Planck Soci-
ety. Income from license agreements is almost completely transferred to the in-
ventors, the Max Planck Institutes and the Max Planck Society. Company
shares acquired during licensing negotiations are owned by the Max Planck So-
ciety. The shareholder agreements are negotiated by Max Planck Innovation
and signed by the Max Planck Society.
The main tasks of Max Planck Innovation include:
 Advising and supervising patenting process of MPS inventions
 Licensing inventions
 Spin-off creating and support including coaching and advising founders
 Advisory role in supporting scientists of the MPS in evaluating inven-
tions
 Marketing innovations through a wide ranging network of industry con-
tacts
Currently, Max Planck Innovation oversees more than 1,113 inventions and is a
shareholder in 15 companies. On average each year an additional 150 projects
are taken on. Since 1979 over 3,000 inventions have been managed and advised
and more than 1,700 license agreements closed and more than 80 spin-offs
coached (since 1990). The total proceeds for inventors, the Max Planck Insti-
tutes and the Max Planck Society currently amounts to about €260m. As a re-
sult, Max Planck Innovation is worldwide one of the most successful technology
transfer organizations.
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4.3.1 Patenting and Licensing
According to Max Planck Society employment contracts and also to the Em-
ployees' Inventions Act, all occupational findings or ideas that may have inven-
tive character must be reported to the institute's management. Especially pre-
mature publication of research results represents the greatest danger to the pat-
entability of inventions according to MPS. Publications in this sense include not
only journal articles, but also speeches, lectures, presentations at conferences
and seminars, as well as disclosure of data and results on the Internet. Therefore
scientists are required to hand in a special form named the ‘invention disclosure
form’ to Max Planck Innovation as soon as possible in order to initiate the pat-
enting process.
After receiving the invention disclosure form the TTO examines whether the in-
vention is likely to lead to a successful patent application and evaluates its
commercial potential. If the evaluation is positive – and after clearance with the
scientist and the Max Planck Institute, who meet the costs of the application –
the TTO instructs an independent patent attorney experienced in the relevant
field to draw up the patent application.
During this process the inventor is required, to the best of his ability, to support
the Max Planck Society in its efforts to apply for and commercialize his inven-
tion. As a rule, the accompanying know-how of the scientist is necessary to en-
able a future licensee to realize the economic potential of a product based on the
invention.
Inventions made by MPG staff members usually emerge within the scope of
their research activities or are based on the institute's experience or work. These
Patenting Processes and Patent Research
73
inventions are thus called "employee inventions". In accordance with the Ger-
man Employees' Inventions Act, the employer, i.e. the Max Planck Society, is
entitled to such inventions.
The compensation of the Max Planck scientist is handled as follows. According
to the current MPS regulations covering Employees' inventions the scientists
generally are entitled to receive up to 30% of the gross license income that Max
Planck Innovation receives from the commercialization of their IP or know-how.
This compensation exceeds the minimum rates of indemnification for employee
inventions provided for by guidelines currently in force in private industry and
in the public sector, and is intended to motivate the scientists to participate ac-
tively in technology transfer.
4.3.2 Spinout Companies
The TTO takes a comprehensive approach towards spinoff creations and super-
vises the entire founding process including set-up phase, evaluation and discus-
sion of the business idea, support in business and finance planning, patent su-
pervision and connection to network partners and by providing management
coaching
Each scientist who plans to commercialize an invention can become a share-
holder in a spin-off. The involved scientists may as well choose to become an
employee of the new company, but in that case they must resign at the Max
Planck Institute due to possible conflicts of interest. Further if they want con-
tinue their scientific carrier as an employee of the Max Planck Institute they
can take an advisory role subject to prior authorization by the institute itself.
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However the acceptance of an executive or managerial position will not be al-
lowed in concurrence with a scientific role at MPS.
The policy towards investment in the spinout company is handled in following
way. Neither the Max Planck Society nor Max Planck Innovation is in the posi-
tion to invest capital in spinouts. However, the Max Planck Society may act as
a technology investor and waive an upfront payment when granting a license to
a spinout, in return for shares in the company. This waiver is analogous to a fi-
nancial investment and the Max Planck Society is therefore requesting typical
rights of a co-investor.
4.3.3 Max Planck Innovation Database
The Max Planck database has been acquired from the Garching Innovation
Gmbh in 2003 and contains comprehensive information on all inventions from
1990. Detailed description of the variables used in this research can be found in
the Appendix. Since the research in this thesis will mostly focus on the creation
and termination of commercialization opportunities, Figure 9-6 and Figure 9-7
in the Appendix show a summary of different activities over the time horizon
from 1990 to 2003.
Since the MPS dataset is one of very few datasets that follows the lifecycle of an
invention from inception to termination, Table 4-2 shows the comparison be-
tween the two other existing datasets in this area which contain information on
commercialization activities from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
University of California.
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Table 4-2 Comparison of datasets existing on lifecycle of innovatons
and patents from public research organiztions and univer-
sities
Shane a Ziedonis c Thesis
Institution
Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
University of
California
Max Planck
Society
Time Period 1980 - 1996 1979-1998 1990 - 2003
Industries
Chemical
Drug
Electrical
Mechanical n/A
Chemical
Drug
Electrical
Mechanical
Number of USOs 134 36 82
Number of Patents 1397 669 1640
Number of Licenses 1032 b 309
950 (individual)
1123 (multi)
License Terminations 338 n/A 484
a Shane, 2001b
b Katila and Shane, 2005
c Ziedonis, 2007
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5 The effects of market and technological uncer-
tainty on university spinout formation and spinout
failure
5.1 Introduction
High technology industries are characterized by a volatile and a rapidly chang-
ing environment where new technologies are constantly evolving under dynamic
market conditions. Technologies are research intensive and exposed to uncer-
tainty regarding their successful development and functionality. On the other
hand these technologies have to be absorbed by volatile markets in order to be
commercialized. The question under which conditions high technologies are ex-
ploited especially through firm formation and under which conditions companies
fail and shutdown operations falls under the category of economic organization
and has traditionally been discussed within the theory of the firm.
Empirical studies correlated high technology firm formation with research and
development intensity (Scherer 1980), cross-industry variation in technology life
cycles (Utterback and Abernathy 1975, Gort and Klepper 1982), strong appro-
priability conditions (i.e. the economic benefit of an innovation can be ade-
quately be captured and protected by the innovator) (Levin et al. 1987, Nelson
and Winter 1982), capital availability, firm size, and industry concentration,
though most of them with contradictory findings (Shane, 2001b). Recent studies
on high-tech formation focused mainly on academic spinouts allowing research-
University spinout formation and spinout failure
77
ers to understand a wide range of determinants of firm formation and expand
different theoretical concepts (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008). Researchers found
that the main determinants influencing their inception are institutional factors
of the parent organization, geographical location, market and industry condi-
tions where the technology is commercialized as well as the nature of the tech-
nology.
Research that focused on the relation between the parent institution and its in-
cumbents (institutional factors) showed that distribution of larger royalties to
inventors (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003), willingness of the parent organization
to take higher equity stakes in return for paying patenting and other up front
costs (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003), benefiting university policies towards spin-
out creation (Tornaztky et al., 1997), allowing leaves of absence to academic in-
ventors, ease of use of university resources (Tornaztky et al., 1997), availability
of pre-seed stage capital (UNICO, 2001) and characteristics of technology trans-
fer offices (UNICO, 2001) increase spinout activity.
Another research stream focused on environmental influences and how geo-
graphical location influences the rate of spinout formation. Main determinants
that were researched in the spinout setting are accessibility to capital and prox-
imity to venture capitalists (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003), locus of property
rights e.g. locating ownership rights at the individual (researcher) vs. a higher
organizational (university) level (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003), rigidity of
academic labour market and industrial composition of area (Shane, 2004b).
A small number of studies discussed how market and industry specific condi-
tions influence their formation. Among them mainly Shane (2004b) proposed
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that the tendency for an invention to be exploited through firm creation varies
with the attributes of the technology regime (the age of the technical field, the
tendency of the market toward segmentation, the effectiveness of patents, and
the importance of complementary assets). He tested this set of hypotheses em-
pirically in a university spin-out setting. Other studies showed that with in-
creasing number of firms in the industry, spinouts are more likely to occur
(Shane and Katila, 2003).
Research on the nature of technology that influences the likelihood of spinout
generation found that only a small proportion of university inventions are suit-
able for creating spinouts. It shows that radical technologies (Vohora et al.,
2002), tacit knowledge, early stage invention and general purpose technologies
that have strong intellectual property rights (IP) protection (Shane, 2001a) are
more suitable than other technologies to provide the basis for spinouts.
On the other hand, firm failure and survival of university start-ups has been
studied from different theoretical angles which included analysing the social ties
of founders (Shane and Stuart, 2002) as well as their regional networks (Saxe-
nian, 1990). Rothaermel and Thursby (2005) found that spinouts with strong
ties to their parent organizations were less likely to fail but also less likely to
successfully graduate within a timely manner. Moreover, in a comparison be-
tween new technology-based ventures and university spinouts Ensley and
Hmieleski (2005) showed that spinouts were not necessarily better performers.
On a more general scale researchers have studied the failure of firms in relation
to their technological competency (Henderson, 1993; Christensen and Bower,
1996). They found that established companies are more likely to be replaced by
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new firms when their technology competency was not valuable to their customer
base. More recently Shane and Nerkar (2003) extended this line of research and
showed that firms with radical technology and a broad patent protection in
fragmented industries increase their likelihood of survival.
Although existing research findings present a reasonably complete framework in
explaining why some technologies are more suitable than others for firm forma-
tion and firm failure, we have identified four major novelties of our study to
current research on new firm formation as well as firm failure:
Firstly, the finding that university spinouts based on early stage inventions are
more likely to occur needs more evidence and scientific verification (Shane,
2004b). Research omitted the influence of uncertainty on new firm formation, to
which high technology ventures are particularly exposed. Existing research in-
vestigated the influence of external uncertainty on existing firms entering new
markets through equity partnerships (Folta and Miller, 2002) and joint ventures
(Kogut, 1991) by embedding a real option perspective. Folta and O’Brien
(2004) used a sample of 17,987 firms from different industries and showed for
existing firms entering new markets, that the effect of uncertainty is non-
monotonic and demonstrated that entry is moderated by the presence of in-
vestment irreversibility, total value of growth opportunities and first mover ad-
vantage. We will fill the gap why new companies rather than existing ones are
entering markets and will explore under what conditions of uncertainty, pre-
dominantly to be found in early stage technologies and research intensive indus-
tries, firm formation is the dominant mechanism of technology commercializa-
tion. In particular, we will examine the effects of exogenous (market) as well as
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endogenous (technology) uncertainty on spin-out activity and analyze how they
are affected by passage of time. Therefore, our study will be the first to study
both, the influence of exogenous (market uncertainty) and endogenous uncer-
tainty (technological uncertainty) on the entry of new high technology firms.
Secondly, research on firm failure has not examined how the market and techno-
logical regime the newly established firm is found in affects its survival. There-
fore this research tries to close this gap by offering an explanation to how the
market and technological uncertainty affect new venture failure.
Thirdly, we will use a new theoretical approach to tackle these research ques-
tions by grounding our findings on the foundations of real option theory (ROT)
in order to consolidate uncertainty and timing of entry and failure into one
theoretical framework. Although other theories like e.g. transaction cost eco-
nomics provide a theoretical framework how uncertainty affects hierarchical
form of governance of market transactions, they deal with different types of un-
certainty that affect economic organization (e.g. behavioural uncertainty). Fur-
ther real option theory can explain the dynamics of entry and exit which other
theories do not entail. Therefore the real options framework can contribute to
our understanding of entry and exit timing of investments (Miller and Folta,
2002) as well as experimentation and the proactive exploration of uncertainty
(McGrath, 1999)
Lastly, most of the studies on spinout formation are using qualitative ap-
proaches and are based on interviews with technology transfer officers. Our
study relies on quantitative data to explore firm formation as well as firm fail-
ure. Although a small number of studies have utilized quantitative data on
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spinout creation all of them relied on a single research institution in the US.
Our study is the first to explore a quantitative dataset outside the US.
In order to consolidate the two concepts of uncertainty and timing, we will ex-
tend real option theory to technology commercialization decisions by taking the
perspective that uncertainty influences the value of the technology option as
well as the timing of exercising it.
5.2 Theory Development and Hypothesis
Real option theory is an investment theory that identifies factors that affect the
threshold at which investment is to occur rather than the level of investment it-
self (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) and discusses optimal decision rules on invest-
ments under uncertainty. Real option theory is derived from the Nobel Prize
winning option models of Black and Scholes (1973) and in contrast to their fi-
nancial counterparts, real options represent usually investments in non-financial
assets with an uncertain payoff that convey the right, but not the obligation, to
exercise the investment, should the total payoff look attractive (Damodaran,
2001). Therefore real options protect the holder against downside risk, since the
expiration of the real option without exercising can only lead to the loss of the
right rather than the whole investment itself.
The basic unit of analysis is the real option and real option theory is based on
several assumptions with the most significant being that investments are not
fully reversible due to the nature of investments which are industry or firm spe-
cific and therefore cannot be fully recovered (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). ‘This
assumption is critical because if investors cannot fully recover sunk costs, the
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initial investment decision depends on expectations about uncertain future cash
flows’ (Miller and Folta, 2002).
A newly developed technology can be viewed as a real option for the hypotheti-
cal investor who can: (i) choose to maintain flexibility by withholding the in-
vestment, (ii) increase its commitment by exercising the option in form of a
spinout company or (iii) sell the option in form of a license. Once the spinout is
formed the equity holders of the spinout can sell or terminate the operation if it
seems unprofitable. In option logic and terminology the option to sell or termi-
nate the operation can be considered as holding a put option and selling or ex-
ercising it. In this paper we will exclusively focus on the exercise of the call op-
tion and creating a spinout as well as exercising the put option and closing
down operations of a spinout.
This section provides a framework that will be used to identify and clarify how
different forms of uncertainty and other variables influence the entry and exit
decision. We will extend the function by Miller and Folta (2002) that captures
the incremental value of holding the call option to actually exercising it (creat-
ing the spinout) and therefore create a systematic framework for analyzing the
decision to form a spinout. Further we will investigate under what conditions of
uncertainty exercising the put option (abandoning the spinout) is the optimal
decision.
University spinout formation and spinout failure
83
5.2.1 Uncertainty and the entry decision
Neoclassical investment theory analyses the simple net present value of the in-
vestment and as long as it is positive the investment should be made. The deci-
sion making rule for investment entry is:
Enter If: NPV >= 0
This traditional approach neglects additional optional value of the investment
project and neglects the influence of uncertainty of on the investment decision
that is pertinent in the real option approach to capital budgeting decisions.
Usually investors fear uncertainty when having to make an investment as it
diminishes the predictability of the profit (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Real op-
tion theory perspective inverts the usual thinking about uncertainty found in
the organizational literature since uncertainty can create opportunities when it
is properly understood (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999).
As noted earlier market uncertainty is a form of exogenous uncertainty and is
unaffected by actions and can only be resolved over time. Premature invest-
ments under high market uncertainty impose certain risks as the hypothetical
investor disregards the value of waiting and receiving new information that
might influence the attractiveness of the investment. Recent research on real
options suggests that increasing exogenous uncertainty ‘may not categorically
dissuade entry investment through a monotonic decrease in the option premium’
(Folta and Miller, 2002; Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999; Kulatilaka and Perotti,
1998) leading to the fact that when there are competitive advantages of early
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entry, higher exogenous uncertainty can increase the likelihood of commitment
and firm formation which we will discuss later in this chapter.
Under the option framework when dividends (opportunity costs of not exercis-
ing) are not existing it is always optimal to delay exercising the call option as
long as possible (for proofs see Miller and Folta, 2002 or Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) who showed that it is never optimal to exercise an American option prior
expiration date when no dividends or opportunity costs are present). It is
known from financial option theory that the value of the option increases with
increasing uncertainty regarding the underlying asset. Similar to a financial op-
tion, options on new technologies become more valuable when market uncer-
tainty is high, that is when the future value of the underlying asset (e.g. tech-
nology) fluctuates strongly. This finding is consistent with innovation literature
which has recognized that technology value increases if the underlying demand’s
potential variance and uncertainty increases (McGrath, 1997).
Exercising the option entitles its owner to a series of cash flows by committing a
largely irreversible investment (X) by creating a spinout. The incremental value
from maintaining flexibility by withholding the investment to increasing com-
mitment and exercising it, is given by V = D – X – C,5 where D is the present
value of forgone dividends for not exercising the option early, X the exercise
price depicting the investment necessary to create the spinout and C the call
option value. Call option value (C) represents the opportunity cost associated
5 The full notation can be written as V(t, , ) = D (t, , ) – X( t, ) – C (t, , ), where 
represents market (exogenous) uncertainty and  technological (endogenous) uncertainty.
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with exercising the option (Miller and Folta, 2002) whereas Dividends (D) are
potential cash flows only realized if the option is exercised prior expiration date
and therefore represent the opportunity cost of not exercising the option and de-
laying investment. The dividend term is given in detail by D = DC + DT + α *
DG – DD + DL– DP, 6 where DC are the discounted cash flows directly related to
the real call option over the remaining option duration period, DT are the dis-
counted cash flows after the option expiration date, DG is the value of the com-
pound growth options that are only available if parent real option is exercised, α
is a multiplier that enhances the value of the growth option if moving early
gives the firm an the ability to expand beyond initial expectations (Liebermann
and Montgomery, 1988), DD is the value of the option to defer investment which
value disappears when option is exercised early, DL captures the value of tech-
nology learning due to investment commitment and exercising the option, DP re-
fers to strategic pre-emptive investments of competitors that reduce the value of
the dividend payments. It should be noted that the optimal exercise time is
when the present value of V reaches a maximum ( 0 tV ).
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have shown that the most valuable options which are
affected by market uncertainty are the growth and deferment option which will
be the focus of this study when analysing the effects of markets uncertainty on
the entry decision. Further, one should point out the fundamental difference
between firms competing in mature industries versus firms competing in knowl-
6 The full notation can be written as D(t, , ) = DC (t) + DT (t) + α * DG (t, ) + DL (t, ) -
DP (t)
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edge intensive industries which our sample represents. Miller and Modigliani
(1961) have characterized the market value of the firm as being composed of
present value of cash flows plus the present value of growth opportunities. The
total market value of firms in knowledge based and emerging industries is pri-
marily based on options to grow in the future (Myers, 1977). These options to
grow can be seen as compound options on the initial real option and can only be
obtained and its value captured by exercising the initial option and committing
to investment.
Folta and O’Brien (2004) analysed how growth and deferment options affect the
investment decision and showed that existing firms will enter new markets ear-
lier rather than later when the net present value of the investment project is
higher, forgone cash-flows (if entry is delayed one period) are higher as well as
the option to grow (compound option) is more valuable and the option to defer
is less valuable. Our research focuses on the entry of new firms. Both DG and DD
are monotonically increasing with uncertainty as all other options are. The op-
tions to grow especially for new entrants are very sensitive to the uncertainty
conditions they are found in compared to the option to defer. Early mover ad-
vantages and direct entry can result in immediate benefits and larger market
share especially for entrants that are entering a high technology environment
where technological advantages are strongly related to the competitive advan-
tage of the firm. Further looking at implications from option pricing theory it
can be seen that growth options are more sensitive to uncertainty compared to
options to defer because their maximum value is not bounded (Folta and
O’Brien, 2004) whereas the option to defer can never be larger than the initial
investment required.
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The variable DG in the dividend function considers the value of the previously
mentioned compound options and therefore predominantly reflects competitive
advantages gained from moving early in emerging industries (Lieberman and
Montgomery, 1988). The timing of the investment decision is primarily domi-
nated by growth and deferment options and as shown earlier the sensitivity of
the growth option towards market uncertainty is larger than that of the option
to defer with increasing market uncertainty. This results in a nonmonotonic be-
haviour of market uncertainty on the investment decision to found a new firm.
Furthermore, since for low market uncertainty the sensitivity of a growth option
is small compared to the option to defer, the option to defer becomes the domi-
nant value driver in low uncertainty environments. On the other hand if uncer-
tainty is very high the sensitivity of the growth option increases and the option
to grow becomes the dominant driver of investment value. Considering our
value function we can see that if this relationship holds, as previously stated
that this is the case in knowledge intensive industries, all other things being
equal, following hypotheses are valid:
Hypothesis 1: The impact of market uncertainty on entry is nonmonotonic
Hypothesis 2: Market uncertainty will negatively influence the likelihood of
commercializing patents through spinouts when uncertainty is low, and posi-
tively influence it when uncertainty is high
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High technology companies are mostly created from high technologies in emerg-
ing markets that are prone to technological uncertainty (Abernathy and Utter-
back, 1978; Schumpeter, 1934). Researchers have also recognized that early
stage technologies with high technological uncertainties are more likely leading
to spinout formation. However they were unable to make this idea precise by
placing in a formal theoretical setting (Shane, 2004b).
Technological uncertainty represents the uncertainty about the success and fea-
sibility of the developed technology and the uncertainty if the underlying tech-
nology will satisfy quality, performance and standards that were initially in-
tended (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In the academic spinout context technologi-
cal uncertainty can be considered as the uncertainty about the time, effort and
other resources needed to successfully create the spinout and develop the under-
lying technology according to its specifications. The major difference between
market uncertainty which is exogenous and technological uncertainty which is
endogenous is that endogenous uncertainty can be resolved through active in-
vestment of time and resources by its holders and by learning and actually un-
dertaking the investment. Therefore technological uncertainty is intrinsic to the
university and entrepreneurs of the spinout as it is them who can actively re-
solve it internally by undertaking the technology development and finalizing it.
Since technology development is part of the cost of investment, its uncertainty
will increase with the volatility of the cost of investment. If an investment has a
negative net payoff but its variance of the cost is adequately high, there is still a
possibility that it can be economical to invest. Similar to market uncertainty,
higher technological uncertainty increases the value of the real option (C). As
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we have shown earlier in our value function higher option value defers invest-
ment in the absence of dividends.
Parallel to Roberts and Weitzman (1981) we argue that the ability to learn
about a technology enhances dividends and capture this value in our dividend
function by DL. DL represents a dividend from learning about a technology by
actively investing in it and resolving the uncertainty around it.
We believe that one of the incentives of early technology commercialization
through spinout formation is uncertainty resolution of the total investment that
is inherent to the investor. Therefore if investing provides information and re-
solves technological uncertainty, earlier investment in form of a spinout is more
likely to occur.
Hypothesis 3: Greater technological uncertainty increases the likelihood of
commercializing patents in form of a spinout (exercising the call option)
5.2.2 Uncertainty and the exit decision
As we have pointed out earlier the development of commercially exploitable
technology has become increasingly important for the PRO’s and universities.
Despite a number of success stories of IP commercialization that range from
Google to Genentech many of the university spinouts have not been able to sur-
vive in the strongly competitive market environment although it is well docu-
mented that failure rates of USO’s are well below the national average in the
USA and European countries (Degroof and Roberts, 2004; AUTM, 2002;
UNICO, 2001). Different explanations of firm failure and survival have been
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proposed by previous research and covered various theoretical angles as we have
elaborated in the previous chapter.
In order to survive, new technology firms have to build up an organizational
structure and continue the development of their technologies. This task is in-
creasingly difficult when these actions are surrounded by a high degree of mar-
ket uncertainty. Overcoming these problems has been addressed by previous re-
search including adopting a principle of exclusivity in selecting exchange part-
ners. Podolny (1994) showed that the greater the market uncertainty, the more
that organizations engage in exchange relations with those with whom they
have transacted in the past and that organizations engage in transactions with
those of similar status. Still research on the decision on the termination of in-
vestments and the role of real option theory has been theoretically addressed
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) but empirically mostly neglected by research with the
exception of O’Brien and Folta (2009) who are analysing market exit for exist-
ing companies in an industry wide setting by focusing on the real option per-
spective. The theoretical reasoning of real option theory indicates that when an
irreversible investment was made and its current net present value is negative,
investors will not abandon the investment if the uncertainty regarding future
payoffs is large enough as conditions could improve rapidly. This decision ra-
tionale can be observed when intensive and irreversible investments are
mothballed. This investment strategy can be observed in the mining industry
when the price of commodities is very uncertain and waiting rather than com-
pletely abandoning the investment could be the decision that yields maximum
profits (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). On the other hand in absence of sunk costs
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there is no economic rationale for continuing the operation under the occurrence
of losses.
New technology based firms and spinouts require initial large investments to
initiate and operate which are mostly irreversible and therefore making it a
good setting to test the rationale of real option theory on the exit and failure of
spinouts. In order to value the abandonment of an investment and its character-
istics, real option theory has relied on the study of put options. The owner of
the abandonment option has two strategic decisions available namely to early
abandon the investment at any point in the option life or wait and continue
business as usual. The payoff structure of the abandonment option is similar to
the traditional American put option which permits early exercise when the op-
tion value is profitable.
The option to abandon gives the owners of the company the right to sell its as-
sets at any time during the option period or close it down to avoid future losses.
Exercising the put option entitles the owner to a salvage value (strike price) of
the spinout if it is positive. The incremental value from waiting and not exercis-
ing the option to shutting down the operation and exercising it, is given by V =
– D + X – P, where D is the present value of forgone dividends and cash flows
for exercising the option early, X the exercise price which describes salvage
value and P the put option value. Put option value (P) represents the opportu-
nity cost associated with exercising the option whereas Dividends (D) are poten-
tial cash flows only realized if the option is not exercised prior expiration date
and therefore the spinout not abandoned.
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Each of the spinouts in our sample is a high technology start-up that has
started to operate based on a unique technological opportunity which we have
analysed in the previous chapter. This technology base has growth options em-
bedded which is typical for high technology start ups. The dividend term D re-
fers to the net present value of the main underlying options and therefore can
be represented by D = DG + DC – DD where DG is the value of growth options
embedded in the technology base of the company, DC the cash flow required to
sustain the business for the next time period and DD is the value of the option
to defer abandonment. In contrast the decision to terminate a business DC cap-
tures the fact that that the continuation of business is also driven by exogenous
factors such as availability of finances and most importantly positive cash flows
at the beginning of each continuation period. The optimal abandonment time is
when the present value of V reaches a maximum ( 0 tV ).
The effect of the required cash flow (DC) on the continuation on the other hand
is inversely related to market uncertainty and is the first condition that needs
to be met for continuation of business. This factor captures the very important
distinction to the firm formation decision in that the continuation of business
for a high technology firm is not only secured by the possession of valuable
growth options. Spinouts can continue operation only if the cash flow is positive
and sufficient finances available. In regimes of very high market uncertainty the
uncertainty of cash flows of the high technology company can bring a business
to failure although the net present value of all the growth options in possession
of the business is positive. Especially under very high market uncertainties this
component can be the critical factor if the business can continue operation for
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one more period. Therefore we would expect that the effect of cash flows under
high market uncertainty would overshadow the value of growth options for ex-
tremely high levels of market uncertainty and we would expect firm failure rates
to increase under very high market uncertainty conditions.
On the other hand we would expect that with increasing market uncertainty the
growth and deferment options are dominating the decision and the spinout fail-
ure rates will start decreasing as the growth options become more valuable.
This leads us to following non linear hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: The impact of market uncertainty on exit is nonmonotonic
Hypothesis 5: Market uncertainty will negatively influence the likelihood of spin-
out failure (exercising the abandonment put option) when uncertainty is low,
and positively influence it when uncertainty is high
5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 Sample
The dataset includes data on all inventions and spinouts created by the 78 Max
Planck Institutes from 1990 to 2003. The data was acquired directly from the
Max Planck technology transfer office (Garching Innovation GmbH) that keeps
records of all their commercialization activities. A total population of 811 pat-
ents issued by the Max Planck Institutes are examined. The most important
advantage of using such a dataset relative to other samples of new ventures is
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that the TTO’s tracks each invention and records every company established to
commercialize its IP, which is important to eliminate selection bias.
5.3.2 Analysis
Since our study incorporates a censored dataset of patents with time dependent
covariates, we will use Cox regression time dependent analysis to examine the
data. The major advantage of using Cox regression is that it does not require an
assumption about a particular probability distribution of survival times and the
possibility to include time dependent covariates. Time dependent covariates are
those that can change their value or impact over the course of observation. This
gives us the possibility to predict the likelihood of new firm formation and firm
failure on the basis of our specified independent variables and to understand
how time influences their impact. The basic model including time dependent co-
variates is usually written as:
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The equation says that the hazard for individual i at time t is a function of a
set of a baseline function at time t and k covariates at time t.
5.4 Variables
5.4.1 Dependent Variables
Firm Formation (INV2USO)
In each year a patent could be licensed or not and the license could be issued to
an established firm, or a new firm. Similar to Shane (2001b) we define firm for-
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mation (spinout) as occurring in a given year, if the invention was licensed to a
for-profit firm that did not exist as a legal entity in the previous year. If the
patent is licensed to an established firm, we define this as licensing. If a spinout
that is already established comes to get another license from the university in a
later year, we will define this occurrence as licensing to an established company.
Only patents that are licensed in the year of formation will be considered as
leading to firm formation.
Further we will count the number of days from the invention disclosure date to
invention commercialization for each single patent in order to be able to test for
non proportionality assumption using a time dependent covariate.
Firm Failure (USO2USOTERM)
The technology transfer office keeps records when a firm ceases to exist. Usually
this date corresponds to the date the firm legally is declared non existing which
is defined as firm failure in this study. Therefore the unit of analysis in this sur-
vival analysis is the spinout itself. Further the number of days from the date
the firm started to exist until firm closure is counted for each spinout and is
used as the time to failure in the survival analysis and for the testing of time
dependent covariates related to firm failure. Firms that are still active at the
end of the observation period are treated as being censored.
5.4.2 Independent Variables
Real option theory distinguishes between endogenous uncertainties (technologi-
cal uncertainty) that are intrinsic to the firm and exogenous uncertainties (mar-
ket uncertainty) which are dependent on the market and where the firm has no
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influence on. We will account for both types of uncertainties and explore how
they affect the likelihood of spinout creation and the timing of innovation com-
mercialization.
Market uncertainty (INV2USO, USO2USOTERM)
The market uncertainty represents the randomness of the external environment
and majority of research has measured randomness of demand to account for
market uncertainty (e.g. Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998) as demand impacts
prices and therefore determines profitability (Folta and O’Brien, 2004). Since
this study measures the uncertainty of the industry segment the patent is in,
macroeconomic uncertainty measures (e.g. based on GDP data) will not be con-
sidered unlike in the majority of real option literature. This research will rather
focus on micro-industry-specific uncertainty. The reason for this is that GDP
data is reported in a relatively sporadic manner (quarterly) and it is believed
that the decision makers’ decision span is more frequent. The patents in this re-
search are subdivided into 5 major technology fields which were classified by the
TTO into Mechanical, Medical, Pharma & Biotech, Chemical and Electrical
Technology. Therefore, these industry segments will be used to calculate market
uncertainty.
The volatilities for each invention were calculated by computing the standard
deviation of the industry clusters’ daily stock returns. Since the invention dis-
closure dates were different across inventions, market volatilities for each inven-
tion needed to be calculated separately. The standard deviation of the stock
market volatilities is specific to the industry subfield and exogenous to the con-
University spinout formation and spinout failure
97
trol of individual firms and therefore represents a valid measure for market un-
certainty.
It should be noted that stock index data that was used for the volatility calcula-
tions was not available for Germany. The available stock indices for Germany
were either not dating back for the required time period or some technology in-
dustries was not available. Therefore, I have used the FTSE Eurotop300 Indexes
that follow the stock prices of these 5 technology clusters for public European
companies since 1987 and calculated the volatilities of the stock composite in-
dexes using daily data obtained from DataStream. Since the majority of compa-
nies in these emerging technology industries are dependent on worldwide mar-
kets it is a valid assumption to use the European wide market uncertainty as it
is mainly driven by macro industrial trends. For some industries where a corre-
sponding German stock index could be found, correlations between the German
and European Stock indices were calculated and very high correlations coeffi-
cients (>95%) were found. This further confirms the previously postulated as-
sumptions.
The next question is how to estimate volatility from this data. A decision maker
that has to make a investment decision which value is influenced by volatility
(option like contracts) will have to evaluate how the volatility will behave in
the future period t during his investment is active. If the investor has estimated
(predicted) the volatility correctly over time period t his investment will realize
this volatility and this volatility should be used to price an option like contract
correctly. This is effectively the volatility we are looking for.
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An analogy with the financial markets in which a market to trade future volatil-
ity exists can be drawn in order to clarify this even further. The financial mar-
kets trade options that have different expiration dates. Each option is quoted a
price in the market which is a consensus of multiple buyers and sellers. The
market norm is usually to quote volatilities rather than prices because they are
interchangeable and can be calculated one from the other. Therefore there is an
agreement what the option is worth for a specific expiry (over a specific time
period) and a volatility figure is determined by the market. This volatility is
called implied market volatility for a specific expiry. This is the number that
the whole market expects the option will realize until its expiration and would
ultimately be the best estimation of volatility.
Since historical option price data for specific industries does not exist the esti-
mation has to be approached differently. Using a historical estimate of volatility
will give the true realized volatility and since volatility is mean reverting, his-
torical volatility will oscillate around the ‘true’ implied volatility. It was decided
therefore to use historical volatility as the approximation of market uncertainty.
A more detailed discussion on the robustness 7 of the market uncertainty meas-
ure is discussed in chapter 9.1.
Following standard formula was used to calculate the annualized volatility for
each invention:
7 It should be noted here that measuring market uncertainty using the GARCH framework does
not significantly alter the results in any of the models
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where  is the annualized volatility, N the number of daily returns, xi the re-
turn in period i and x the average return over N periods.
As a reference date the day when the invention was disclosed to the TTO was
used for measuring the market uncertainty of the firm formation hypothesis. For
the firm failure hypothesis the reference date when the spinout was founded was
measured. For each invention the market uncertainty was calculated from the
previous daily returns prior to the invention disclosure date (see Folta, 1998).
Therefore for each patent a historical 1 year volatility window based on daily
stock index return data was obtained. The reason for using the invention disclo-
sure date rather than the date when the patent was granted as the reference
date for our calculation is simply because some of the inventions can get com-
mercialized even before the patent was granted.
Technological Uncertainty (INV2USO)
We have previously defined technological uncertainty as the uncertainty regard-
ing the technology development cost and the physical difficulty of completing
the investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). One possibility of measuring uncer-
tainty is to ask experts such as technology transfer officers, inventors, and IP
lawyers to assess the uncertainty of each technology patent individually at time
of publication. Walker and Weber (1984) have utilized such an approach in
measuring technological uncertainty in a two dimensional measure as “frequency
of expected changes in specifications” and “probability of future technological
improvements” measuring technology uncertainty of products for a small num-
University spinout formation and spinout failure
100
ber of established firms. In our case this approach would be impracticable due
to three reasons. Firstly, the large number of patents we consider in our analysis
and the previous approach would limit the sample size drastically since the in
depth analysis of a single patent can take several weeks and is very expensive
(Markman et al., 2004). Secondly, we are considering uncertainty of already is-
sued patents and it would not be efficient to ask professionals retrospectively
about evaluations of patents that are already a couple of years old. Thirdly,
technological uncertainty has dynamic characteristics as it fluctuates over time.
To account for this problem, we would have to ask professionals if the techno-
logical uncertainty changed for each year after patent issuance, which makes
this approach implausible. Therefore we will develop a measure which unravels
all mentioned disadvantages and does not depend on primary measures.
Before a patent is issued, patent officers determine what previous patents and
non patent literature must be cited in a patent by researching prior patents.
Each of these citations refers to a specific date when the cited patent was is-
sued. The citations show adjacent technological knowhow and with increasing
average age of the citations, the technology field is more explored and more cer-
tain. Similar to Lowe (2002) we measure patent specific technological uncer-
tainty (TU) for each patent as the average age of the cited patents (PCj) and
cited non patent literature (NPLi), where j is the number of the cited patents
and i is number of cited non patent literature entries. For the reference date to
calculate the average age of patents we use the invention disclosure date. This
measure is valid as it provides the technological uncertainty at the time the in-
vention was disclosed and is therefore not a retrospective measure of uncer-
tainty. We define TU as:
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5.4.3 Control Variables
Technical field (INV2USO, USO2USOTERM)
Since patents are more likely to be commercialized in certain technology fields,
we will research patents from different technology fields and, we will control for
the technology fields the patents are in. Similar to Shane (2001b) we will in-
clude dummy variables for mechanical inventions, electrical inventions, chemical
inventions and drugs.
Time controls (INV2USO)
We control for effects of time by using a time dummy variable for the period
between 1995 and 2003. The reason for the time control is the fact that Max
Planck has proactively changed its policy towards spinning out more ventures in
1995. Therefore we expect the highest spinout rates after 1995.
Firm Size (INV2USO, USO2USOTERM)
Research has shown that large firm size in an industry discourages entry since it
raises the cost of entry (Audretsch, 1995). We have therefore measured the av-
erage firm size per year as the average number of employees per firm in an in-
dustry sector. A better measure would be the median of firm size to control for
skewness in the distribution. We acknowledge the limitations but the mean was
the only available variable existing historically.
Capital Intensity (USO2USOTERM)
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We control for the average revenue per company in a given industry. Especially
new entrants in highly capital and revenue intensive industries have problems
establishing themselves among the competition. We therefore measure the aver-
age revenue per company per year in an industry sector and use this variable to
control for firm failure.
R&D Intensity (INV2USO, USO2USOTERM)
It was shown that research intensive industries negatively influence new firm
entry because large and established firms can achieve larger economies of scope
in R&D. We have therefore measured R&D Intensity as a yearly percentage of
investments in R&D of the total investments in a given industry.
Capital Availability (INV2USO, USO2USOTERM)
Especially in highly capital intensive industries that are intrinsic to high tech-
nology areas in which most spinouts compete, one of the most important mod-
erators of firm formation is capital availability. We will therefore control for in-
dustry specific capital availability.
Diverse industries attract capital, e.g. venture capital differently which could
lead to a variation of spinout rates due to capital availability. We will therefore
assign to each industry class the patent is in the venture capital availability for
the year the patent was issued using the Venture Economics database. Similar
to Shane (2001b) we will express the capital availability as the venture capital
amount spent per year in an industry as a percentage of the average industry
asset size.
Age of technology class (INV2USO)
University spinout formation and spinout failure
103
According to Utterback and Abernathy (1975), new companies are more likely
to be established when the field of technology is young. We will therefore meas-
ure the age of technology class as the number of days between the IPC (interna-
tional patent class) code was first issued by the patent office and the patent
publication date. The difference between age of technology class and technologi-
cal uncertainty should be elaborated at this point. The age of technology class
measures how old the technology class is which is not necessarily related to
technological uncertainty. One can assume that an older technology class is also
less uncertain but it is still common to observe technological breakthroughs in
old technology classes. This is exactly what the technology uncertainty variable
tries to capture by analysing the average age of citations rather than the age of
technology class. Table 5-2 shows that the correlations of these two variables
are relatively low, which strengthens the argument that there is little associa-
tion between the two variables.
Patent scope (INV2USO)
To control for the patent scope we include Lerner’s (1994) measure of patent
scope, which is based upon the number of technological classes the patent is
categorized into. Patents that are classified into more technological areas are
broader in scope according to Lerner (1994) and Shane (2001b) and are more
valuable. According to Lerner this measure captures different dimensions of
economic importance e.g. firm valuation, likelihood of patent litigation and cita-
tions. Therefore it should increase the likelihood of licensing an invention and
decrease the likelihood of termination.
Patent Quality (INV2USO)
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Previous research has argued that a measure for patent quality can be derived
from the fact how many other patents the claims and to how many other pat-
ents and non patent literature the patent refers to (Lerner, 1994). We control
for patent claims and references since patent value should increase the likelihood
of licensing and decrease licensing termination.
Spinout support from technology transfer office (USO2USOTERM)
Several studies have shown that one very important determinant related to the
performance of university spinouts are the support structures of the technology
transfer office (Shane and Shane, 2002; Saxenian, 1990). Therefore we control
for several support occurrences from the technology transfer side. The control
variable is coded as 1 if support received and 0 otherwise:
 conceptual support (FLG_SUPP_CONC)
 business plan support (FLG_SUPP_BUSP)
 financial planning support (FLG_SUPP_FINP)
 support by issuing a license to spinout (FLG_SUPP_LICC)
 taking equity in spinout (FLG_SUPP_EQTY)
 after foundation support (FLG_SUPP_AFSP)
Spinout financing (USO2USOTERM)
Resource based theory has shown that firms whose resources are better utilized
and that have strong financing structures are more likely to survive especially in
harsh and volatile market conditions. Receiving venture funding e.g. was the
single most important determinant for the spinout to experience an IPO (Shane
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and Stuart, 2002). Therefore we control for spinout financing in our study on
firm failure. Each spinout can during its lifetime receive financial support which
is captured with this variable (1 = support received, 0 otherwise). This support
is different from the previous control variable which only refers to support re-
ceived from the technology transfer office. Financial support is usually received
in form of a business loan, government grant or in exchange for an equity stake
in the spinout.
Spinout cooperation (USO2USOTERM)
Social ties and network structures have been suggested as an important link to
spinout performance. Nicolaou and Birley (2003b) found a link between pre-
formation networking and the spinout structure and suggested that the net-
working ties can influence growth trajectories and performance of the spinout.
Further Shane and Stuart (2002) offered empirical evidence of the network-
performance relationship, analysing how social capital endowments of the foun-
ders affect the likelihood of three critical outcomes of spinouts: attracting ven-
ture capital financing, experiencing IPO’s and fail. Direct and indirect linkages
to investors were found to be constructive to receiving venture funding and re-
duced the likelihood of spinout failure and that personal networks of founders
had a long-term positive effect on spinout performance. Therefore we control for
following partnership occurrences during the lifetime of the spinout:
 Max Planck Cooperation (COOP_MPS)
 Industry Cooperation (COOP_INDUSTRY)
 University Cooperation (COOP_UNIVERSITY)
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Spinout formation (INV2USO)
We used a Cox regression analysis to test our hypothesis. Table 5-1 reports the
descriptive statistics and Table 5-2 bivariate correlations for the independent
variables in the initial regression analysis respectively. The Cox regression mod-
els presented in Table 5-3 report how endogenous (market) and exogenous
(technological) uncertainty affect the likelihood of new firm formation.
Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics (INV2USO)
Variables N Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Mechanical 950 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.25
Chemical 950 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45
Pharma&Bio 950 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.49
Medical 950 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29
Year Issued (1995-2003) 950 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.50
Patent Quality 950 0.00 613.00 18.82 26.39
Patent Scope 950 0.00 19.00 2.55 2.75
Technology Age 950 0.00 77.33 16.57 13.13
Firm Size 950 71 502 343 118
R&D Intensity 950 250 10884 4573 2785
Capital Availability 950 0.00 352.44 47.42 92.91
Market Uncertainty 950 0.10 0.49 0.21 0.07
Technological Uncertainty 950 -9.13 0.00 -1.20 1.33
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As can be seen in Table 5-2, the highest correlation between any two of the in-
dependent variables is r = 0.76 between firm size and R&D Intensity control
variable. The correlation values imply that multicollinearity problems are not a
concern in our analysis. Still our moderately high correlations shown in Table
5-2 indicate that none of the factors that predict firm formation are completely
independent which was as well observed by Shane (2001b).
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Table 5-2: Correlation Matrix (INV2USO)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Mechanical 1.00
2. Chemical -0.17 1.00
3. Pharma&Bio -0.23 -0.53 1.00
4. Medical -0.09 -0.20 -0.27 1.00
5. Year Issued (1995-2003) 0.03 -0.09 0.09 -0.02 1.00
6. Patent Quality -0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.05 1.00
7. Patent Scope -0.13 -0.02 0.21 0.00 -0.08 0.16 1.00
8. Technology Age 0.14 0.15 -0.27 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 1.00
9. Firm Size -0.32 0.37 0.50 -0.70 -0.05 0.08 0.17 -0.15 1.00
10. R&D Intensity -0.27 0.72 -0.04 -0.45 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.76 1.00
11. Capital Availability -0.09 -0.20 0.37 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.19 0.08 1.00
12. Market Uncertainty 0.01 -0.20 -0.06 0.19 -0.05 0.02 -0.11 0.16 -0.34 -0.31 0.30 1.00
13. Technological Uncertainty -0.03 -0.11 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.17 0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.06 1.00
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Table 5-3: Cox Regression Analysis for the determinants of firm
formation (INV2USO)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Mechanical -0.148 -0.028 1.732
Chemical 0.488 0.613 1.986
Pharma & Bio 1.645 *** 0.747 1.924
Medical 1.042 † 1.167 3.593 **
Year Issued (1995-2003) 0.449 * 0.485 * 0.658 **
Patent Quality 0.004 * 0.005 *
Patent Scope 0.003 0.002
Technology Age -0.034 *** -0.033 ***
Firm Size 0.004 0.008
R&D Intensity -0.160 -0.209
Capital Availability 0.003 ** 0.002 †
Market Uncertainty -22.803 *
Market Uncertainty Square 59.978 **
Technological Uncertainty 0.451 **
N 950 950 950
Model 2 42.2 *** 74.1 *** 90 ***
-2 Log Likelihood 1246 *** 1223 *** 1193 ***
Note: The dataset includes 950 cases and 82 events and two-tailed tests for all variables
†     p < 0.1
*     p < 0.05
**    p < 0.01
***   p < 0.001
We provide three models in our analysis and the detailed steps can be found in
the Appendix (Chapter 9.4.1). Model 1 presents the base model and predicts the
likelihood of firm formation on the basis of the year of patent filing and the in-
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dustry the spinout is founded in. Overall this model is significant (chi-square =
42.2, p < 0.001). As Model 1 shows, the time period when the patent was filed
has a positive effect on firm formation. Patents that are filed between 1995 and
2003 had a 0.45 times greater likelihood of firm formation than patents filed be-
fore 1995 (p < 0.05). This robust pattern of increasing firm formation likelihood
is consistent with prior research on entrepreneurship (Gartner and Shane 1995)
and also corresponds to the proactive spinout policy of the parent institution.
The incidence of spinning out an invention was the lowest for chemical patents
(b = 0.49, p = 0.35) but not statistically significant. Among other industrial
controls Bio and Pharmaceutical industry had the strongest relation to spinout
formation (b = 1.65, p < 0.001). It should be noted that the reference industry
is the electrical industry, which was omitted from the industry controls to pre-
vent falling into the dummy variable trap, which implies perfect collinearity be-
tween the dummy variables.
Model 2 reports the baseline model with five additional controls; technology age,
venture capital availability, R&D investment intensity, industry firm size and
scope of invention. The inclusion of these control variables provides a good fit-
ting model (chi-square = 74.1, p <0.001) and all signs are consistent with previ-
ous research although some controls are not statistically significant.
Among the control variables technology age had a significant negative relation-
ship (b = -0.03, p <= 0.001). This result is consistent with Shane (2001b) who
showed that age of technology class negatively influences spinout firm forma-
tion.
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Further R&D intensity decreases the likelihood of new firm formation (although
not statistically significant), which is consistent with Scherer (1980) who argued
that large firms have competitive advantages over small incumbents in R&D in-
tensive industries because they can more effectively exploit economies of scope
in R&D. The availability of venture capital is positively related to spinout oc-
currence as was expected and highly significant (b = 0.003, p <= 0.01). Aver-
age firm size is not consistent over the models and does not confirm the findings
by prior research conducted by Audretsch (1995) who showed that the entry
costs in industries with larger firm sizes are higher, making entry for small in-
cumbents less attractive. Furthermore, patent quality is significant (b = 0.004,
p <= 0.05) for all the models and has a positive impact on the incidence of new
firm formation (Lerner, 1994).
Model 3 includes market uncertainty, market uncertainty square and techno-
logical uncertainty as predictor variables and shows that inclusion of the vari-
ables generates a good fitting model (chi-square = 90, p < 0.001). These results
support the hypotheses 1 and 2. Consistent with hypothesis 1 and 2, the market
uncertainty is non monotonic and for low market uncertainty we observe a de-
creasing likelihood of firm formation and for high market uncertainty a positive
relation with firm formation which starts at 38% . Hypothesis 3 is confirmed by
Model 3 and shows that the higher technological uncertainty increases likelihood
of spinout formation (b = 0.45, p < 0.001).
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Figure 5-1 Nonlinear effect of market uncertainty on firm formation
(x-Axis = Market Uncertainty, y-Axis firm formation
likelihood)
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5.5.2 Spinout failure (USO2USOTERM)
In concordance with our analysis on the spinout entry we use a Cox regression
analysis on spinout failure as both model frameworks can be considered as sur-
vival models. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the independ-
ent variables are presented in Table 5-4 and Table 5-5 respectively whereas the
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Table 5-4: Descriptive Statistics (USO2USOTERM)
Variables N Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Mechanical 82 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24
Chemical 82 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.33
Pharma & Bio 82 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.49
Medical 82 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.16
Conceptual Support 82 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50
Business Plan Support 82 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50
Financial Planning Support 82 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.49
License Support 82 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46
Equity Support 82 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46
External Financing 82 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49
Industry Cooperation 82 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.49
MPG Cooperation 82 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47
University Cooperation 82 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.28
Firm Size 82 71 479 364 103
Capital Intensity 82 6116 190539 95374 47723
R&D Intensity 82 250 10443 4509 2097
Capital Availability 82 0 352 97 126
Market Uncertainty 82 0.08 0.36 0.17 0.06
Multicollinearity problems are not a concern as correlation threshold between
two variables of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2008) is not breached. The highest observed cor-
relation in Table 5-5 is between R&D investment and average company revenue
(0.79).
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Table 5-5: Correlation Matrix (USO2USOTERM)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1. Mechanical 1.00
2. Chemical -0.09 1.00
3. Pharma & Bio -0.33 -0.48 1.00
4. Medical -0.04 -0.06 -0.20 1.00
5. Conceptual Support -0.15 -0.15 0.08 0.00 1.00
6. Business Plan Support -0.02 -0.03 0.13 0.02 0.64 1.00
7. Financial Planning Support 0.02 -0.05 0.12 0.04 0.61 0.76 1.00
8. Licence Support 0.05 0.16 0.02 -0.10 0.19 0.37 0.43 1.00
9. Equity Support 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.43 0.49 0.60 1.00
10. External Financing 0.12 0.02 0.14 -0.12 0.08 0.27 0.30 0.36 0.63 1.00
11. Industry Cooperation -0.09 0.18 0.12 -0.12 -0.05 0.20 0.21 0.38 0.49 0.56 1.00
12. MPS Cooperation 0.05 0.07 0.15 -0.11 -0.05 0.14 0.08 0.35 0.23 0.23 0.14 1.00
13. University Cooperation 0.10 0.15 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.08 -0.05 0.18 0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 1.00
14. Firm Size -0.36 0.12 0.77 -0.44 -0.02 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.25 0.20 0.06 1.00
15. Capital Intensity -0.27 0.35 0.35 -0.30 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.68 1.00
16. R&D Intensity -0.32 0.51 0.34 -0.28 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.79 0.70 1.00
17. Capital Availability -0.17 -0.29 0.50 -0.11 0.23 0.06 0.10 -0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.41 0.09 0.33 1.00
18. Market Uncertainty -0.09 -0.26 -0.21 0.05 0.24 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.14 -0.19 -0.30 -0.11 -0.04 -0.39 -0.40 -0.28 0.24 1.00
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Similar to the previous chapter we provide the statistical model in three blocks
to check for the stability of the results. The main model is shown in Table 5-6
and the detailed modelling steps can be seen in the Appendix. Model 1 presents
the base model and predicts the likelihood of firm failure on the basis of the in-
dustry the spinout is founded in. Overall this model is not significant and firm
failure does not differ across industries in our sample. This finding is not consis-
tent with Shane and Nerkar (2003). Their analysis showed that spinout failure
across industries is more likely in the electronics industry.
Model 2 shows the baseline model with twelve additional controls including:
technology transfer support structures, venture financing received, cooperation,
firm size, R&D intensity and capital intensity. Inclusion of the additional con-
trol variables results in a good fitting model (chi-square = 60.4, p <0.001). In-
terestingly none of the technology transfer support variables is significant and it
seems that the technology transfer office cannot ‘save’ the spinout from failure.
Still the technology transfer office activities can be very beneficial to the per-
formance of its incumbents as has been supported by previous research. Still the
one dimensional performance measure of firm failure which is the subject of this
analysis cannot be mediated by any support mechanisms of the TTO in our
data sample.
External financial support seems to be negatively correlated to firm failure
which is to be expected. Spinouts that receive financial help are 2.1 times less
likely to fail (p<= 0.05).
On the other hand cooperation with industry as well as cooperation with other
universities decreases the likelihood of failure by 3.1 and 2.6 times respectively
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and both are strongly significant (p<=0.01). Surprisingly cooperation with par-
ent institutions of the Max Planck Society does not significantly influence spin-
out failure.
Among the other control variables R&D intensity positively influences spinout
failure as was expected (b = 0.98, p <= 0.05). Furthermore the model shows
that availability of venture capital in an industry increases firm failure (b =
0.006, p <= 0.05).
Model 3 includes market uncertainty and market uncertainty square as predic-
tor variables and shows that inclusion of the variables generates a good fitting
model (chi-square = 64.6, p < 0.05). These results support the hypotheses 4 and
5. Consistent with hypothesis 4 and 5, the market uncertainty is non monotonic
and for low market uncertainty we observe a decreasing likelihood of firm failure
and for high market uncertainty a positive relation with firm failure formation
(see Figure 5-2), which starts at 44%.
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Figure 5-2 Nonlinear effect of market uncertainty on firm failure
(x-Axis = Market Uncertainty, y-Axis firm failure likelihood)
USO2USOTERM
0.22-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Market Uncertainty
Lifecycle of a License
118
Table 5-6: Cox Regression Analysis for the determinants of firm
failure (USO2USOTERM)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Mechanical -0.825 -0.379 0.162
Chemical -1.331 -2.111 2.141
Pharma & Bio 0.22 3.926 5.124
Medical -12.19 -17.43 -16.68
Conceptual Support 0.820 0.786
Business Plan Support -0.640 -0.433
Financial Planning Support 0.288 -0.044
Licence Support -0.765 -0.560
Equity Support 1.151 1.871
External Financing -2.090 * -2.923 **
University Cooperation -3.085 * -3.446 *
Industry Cooperation -2.595 * -3.091 **
MPG Cooperation -0.198 -0.301
Firm Size -0.037 -0.032
R&D Intensity 0.981 * 1.021 *
Capital Intensity -0.005 -0.005
Capital Availability 0.006 * 0.007 **
Market Uncertainty -49.14 **
Market Uncertainty Square 111.5 **
N 82 82 82
Model 4.93 60.4 *** 64.6 *
-2 Log Likelihood 202 144 *** 137 ***
Note: The dataset includes 82 cases and 26 events and two-tailed tests for all variables
†    p < 0.1
*     p < 0.05
**    p < 0.01
***   p < 0.001
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5.6 Discussion
We have examined data on the population of Max Planck inventions over the
1990 to 2003 period. To build a robust model of firm formation and firm failure
we have included several control variables that previous research has shown to
be significantly influencing the dependent variables. Overall we found that mar-
ket uncertainty is non monotonic in both, the firm formation as well as the firm
failure model. Further we have shown that technological uncertainty influences
the likelihood that an invention will be commercialized through firm formation.
We have found that market uncertainty has a nonlinear relation to firm forma-
tion and that higher uncertainty increases the likelihood of firm formation and
that lower market uncertainty decreases it. Further greater technological uncer-
tainty increases the likelihood of commercializing patents in form of a spinout.
Looking at the spinout failure model we found that for increasing and moderate
levels of market uncertainty the firm failure rates decrease whereas spinout fail-
ure is more likely to occur under very higher market uncertainty.
Our design for both models resembles the design of Shane (2001a) using a Cox
regression (survival analysis) for both dependent variables (firm formation and
firm failure) and assures the validity of the results due to following characteris-
tics. Firstly our design includes the complete population of patents as well as
spinouts issued by our target institution and therefore avoids sample selection
bias. Furthermore the study on firm formation examines patents and inventions
that are simultaneously at risk of being exploited through firm formation as well
as being licensed in by established firms, where both commercialization forms
are mutually exclusive in our sample. Secondly we are examining patents and
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spinouts from a single research institution, where the opportunities as well as
the entrepreneurs who exploit them have homogenous characteristics. This re-
duces the bias of the heterogeneous characteristics of entrepreneurs that are in-
volved in firm formation as well as firm failure.
The implications of this research make a clear contribution to the literature by
being the first to empirically investigate different forms of uncertainty not only
on the entry of new high technology firms but also on their failure which we will
analyse in more detail in the next two chapters.
5.6.1 Firm formation
Looking at the firm formation in more detail our results show that high techno-
logical uncertainty increases the likelihood of entry and that firm formation is
negatively correlated for low market uncertainty and positively for high market
uncertainty. We therefore demonstrate that option value and ultimately firm
entry likelihood (exercise decision) and entry timing changes with the uncer-
tainty regime the technological opportunity is found in. For example as market
uncertainty is dynamic and exogenous and changes in industries over time we
expect the firm entry rates to follow this dynamic behaviour and behave accord-
ingly. Technological uncertainty on the other hand is endogenous and is intrin-
sic to the technology regime it is found in. It does not show dynamic behaviour
like market uncertainty and can only be resolved by subsequent investment and
research. These findings add further support that two different classes of uncer-
tainty are underlying the complex relationship between option value and its ex-
ercise. Further our findings confirm results of previous studies that found a
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nonlinear relation between new firm formation and exogenous uncertainty. As
we have shown in knowledge intensive industries (which were the focus of our
analysis) compound growth options might dominate investment value leading to
our finding that higher market uncertainty increases likelihood of new firm for-
mation. On the other hand in industries with small or non existing growth op-
tions, exogenous uncertainty is expected to be a deterrent of new firm entry.
Hypothesis one relies on the same theory and reasoning deducting the hypothe-
sis as the work of Folta and O’Brien. The main difference and contribution of
hypothesis one is that it explains a different phenomenon. Whereas Folta and
O’Brien focus on the decision by existing firms to enter new industries, hy-
pothesis one focuses on the individual invention and technology level and ex-
plains new firm formation from new entrepreneurs. It uses therefore a different
setting and completely different dataset. It follows each invention and opportu-
nity and examines its occurrence rather than looking on firm wide level. This
enables us to control for invention specific variables and as well extend real op-
tion theory to endogenous variables such as technological uncertainty which
cannot be accomplished with the approach by Folta and O’Brien as their data
choice does not allow this. Further, decision heuristics can be different for deci-
sions coming from large corporations and individual entrepreneurs. Hypothesis
one reaffirms and strengthens real option reasoning as it extends the work on
Folta and O’Brien (2004) in a way that it shows that it is not only applicable in
corporate entrepreneurship but as well on the individual entrepreneurship level.
A similar approach towards explaining entrepreneurial entry was done by Shane
(2001a) who has followed each invention individually but has not focused on
real options and on the variables used in this study. Further the thesis extends
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the work by Shane (2001a) and Ziedonis (2007) as it is using a competing risk
model to explain competing risks of technology commercialization (see Chapter
6.6).
The results are important mainly to two streams of research on new firm forma-
tion. One of the streams analyses the market structure of an industry to under-
stand firm formation (Audretsch, 1995) but does not provide an extensive over-
view and empirical evidence how market uncertainty influences it. Further, we
contribute to another stream of research that looks at the technology level and
tries to identify technology specific characteristics that have effect on firm entry
(Shane, 2001b).
The results should be particularly interesting to scholars of strategic manage-
ment who study the challenge established firms are facing with new entrants.
Our framework provides evidence under what circumstances of uncertainty ex-
isting firms are most likely to be challenged by new firms. In general it provides
a framework for strategic management scholars to understand under which cir-
cumstances competition with new entrants arises.
Future work should try to validate these findings by extending the research to
different industry sectors we have not included in our sample. While we have
aggregated market data for 5 industries future research could include a greater
detail of industry sub levels and depth. We should note that this extension can
only have effect on the findings including market uncertainty, since technologi-
cal uncertainty is market independent. Further research could also be extended
to different or a larger number of institutions to generalize the findings since we
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have analyzed this behaviour based on the technological innovations of only one
large research institution located in Europe.
Our research has primarily focused on the market-wide factors that influence
the value of real options. An area for further research could be to investigate
factors on the institution-level that might influence the value of technological
options they plan to pursue. Such institution-level factors may help to under-
stand how different institutions are coping with exogenous and endogenous un-
certainty in order to optimize their technology commercialization outcomes.
5.6.2 Firm Failure
In this chapter we have examined the effects of market uncertainty on the like-
lihood of firm failure for university start-up companies. Our unique dataset con-
sists of 82 companies that were created from research based in the Max Planck
Society between 1990 and 2003. We showed that market uncertainty has a non
monotonic effect on firm failure and that in market environments with very
high market uncertainty firm failure is more likely whereas relatively stable
markets decrease firm failure rates.
Previous research has shown that the likelihood of new firm survival depends on
the radicalness of technologies they exploit especially when they operate and
compete in fragmented industries (Shane and Nerkar, 2003).
Apart from radical technologies newly formed firms from research institutions
usually operate in uncertain markets and previous research has not addressed
how it affects firm failure of newly established firms. Ghosal (2002) has shown
in an industry wide study on 267 manufacturing US industries that especially
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small companies are susceptible to the influences of market uncertainty whereas
big companies seem not to be affected. He showed that increasing uncertainty is
detrimental for survival of small companies but treated uncertainty as mono-
tonic. Our study is consistent with these findings for higher ranges of uncer-
tainty. We have shown that low uncertainty increases the survival of high tech-
nology companies when it is smaller than 44 % (quadratic equation solved for
model 3 in
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Table 5-7). Since we have shown that uncertainty is non monotonic, we showed
that uncertainty values above 44% seem to be detrimental for high technology
companies.
Therefore our study is consistent with previous findings and complements them
since it shows that uncertainty has a non monotonic impact on high technology
firm survival rates.
5.6.3 Interaction Effects
In addition to the previous results we have tested the dependent variables for
interaction effects between themselves as well as the control variables for com-
pleteness of the analysis. The details of the analysis for spinout formation can
be found in chapter 9.4.2 whereas the chapter 9.4.4 contains the analysis for the
interaction effects of spinout failure.
Only one significant interaction effect is discovered for spinout formation and
that is between the market uncertainty and capital availability.
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Table 5-7 Summary of interaction effects for the firm formation
model
Interactions Coefficient
Market Uncertainty * Capital Availability -0.378 †
Market Uncertainty Square * Capital Availability 0.779 †
Legend
†     p < 0.1
*     p < 0.05
**    p < 0.01
***   p < 0.001
The mediating effect of market uncertainty and capital availability can be in-
terpreted as follows:
 In more certain markets capital availability attenuates the effects of
market uncertainty on firm formation whereas in uncertain markets capi-
tal availability accentuates the effects of market uncertainty on spinout
formation
The interaction model for the firm failure model was performed but no signifi-
cant interaction effects were found between market uncertainty and the other
independent variables.
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6 The lifecycle of a license under market and
technological uncertainty
6.1 Introduction
The rise of university and public research organization (PRO) commercial ef-
forts in the recent years lead to a steady increase in patenting and licensing that
almost tripled over the last decade (AUTM, 2002). This growth shows the suc-
cess in technology transfer and suggests the increasing importance of universities
and PRO’s in technology innovation. A major shift towards support of univer-
sity and PRO commercialization efforts came over the last two decades from in-
centive structures initiated by several governments that have recognised the
value and started to develop support structures. Major policy changes such as
the Bayh Dole Act, but also other supporting policies, such as promoting coop-
erative R&D, patent policy to expand government technology, relaxing anti-
trust regulations, developing cooperative research centres and altering guidelines
for disposition of government owned intellectual property (Bozeman, 2000) have
supported the orientation towards commercialization of innovations created in
universities and PRO’s. This phenomenon can be observed on an international
level and has inspired a recent increase of research interest on the drivers of
university IP commercialization with one of the main vehicle of commercializa-
tion being licensing contracts. Universities and PRO’s typically require faculty,
staff and students to file invention disclosures whenever a new invention was
generated. Further they retain the rights to these inventions. Technology trans-
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fer offices (TTO) usually review these disclosures and decide whether to file for
a patent and subsequently with which commercialization approach to proceed.
Patenting is one of the most obvious and common ways of protecting a submit-
ted invention. Since the scope of protection for patents is not equally effective
across technological fields and the fact that an innovation must be must be
novel, non-obvious and valuable (see Chapter 4) to be patentable, only a pro-
portion of all filed inventions are patented. The role of the TTO is therefore to
decide on the lifecycle of the invention disclosure by maximizing commercial
and strategic value for the university or PRO. In the majority of cases the TTO
decides to licence the invention to an existing company and/ or cooperation
partner. It therefore provides a good setting of understanding the economics and
determinants of licensing, which is one of the most common and most important
inter firm contractual agreements especially in high technology industries
(Grindley and Teece, 1997).
However licensing activity has traditionally been a subject of theoretical enquiry
where empirics were extremely rare (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Theoretical an-
gles explaining licensing contracts can be found in industrial organization theory
and game theory that broadly cover following three research fields (Anand and
Khanna, 2000). (1) Relationship between industry structure and choice of licen-
see (Arrow, 1962), (2) value creation of licence contract between licensor and li-
censee (Kamien and Tauman, 1986), (3) likelihood of ex ante or ex post licens-
ing and relationship between sequential innovations and licensing strategies
(Shapiro, 1985). Recently some studies have viewed licensing from the real op-
tion perspective and analysed impact on the investment and financing of tech-
nology investment (Kulatilaka and Lin, 2006).
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A small number of studies have analysed the licensing phenomenon from an
empirical perspective with the main ones being Anand and Khanna (2000) who
elaborated cross industry differences in licensing contracts, Grindley and Teece
(1997) who have analysed licensing practises in particular industries and Caves
et al. (1987) who have surveyed licensors and licensees on their licensing prac-
tises in a small sample survey. Studies combining theory with strong empirics
are rare with the two main exceptions being Ziedonis (2007) and Dechenaux et
al. (2003). Our study aims to bridge this gap and comprehends current research
with following novelties:
Especially the highly uncertain underlying technology of university inventions
requires substantial development under volatile market conditions to achieve
commercial success therefore making uncertainty one of the main influences of
commercialization success. Recent research has used the theoretical lens of real
option theory mostly to value R&D projects under uncertainty and to highlight
the additional value uncertainty can bring to an option value. A relatively small
fraction of research studied the influence of uncertainty on commercialization
activities and its timing, to which high technology inventions are particularly
exposed (Dechenaux et al., 2003).
We will fill the gap and explore under what conditions of uncertainty, predomi-
nantly to be found in early stage technologies and research intensive industries,
inventions get commercialized. In particular, we will examine the effects of ex-
ogenous (market) as well as endogenous (technology) uncertainty on innovations
and analyze how they are affected by passage of time. Therefore, our study will
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be the first to study both, the influence of exogenous (market uncertainty) and
endogenous uncertainty (technological uncertainty) on licensing activities.
Secondly, we view the commercialization decision under a new theoretical angle
and approach the research questions by grounding our findings on the founda-
tions of real option theory (ROT) in order to consolidate different forms of un-
certainty and optimal decision timing into one theoretical framework. Real op-
tions framework can add new insight towards decision making, namely the un-
derstanding of entry timing of decisions and investments under uncertainty.
Particularly in this case ROT will be used to understand how uncertainty af-
fects the lifecycle of a licence from its inception to termination.
Lastly, although a small number of studies have utilized quantitative and em-
pirical approaches towards university commercialization activities most of them
relied on a single research institution in the US. Our study is the first to explore
a quantitative dataset of university research activities outside the US.
The following section provides a brief introduction into the real options litera-
ture and develops relevant hypotheses. Chapter 6.3 describes the sample, ex-
plains the empirical methodology, and presents the variables. Section 6.4 reports
the model and empirical findings. Finally, Chapter 6.5 and discusses implica-
tions and provides a conclusion of this part of our research.
6.2 Theory Development and Hypothesis
Real options are derived from financial options which give the option holder the
right to buy (call option) or sell (put option) a valuable asset traded in the fi-
nancial markets for a given price. Similar to their financial counterparts, real
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options give the option holder the right to obtain a ‘real’ investment for a given
price that usually corresponds to the cost of the investment. The value of the
option corresponds to the difference between the uncertain payoff and uncertain
investment cost and can never be smaller than zero. Therefore the option holder
possesses the right, but not the obligation, to exercise the investment, should
the total payoff look attractive. This protection against the downside risk can
only lead to the loss of the right rather than the whole investment itself assum-
ing the investor has not exercised the option and committed to the irreversible
investment.
The main prediction of real option theory is that greater uncertainty increases
the value of the option since the upside earnings potential is not limited whereas
the downside risk is. As mentioned earlier, different forms of uncertainty influ-
ence the value of a real option. Two major forms of uncertainty are pertinent in
the real options literature (exogenous and endogenous) that affects the value
and the decision regarding valuation and execution of real option contracts
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Folta, 1998). Exogenous uncertainty, usually referred
to as market uncertainty, is affected by external market forces and can only be
resolved through waiting. Further the holder of the option does not have any ef-
fect on this form of uncertainty and resolution is independent of actions of the
option holder. Endogenous uncertainty on the other hand refers to uncertainties
intrinsic to the investment where the investor can have influence on its resolu-
tion. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have shown that endogenous uncertainty can
only be resolved by active investment of the option holder and usually encour-
ages early and sequential investment.
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Each invention created by university researchers passes different phases before
it can be absorbed in a commercial setting which we refer to as the pre and post
licence phase. The process and pre-license phase starts with the invention being
disclosed to the technology transfer office by a university scientist or a research
group. Once an invention is licensed, we consider that the same invention is in
the post licence phase.
The TTO can decide what to do with the university invention but the basic two
ways of commercialization are a) licensing the invention to an industry partner
or b) exploiting the technology themselves by investing in the technology and
e.g. creating a university spinout. Basically MPS uses license agreements to pro-
vide commercial usage rights of their inventions, patents, technical know-how or
software against payment. The majority of licences are patent licences meaning
that MPS will not sue a counterparty that infringes MPS’s patents on the li-
censed technology. During the licensing agreement the limitation is usually
agreed upon between licensor and licensee and refers to limitations of usage to
specific technology fields or territories. Further the sponsors of research (e.g.
government) can guarantee themselves to exploit the technology in a limited
fashion. In an additional agreement the licensee might lock in additional assis-
tance in areas such as training, technology transfer, consulting and further de-
velopment of the underlying product.
A common process a licensee passes through before committing to a licensing
contract:
 conducting due diligence on the underlying technology
 deciding on licensing terms with the TTO
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The licensing terms usually encompass:
 exclusive vs. non exclusive licence
 territory and field limitations if any
 amount and form of payment
 milestones for development
 additional TTO assistance and support
License revenues exist in form of milestone payments, unique upfront payments
as well as royalties on inventions once they have commercial value. The royalty
payments can take a variety of forms. Some of the most common are fixed per
unit royalties, royalties as percentage of revenue streams as well as royalties
that scale with the success of technology usage. The licence can be up to the life
of the underlying patent but is usually defined for a period of time. The termi-
nation of a licence is usually negotiated with the TTO at will which enables the
licensee with the right to terminate the license at some period of advance notice.
The TTO possesses as well the right to terminate the licence if the licensee vio-
lates the licensing terms such as not paying the royalties or milestone payments.
License agreements as previously mentioned are negotiated, locked in and su-
pervised by the patent and license managers as well as lawyers of the TTO. If a
licensee is found, licensing can bring in a stable revenue flow in the short term.
However, it can be more profitable over the long term for the institution by tak-
ing equity stake in form of a spinout in lieu of licensing fees if the technology
proves to be successful. Generally a greater risk pays potentially a greater re-
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ward. The difficulty lies in the fact that the decision makers operate under
ubiquitous uncertainty regarding market conditions as well as the technology it-
self when trying to make this decision (assuming both options can be pursued).
Especially in high technology industries where dynamic and volatile markets
dominate the commercialization potential of new technologies and the technolo-
gies itself underlie high uncertainties regarding their feasibility it is important to
understand how the markets govern the commercialization of innovations.
University inventions have option like characteristics as the option holder has a
limited downside risk but upside potential to exploit it. If the technology turns
out to be technologically not feasible and problematical or the market demand
is not favourable, the option holder can decide to abandon the licence and other
subsequent investments. Moreover the licence on the invention is timely
bounded as the monopoly profits based on the invention expires after a fixed
amount of time (usually 20 years). Further other competitors in the same tech-
nology domain may reduce the shelf life of the patent by inventing around or
creating substitutes for the licensed invention. Another important characteristic
is that the invention value is highly susceptible to uncertainty regarding its
market value as well as its technical feasibility. Another important characteris-
tic is that the underlying investment is irreversible.
PRO’s and universities are involved in cutting edge research and pioneering de-
velopment of new ingenious technologies. These technologies have potential to
be commercially valuable but are in very early development phases making
them susceptible to high technological as well as market uncertainty. Obtaining
a license allows the licensee to gain early access to the underlying technologies
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but requires further investments in technology development if the commercial
phase is to be achieved. We consider licenses as an opportunity to invest in a
first generation high tech product that are in real option terms analogous to an
compound option (options on options) for the licensee (Trigeorgis, 1993). This
type of option gives the licensee the opportunity to stage investments with the
ability to discontinue investment and abandon the licence in the event that the
technology seems not feasible or unfavourable information is uncovered during
the investment period. The subsequent options that the compound option
holder is entitled to can be seen as growth options that give the licensee the op-
tion to expand in a technology field.
Following section provides a framework that will be used to identify and clarify
how different forms of uncertainty influence the lifecycle of the invention in the
pre and post-licensing phases especially in research intensive industries where
uncertainty can have large impact on the decision making process.
6.2.1 Effects of Uncertainty on Licensing and Licensing Ter-
mination
Uncertainty is usually feared by investors as it diminishes the predictability of
the profit (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Still uncertainty can create opportunities
when it is properly understood (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999) and real option
theory tries to understand the effects of uncertainty on optimal investment deci-
sion making giving uncertainty a value during the decision process (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994).
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It was stated earlier that market uncertainty is referred to as a form of exoge-
nous uncertainty and cannot be affected by actions of the option holder as it is
determined by the market. Option theory tells us that the value of the option
increases with increasing uncertainty regarding the underlying asset. Similar to
a financial option, options on new technologies become more valuable when
market uncertainty is high, that is when the future value of the underlying asset
(e.g. future cash flows from the licence) or the investment cost itself fluctuates
strongly. Innovation literature has observed the fact that technology value is
proportional to underlying demand’s potential variance and uncertainty
(McGrath, 1997).
On the other hand waiting for the uncertainty to resolve and gain new informa-
tion regarding its value through time has a value which in ROT literature is re-
garded as the option to delay or defer. This delay of action and waiting to re-
ceive new information influences the attractiveness of the investment as well as
the decision timing of the option holder when to exercise the option and commit
to the irreversible investment. Under the option framework when dividends (op-
portunity costs of not committing oneself to the investment and exercising the
option) are not existing it is always optimal to delay exercising the call option
as long as possible if dividends are not present (for proofs see Miller and Folta,
2003 or Dixit and Pindyck (1994) who showed that it is never optimal to exer-
cise an American option prior expiration date).
Licences on the other hand present a compound option for the licensee. These
are options to expand current operations that are of considerable strategic im-
portance and enable the exploitation of future opportunities. A good example is
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the pharmaceutical and biotech license that introduces a new technology result-
ing in a new product and future growth opportunities. A license is an early
stage technology needs to pass though clinical phase I study, clinical II study,
clinical III study and an FDA regulatory review. Even when the phases were
successfully developed there is substantial uncertainty about the potential cash
flows and revenues of the technology. A licensing agreement for an early tech-
nology therefore transfers the development and commercialization risk to the li-
censee who has the flexibility to decide when to commit to the next step of de-
velopment and investment.
Exploiting the licence usually is a sequential process and each required invest-
ment can be seen as link in the chain of interrelated investment projects. The
ultimate value may not be directly measured from cash flows of the license itself
but rather from unlocking future growth opportunities (growth options). These
growth options can be of strategic nature such as developing a new product to
preempt competition, accessing or expanding to new markets and strengthening
firms’ core capabilities and positioning (Trigeorgis, 1993). The value of waiting
and postponing licensing the invention is small relative to the value depreciation
of the growth options across time (Folta and O’Brien, 2004). Since the value of
the options increases with the market uncertainty regime, the licensee is inter-
ested in getting access to the underlying growth options as soon as possible and
therefore it is expected that under higher market uncertainty the licensee of a
high technology that is sensitive to uncertainty will purchase it earlier rather
than later. Further universities and public research institutions have usually a
broad spectrum of research activities and markets the inventions might be valu-
able for. Exact understanding of how these markets work and function is a pre-
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requisite of understanding the commercialization potential of the invention.
Lack of industry experience and market understanding is especially accentuated
when high market uncertainty persists. In these cases the consequences of mar-
ket uncertainty might better be understood by industry professionals rather
than the research institution itself who decides to sell the invention in form of a
licence rather than exploit it themselves in form of a spinout. Therefore there is
an increased preference for licensing when uncertainty gets higher.
However at some extreme high levels of uncertainty, the costs of developing the
technology overwhelm the likelihood of extracting any license and so it does not
occur.
These arguments lead us to following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The impact of market uncertainty on selling patents in form of a
license is nonmonotonic
Hypothesis 2: Market uncertainty will positively influence the likelihood of sell-
ing patents in form of a license when uncertainty is low and negatively influence
it when uncertainty is high
The technology licensed from a PRO is usually novel piece of technology for the
licensee. The learning process, experience, potential by products gained during
the development and exploitation of the licence may serve as a catalyst for im-
proved future generations of that product or even advances in other areas. Fur-
ther the experience and learning process during exploitation of a novel technol-
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ogy and license can reinforce the licensees’ competitive advantage. All these
benefits are not possible before the licensee commits to make the initial invest-
ment and purchase the license.
It was pointed out earlier that inventions of research institutions and universi-
ties stem mostly from basic research and need further technological development
before the technology can be ready for commercialization. These technologies
have a risk and uncertainty associated with them which are referred to as en-
dogenous uncertainty or technological uncertainty. This form of uncertainty is
resolved by active involvement by the firm, and encourages early and sequential
investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Technological uncertainty is a techno-
logical bottleneck that the invention can have commercial use whereas market
uncertainty determines the market value of the technology once it is developed
and technological uncertainty resolved. For this reason technological uncertainty
is intrinsic to the option holder as it is them who can actively resolve it inter-
nally by undertaking the technology development and investing time and re-
sources.
From the real option perspective higher technological uncertainty incentivises
early and incremental investment and increases the probability that the license
is purchased. Another important point to be made is that the knowledge intrin-
sic to an early stage technology is best understood by the scientists themselves
(technology creators) who possess knowledge which further investments and re-
sources are needed for the inventions’ technical feasibility. The ability to evalu-
ate external information and the ability to utilize external information was ob-
served by Arora and Gambardella (1994) as two dimensions of a firm’s absorp-
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tive capacity that affect a firm’s likelihood to enter in technological collabora-
tions in different ways. External buyers (licensees) of technologies have limited
access to this form of tacit knowledge and are reluctant to buy a technology
that is technologically highly uncertain as they do not possess the knowledge to
estimate how much effort and resources are needed and have problems evaluat-
ing it. This risk is usually mitigated by the fact that the TTO offers support of
technology transfer to the licensee.
Therefore if investing provides information and resolves technological uncer-
tainty like e.g. taking out a licensing contract, higher technological uncertainty
increases the probability of licensing the invention. This leads us to following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Greater technological uncertainty increases the likelihood of sell-
ing patents in form of a licence (pre-licensing phase)
One important question raised by strategic investment literature addresses the
timing of entering new markets of existing under competition. Companies that
develop new products face often the dilemma of early versus delayed entry.
Both can be beneficial in a sense that early entry can discourage other competi-
tors from market entry by profiting from early mover advantages whereas delay-
ing entry and waiting for market uncertainty to resolve can lead to more certain
and predictable investments. When the new market turns out to be strong, de-
laying investments can be the suboptimal strategy since gaining a strong market
position can than be more difficult.
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Preemption refers to the possibility of other parties entering the same market
and can be viewed as possible strategic investments which from the option per-
spective reduce the value of competitor’s dividends as well as the value of the
competitors’ real options (Miller and Folta, 2002). A call option on a monopoly
position is analogous to a call on a stock paying a constant dividend whereas
under competition the dividend payout decreases as rivals enter the market
(Miller and Folta, 2002). Therefore option value (C) in a market that faces high
threat of preemption is lower than in a market where there is no threat of pre-
emption (current dividends are reduced), which represents the loss of market
share in the next period due to competitive preemption. Especially, entrants in
new technology fields face the threat of preemption as existing companies try to
secure their position through patenting and commercializing new technologies
by increasing the cost of subsequent entry of rivals. As we have shown, techno-
logical areas with high threat of preemption can indicate a strongly contested
technological field, mostly dominated by incumbents, which can be unattractive
to new entrants. Consequently, the higher the risk that a real option will be ex-
ploited by competitors (e.g. through existing companies or other start-ups), the
less likely will be the exercise of the option. This leads us to following hypothe-
sis:
Hypothesis 4: High threat of preemption negatively influences the likelihood that
an invention will be licensed (pre-licensing phase)
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In the previous chapters we have considered an invention as an option to com-
mercialize it either by selling the invention in form of a license or by exercising
it in form of a spinout. Once the invention is sold the licensees hold themselves
an option to commercialize the underlying IP. The licensee is bound through
one or more of the following alternatives to the licensor such as milestone pay-
ments, unique upfront payments as well as royalties on inventions once it has
reached commercial value. If the commercial potential of the license turns out to
be less than expected and therefore less than the cost needed to maintain it, the
licensor can terminate the agreement and decide not to continue paying the
costs for the license. Unlike in the spinout case the sunk cost in exploiting the
license is much smaller and the sensitivity of uncertainty on cash flows from the
license much smaller since the project can be mothballed whereas the spinout
cannot. This leads to the fact that the decision is mostly governed by the value
of the option rather than external factors. As we have pointed out in earlier
chapters an option value increases with the market uncertainty regime it is
found in. In relatively certain markets the value of the option can be relatively
small compared to the investment needed for its continuation. Further the value
is much easier to estimate in these market conditions. This would lead that in
low uncertainty conditions the option would be terminated as soon as the licen-
see realizes that it cannot be a commercial success whereas in regimes of high
levels of market uncertainty it is preferable for the licensee to hold an option as
it increases in value. Therefore we would expect that under very high market
uncertainty the licensee would not abandon his license and keep it.
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This leads us to following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The impact of market uncertainty on licensing termination is
nonmonotonic
Hypothesis 6: Market uncertainty will positively influence the likelihood of ter-
minating licenses when uncertainty is low, and negatively influence it when un-
certainty is high
A licence provides the firm with the opportunity to generate cash flows in the
future on the underlying technology. The firm however also has the opportunity
to "put" the project back and abandon the investment permanently. This is
usually done when the continuation value of the project is smaller than the
value of abandoning it. If events unfold such that market demand for the new
product is weak and not sufficient for the new product to be profitable, the firm
can with a prior notice terminate the project, halt development and technology
exploitation and stop paying license fees. In such a case the option to abandon
the license can be framed as an American put option since it can be exercised at
any point in time. The licensing firm has the right, but not the obligation to
terminate the project and if possible sell off, write off or reuse the project's as-
sets in another setting. The firm will in this case exercise the put option and
abandon the project. On the other side if demand turns out to be strong and
the technology development successful, the licensee will allow its put option to
expire, and will continue to develop further and eventually market the new
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technology. The value of each option is increasing with uncertainty according to
real option theory. Therefore the value of the abandonment option increases
with both market and technological uncertainty. However unlike a growth op-
tion, the option to abandon does not contain hidden value that might influence
the exercise timing of the option. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have shown analyti-
cally that uncertainty over future demand increases the firms’ zone of inaction
for options to abandon and stop an investment. Therefore we expect the licensee
to postpone abandonment under high market uncertainty and wait. Only when
the demand structure is certain and the licensee expects a negative demand for
the technology they will abandon the license and development of the technology
as was explained in the previous hypothesis. For technological uncertainty on
the other hand there is no value in waiting since it can be only resolved by ac-
tive investment of the licensee. Especially externally developed technologies that
are licensed have a additional risk as they are not developed in house and exper-
tise and knowledge have to be transferred to the licensor. Therefore high tech-
nological uncertainty will always lead to a higher likelihood of license termina-
tion. This leads us to following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: Greater technological uncertainty increases the likelihood of
abandoning and terminating the licence by the licensee (post-licensing phase)
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6.3 Methodology
6.3.1 Sample
The dataset for this study comes from unpublished records of the technology
transfer office of the Max Planck institution that keeps records of all their
commercialization activities. The data includes all patented inventions by the
MPS faculty, staff and students from 1990 to 2003.
MPS practices a licensing process that includes different ways of obtaining a li-
cense. A firm can either agree a non exclusive license, an exclusive license, an
option on an exclusive license and an option on a non exclusive license. The
term exclusive grants the potential licensee an exclusive right either (in an op-
tion on a license contract) to use information disclosed by the university to de-
termine the technological and commercial viability of the invention or (in a li-
cense contract) to have rights to commercialize the university invention and
generate cash flows from it. We consider an option on a license as a compound
option (option on option) and exclude it from our analysis. Typically the firm
pays up-front fees, royalty payments, and/or minimum royalties fee for obtain-
ing the license.
A complete population of 1123 invention disclosures are examined for the preli-
censing phase out of which 484 were licensed out to the industry (including ex-
clusive, nonexclusive and licence options). The postlicensing phase contains data
on all 484 exclusive and nonexclusive licensed patents out of which 186 licences
were terminated prematurely. A major advantage of this dataset relative to
other samples of is that the TTO’s tracks each invention and records every li-
Lifecycle of a License
146
cence activity and commercialization effort of its IP, which is important to
eliminate selection bias.
6.3.2 Analysis
Cox regression time dependent is the first analysis of choice in our case since
our study incorporates a censored dataset of patents with time dependent co-
variates. Several advantages exist compared to other regression methods with
the major advantage of that not requiring an assumption about a particular
probability distribution of survival times. Further it allows the inclusion of time
dependent covariates. Time dependent covariates are those that can change
their value or impact over the course of observation. This gives us the possibil-
ity to predict the likelihood of new firm formation on the basis of our specified
independent variables and to understand how time influences their impact. The
basic model including time dependent covariates is usually written as:
)(...)()()(log ,1,1 txtxtth kikii  
The equation says that the hazard for individual i at time t is a function of a
set of a baseline function at time t and k covariates at time t.
6.3.3 Dependent Variables
License Initiation (INV2LIC, pre-licensing phase)
Our data is an unbalanced, right censored panel. Each day a patented invention
can be licensed or not and the license could be issued to a non-profit organiza-
tion, an established firm, or a new firm. Therefore we track the date from in-
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vention disclosure to the date until one of the following events occurs: it is right
censored or it is licensed out. The different forms of licenses that we consider in
our analysis include exclusive and non exclusive licences and licensing options.
Since the Cox regression needs a timing parameter that measures the time to
event occurrence we count the number of days from the invention disclosure
date to date of licensing the invention for each single invention disclosure. An
observation that does not contain an event (e.g. licensing) is defined as a cen-
sored event and the time to event is counted as the number of days from the
invention disclosure date to a fixed date. In our case we have chosen it to be the
last date of observation to be 31/12/2003.
License Termination (LIC2LICTERM, post-licensing phase)
Since university inventions usually stem from basic research the inventions
when licensed out to an industry partner need further investment to bring them
to a commercially feasible state. Once an industry partner has licensed the in-
vention he can reap the benefits but can also abandon and terminate the licence
once it deems to be unprofitable. Therefore the unit of analysis in this survival
analysis is the license itself. We track the termination of exclusive and non ex-
clusive licenses and track the time to event from date of acquiring the license to
the date the license is terminated. An observation that does not contain an
event (e.g. termination) is defined as a censored event and the time to event is
counted as the number of days from the date the license is acquired to a fixed
fate (31/12/2003).
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6.3.4 Independent Variables
Real option theory distinguishes between endogenous uncertainties (technologi-
cal uncertainty) that are intrinsic to the firm and exogenous uncertainties (mar-
ket uncertainty) which are dependent on the market and where the option
holder has no influence upon. We will account for both types of uncertainties
and explore how they affect the likelihood of invention commercialization and
its timing.
Market uncertainty (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
The market uncertainty represents the randomness of the external environment
and majority of research has measured randomness of demand to account for
market uncertainty (e.g. Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998) as demand impacts
prices and therefore determines profitability (Folta and O’Brien, 2004). Since
our study measures the uncertainty of the industry segment the patent is in, we
will not consider macroeconomic uncertainty measures (e.g. GDP uncertainty)
like the majority of real option literature but rather focus on micro-industry-
specific uncertainty. Since our patents are representing 5 major technology fields
which were classified by the TTO into Mechanical, Medical, Pharma & Biotech,
Chemical and Electrical Technology, we will use these industry segments to cal-
culate our market uncertainties.
The volatilities for each invention were calculated by computing the standard
deviation of the industry clusters’ daily stock returns. Since the invention dis-
closure dates were different across inventions we had to calculate market volatil-
ities for each invention disclosure separately. The standard deviation of the
stock market volatilities is specific to the industry subfield and exogenous to the
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control of individual firms and therefore represents a valid measure for market
uncertainty.
It should be noted that stock index data that was used for the volatility calcula-
tions was not available for Germany. The available stock indices for Germany
were either not dating back for the required time period or some technology in-
dustries was not available. Therefore, I have used the FTSE Eurotop300 Indexes
that follow the stock prices of these 5 technology clusters for public European
companies since 1987 and calculated the volatilities of the stock composite in-
dexes using daily data obtained from DataStream. Since the majority of compa-
nies in these emerging technology industries are dependent on worldwide mar-
kets it is a valid assumption to use the European wide market uncertainty as it
is mainly driven by macro industrial trends. For some industries where we could
find a corresponding German stock index we have calculated correlations be-
tween the German and European Stock indices and found very high correlation
coefficients (>95%) which further confirms our assumption.
The next question is how to estimate volatility from this data. A decision maker
that has to make a investment decision which value is influenced by volatility
(option like contracts) will have to evaluate how the volatility will behave in
the future period t during his investment is active. If the investor has estimated
(predicted) the volatility correctly over time period t his investment will realize
this volatility and this volatility should be used to price an option like contract
correctly. This is effectively the volatility that needs to be used in a real option
theory framework.
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An analogy with the financial markets in which a market to trade future volatil-
ity exists can be drawn in order to clarify this even further. The financial mar-
kets trade options that have different expiration dates. Each option is quoted a
price in the market which is a consensus of multiple buyers and sellers. The
market norm is usually to quote volatilities rather than prices because they are
interchangeable and can be calculated one from the other. Therefore there is an
agreement what the option is worth for a specific expiry (over a specific time
period) and a volatility figure is determined by the market. This volatility is
called implied market volatility for a specific expiry. This figure is what the
whole market expects the option will realize until its expiration and would be
the best measure of volatility.
Since historical option price data for specific industries does not exist the esti-
mation has to be approached differently. There are two main approaches exist-
ing in current literature on real options handling this problem. Using a GARCH
model and using historical volatility. In this research the historical volatility
measure was chosen but the models were tested as well using the GARCH
framework and it should be noted that it does not alter the model results in any
way. A more detailed discussion on the robustness of the market uncertainty
measure can be found in chapter 9.1.
Following standard formula was used to calculate the annualized volatility for
each invention:
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where  is the annualized volatility, N the number of daily returns, xi the re-
turn in period i and x the average return over N periods.
As a reference date we have used the day when the invention was disclosed to
the TTO for measuring the market uncertainty of the license initiation hypothe-
sis. For the licensing termination hypothesis we measured the reference date
when the license was contracted. We calculated for each invention the market
uncertainty for 52 (similar to Folta 1998) prior to the invention disclosure date.
Therefore for each patent we obtained a 1 year volatility window based on daily
stock index return data. The reason for using the invention disclosure date
rather than the date when the patent was granted as the reference date for our
calculation is simply because some of the inventions can get commercialized
even before the patent was granted.
Technological Uncertainty (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
We have previously defined technological uncertainty as the uncertainty regard-
ing the technology development cost and the physical difficulty of completing
the investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). One possibility of measuring uncer-
tainty is to ask experts such as technology transfer officers, inventors, and IP
lawyers to assess the uncertainty of each technology patent individually at time
of publication. Walker and Weber (1984) have utilized such an approach in
measuring technological uncertainty in a two dimensional measure as “frequency
of expected changes in specifications” and “probability of future technological
improvements” measuring technology uncertainty of products for a small num-
ber of established firms. In our case this approach would be impracticable due
to three reasons. Firstly, the large number of patents we consider in our analysis
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and the previous approach would limit the sample size drastically since the in
depth analysis of a single patent can take several weeks and is very expensive
(Markman et al., 2004). Secondly, we are considering uncertainty of already is-
sued patents and it would not be efficient to ask professionals retrospectively
about evaluations of patents that are already a couple of years old. Thirdly,
technological uncertainty has dynamic characteristics as it fluctuates over time.
To account for this problem, we would have to ask professionals if the techno-
logical uncertainty changed for each year after patent issuance, which makes
this approach implausible. Therefore we will develop a measure which unravels
all mentioned disadvantages and does not depend on primary measures.
Before a patent is issued, patent officers determine what previous patents and
non patent literature must be cited in a patent by researching prior patents.
Each of these citations refers to a specific date when the cited patent was is-
sued. The citations show adjacent technological knowhow and with increasing
average age of the citations, the technology field is more explored and more cer-
tain. Similar to Lowe (2002) we measure patent specific technological uncer-
tainty (TU) for each patent as the average age of the cited patents (PCj) and
cited non patent literature (NPLi), where j is the number of the cited patents
and i is number of cited non patent literature entries. For the reference date to
calculate the average age of patents we use the invention disclosure date for the
licensing initiation hypothesis. For the licensing termination hypothesis the ref-
erence date for calculating the technological uncertainty is the date the license
was contracted. This measure is valid as it provides the technological uncer-
tainty at the time the invention was disclosed and is therefore not a retrospec-
tive measure of uncertainty. We define TU as:
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Threat of Preemption
Similar to Geroski’s (1995) argument that high industry concentration levels in-
crease incumbent power to attack new entrants we argue that the higher the
technological concentration in a technological field the higher the threat of pre-
emption. Technological fields which are dominated by a smaller number of in-
cumbents and therefore are more concentrated will be more likely involved in
preemptive strategies to protect their technologies, which will lead to higher
threat of preemption.
Similar to the Herfindahl index, that measures industry concentration by sum-
ming squared market shares of leading companies in an industry, we will meas-
ure technological concentration and therefore threat of preemption as sum of
squared patent shares of rivals in the same technological domain (patent sub-
class) during year t. Rivals are defined as any other organization (for-profit or
not-for profit such as other universities) issuing patents in the same patent sub-
class. We define patents in the same technology areas when their international
patent classification code equate.
TCit is the patent concentration of rivals in patent subclass i in year t indicated
by the sum of patent shares PSikt for companies k=1 to n. We define patent
share (PSikt) as the number of patents (Pikt) in a subclass i company k has issued
in a given year t divided by the total number of patents (TPit) issued in this
sub-class i.
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6.3.5 Control Variables
Invention Experience (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
Currently the Max Planck Society maintains 80 institutes, research units, and
working groups that are devoted to a wide range of research areas. The insti-
tutes are organized in a way that each institute specializes in a certain technol-
ogy field. The institutes work largely in an interdisciplinary setting and in close
cooperation with universities and other research institutes in Germany and
abroad to generate cutting-edge knowledge and technological breakthroughs in
diverse technological areas. The institutes themselves produce difference amount
of inventing output which can affect the amount of licenses generated as well as
terminated. Therefore we control for the number of inventions each institute has
disclosed to the TTO before the current invention was disclosed as a measure of
inventive experience.
Licensee Experience (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
Similar to Ziedonis (2007) we measure the number of previous licenses a licensee
has acquired from MPS. Firms that have previously licensing experience with a
MPS invention may be better able to evaluate a new technology in related ar-
eas. Our measure for previous licensing experience with MPS equals 1 if the firm
has previously licensed a patent from an MPS and equals 0 otherwise.
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Technical field (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
A cross industry variation of licensing behaviour was observed by Anand and
Khanna (2000). We will therefore control for the technology fields the patents
are in, since certain technology fields that the different research institute cover
are more likely to be commercialized than others. Similar to Shane (2001b) we
will include dummy variables for mechanical, electrical, chemical and biophar-
maceutical inventions.
Time controls (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
We control for effects of time by using a time dummy variable for the period
between 1995 and 2003. The reason for the time control is the fact that Max
Planck has proactively changed its policy towards commercializing their IP from
this time period. Therefore we expect the highest number of licensing agree-
ments after 1995.
Partnered Research (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
Inventions that are resulting from partnered research, especially partnered with
industry, can be more commercially oriented. Further partnering with other
universities and public research organizations can result in a more effective
knowledge transfer. This can have effect on both the licensing probability as
well as termination. We therefore control for partnered research if the invention
was partnered with an industry partner, with another public research organiza-
tion or a university.
Funded Research (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
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Funding does suggest a particular interest in the research underlying the pat-
ented invention. We therefore control for funding that equals 1 if the invention
that has led to the patent under consideration was funded and equals 0 other-
wise.
Age of technology class (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
New technologies are more likely to be commercialized when the field of tech-
nology is young. We will therefore measure the age of technology class as the
number of days between the IPC (international patent class) code was first is-
sued by the patent office and the patent publication date. The difference be-
tween age of technology class and technological uncertainty should be elabo-
rated at this point. The age of technology class measures how old the technol-
ogy class is which is not necessarily related to technological uncertainty. One
can assume that an older technology class is also less uncertain but it is still
common to observe technological breakthroughs in old technology classes. This
is exactly what the technology uncertainty variable tries to capture by analys-
ing the average age of citations rather than the age of technology class. Table 1
shows that the correlations of these two variables are relatively low which
strengthens the argument that there is little association between the two vari-
ables.
Patent scope (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
To control for the patent scope we include Lerner’s (1994) measure of patent
scope, which is based upon the number of technological classes the patent is
categorized into. Patents that are classified into more technological areas are
broader in scope according to Lerner (1994) and Shane (2001b) and are more
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valuable. According to Lerner this measure captures different dimensions of
economic importance e.g. firm valuation, likelihood of patent litigation and cita-
tions. Therefore it should increase the likelihood of licensing an invention and
decrease the likelihood of termination.
Patent Quality (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
Previous research has argued that a measure for patent quality can be derived
from the fact how many other patents the claims and to how many other pat-
ents and non patent literature the patent refers to (Lerner, 1994). We control
for patent claims and references since patent value should increase the likelihood
of licensing and decrease licensing termination.
Start Up (INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM)
We control if the licensee is a start-up company. In each year a patent could be
licensed or not and the license could be issued to an established firm, or a new
firm. Similar to Shane (2001b) we define firm formation as occurring in a given
year, if the invention was licensed to a for-profit firm that did not exist as a le-
gal entity in the previous year. As we have shown in the previous chapter the
characteristics of the licensee can influence how the market and technological
uncertainty affects licensing or spinning out and termination or firm failure.
Previous Technology Transfer Experience (INV2LIC)
We measure the previous technology transfer experience of a technology transfer
officer as the amount of previous inventions they have disclosed and have sup-
ported before a certain invention was disclosed. A highly experienced technology
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transfer officer may be more successful at licensing out inventions which we ac-
count for with this control variable.
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Prelicensing Phase (INV2LIC)
Table 6-1 reports the descriptive statistics and Table 6-2 bivariate correlations
for the independent variables in the initial regression analysis respectively. The
total amount of inventions considered is 1123 which result in 484 events (li-
censes contracted).
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Table 6-1: Descriptive Statistics (INV2LIC)
Variables N Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Mechanical 1123 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24
Chemical 1123 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.44
Pharma & Bio 1123 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50
Medical 1123 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30
Year Issued (1995-2003) 1123 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.50
Patent References 1123 0.00 29.00 5.21 3.93
Patent Quality 1123 0.00 613.00 18.48 25.32
Patent Scope 1123 0.00 19.00 2.63 2.77
Technology Age 1123 0.00 77.33 15.96 13.06
Funded Research 1123 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.28
Partnered Research 1123 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.48
Invention Experience 1123 0.00 212.00 39.11 42.82
Licensee Experience 1123 0.00 228.00 25.97 35.15
Previous Technology Transfer Experience 1123 0.00 144.00 31.73 31.59
Market Uncertainty 1123 0.09 0.49 0.21 0.07
Technological Uncertainty 1123 -9.13 0.00 -1.15 1.28
Threat of Preemption 1123 0.77 6.12 2.62 0.76
We provide six models for the pre as well as the postlicensing phase in our
analysis. The main model for the prelicensing phase can be found in Table 6-3
and the different model steps can be found in the Appendix. Model 1 in presents
the base model for the prelicensing phase and predicts the likelihood of licensing
on the basis of industry and time controls. Overall the model is significant (chi-
square = 31.2, p < 0.001). As Model 1 shows, licensing out an invention was the
lowest for chemical patents (b = 0.67, p < 0.001) among other industrial con-
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trols with the highest being medical (b = 0.92, p < 0.001). It should be noted
that the reference industry is the electrical industry, which was omitted from
the industry controls to prevent falling into the dummy variable trap, which
implies perfect collinearity between the dummy variables (Gujarati, 2008). Fur-
ther biopharmaceutical patents are 0.85 (p < 0.001) times more likely to be li-
censed out.
The correlation table (Table 6-2) shows that the correlation coefficient of the
independent variables does not exceed r = 0.54. The only exception is between
invention experience and licensee experience where the correlation coefficient is
r = 0.86 which is relatively high and multicollinearity can become a problem.
We have performed analyses including and excluding these two variables and
the results were stable concluding that multicollinearity is not a concern in this
analysis.
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Table 6-2: Correlation Matrix (INV2LIC)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1. Mechanical 1.00
2. Chemical -0.15 1.00
3. Pharma & Bio -0.22 -0.54 1.00
4. Medical -0.08 -0.20 -0.29 1.00
5. Year Issued (1995-2003) 0.02 -0.10 0.08 -0.02 1.00
6. Patent References -0.10 -0.08 0.16 0.04 0.13 1.00
7. Patent Quality -0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.13 1.00
8. Patent Scope -0.13 -0.03 0.20 0.01 -0.07 0.18 0.16 1.00
9. Technology Age 0.14 0.16 -0.28 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.00 -0.07 1.00
10. Funded Research -0.01 -0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.19 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 1.00
11. Partnered Research -0.06 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.12 -0.04 0.12 1.00
12. Invention Experience -0.03 0.10 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.12 0.08 1.00
13. Licensee Experience -0.05 0.01 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.11 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.09 0.86 1.00
14. Previous Technology Transfer Experience -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.17 0.04 0.13 -0.09 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.40 0.32 1.00
15. Market Uncertainty 0.01 -0.19 -0.08 0.21 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.10 0.14 0.09 -0.01 0.27 0.22 0.19 1.00
16. Technological Uncertainty -0.04 -0.11 0.16 0.02 -0.01 -0.23 0.01 0.07 -0.16 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 1.00
17. Threat of Preemption 0.18 0.15 -0.44 0.00 -0.03 -0.14 -0.02 -0.14 0.25 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.19 -0.07 1.00
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Model 2 reports the baseline model with nine additional controls. The inclusion
of these control variables provides a good fitting model (chi-square = 214, p
<0.001) and the three significant variables are previous licensee experience (b =
0.007, p < 0.05, partnered research (b = 0.999, p < 0.001) and patent refer-
ences (b = 0.023, p < 0.1).
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Table 6-3: Cox Regression Analysis for the determinants of licensing
(INV2LIC)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Mechanical -0.055 -0.153 -0.279
Chemical
0.668
*** 0.292 0.191
Pharma & Bio
0.849
*** 0.437 * 0.147
Medical
0.924
*** 0.533 * 0.239
Patent References 0.023 † 0.025 *
Patent Quality 0.002 0.002
Patent Scope -0.006 -0.005
Technology Age -0.005 -0.005
Funded Research 0.031 -0.017
Partnered Research
0.999
***
0.998
***
Invention Experience 0.399 0.203
Licensee Experience 0.007 ** 0.006 *
Tech. Trans. Experience 0.002 0.001
Market Uncertainty 12.36 *
Market Uncertainty Square -27.94 *
Technological Uncertainty 0.054
Threat of Preemption -0.195 *
N 1123 1123 1123
Model 2 31.2 *** 214 *** 225 ***
-2 Log Likelihood 4931 *** 4776 *** 4762 ***
Note: The dataset includes 1123 cases and 383 events and two-tailed tests for all variables
†     p < 0.1
*     p < 0.05
**    p < 0.01
***   p < 0.001
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Technology age had a negative impact on the likelihood of contracting a license
(although not statistically significant) which shows the fact that newer tech-
nologies are more likely to be commercialized. Cutting edge research and new
technologies is the area where PRO’s and university contribute most to knowl-
edge creation and industrial licensees are more likely to contract inventions in
these areas. Licensee experience had a significant positive relationship with li-
censing. This result indicates that previous licensee experience influences the li-
censing and commercialization likelihood of research. It seems that licensees that
have a strong working relationship with the PRO are better able to evaluate
technologies and mitigate uncertainty found in inventions leading to a higher li-
censing rate. It seems that potential licensees are more aware and less careful
when evaluating an invention if they have previous experience in commercializ-
ing research from PRO’s. As expected the experience of the technology transfer
officer increases the likelihood of licensing out inventions. A strong predictor of
licensing is partnered research which has a positive relationship with licensing.
Industry partners usually collaborate with PRO’s on inventions where they have
already evaluated commercial potential and therefore are more likely to license
it after successful development. These findings that links basic research and re-
search output quantity with commercial value might provide an insight on the
debate to what extent university research should be commercialized.
Model 3 includes technological uncertainty, market uncertainty and threat of
preemption as predictor variables and shows that inclusion of the variables gen-
erates a good fitting model (chi-square = 225, p < 0.001). These results gener-
ally support hypotheses 1 and 3 whereas Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Hy-
pothesis 1 is confirmed by Model 3 which shows that market uncertainty has a
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nonmonotonic effect on the likelihood of selling the option in form of a license.
Inconsistent with hypothesis 2, the excessive technological uncertainty does not
significantly increase the likelihood of licensing. Hypothesis 3 is confirmed with
threat of preemption negatively influencing likelihood of licensing (b = -0.20, p
< 0.05).
Figure 6-1 Effects of Market Uncertainty on Licensing
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6.4.2 Postlicensing Phase (LIC2LICTERM)
The descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are reported in Table 6-5
and Table 6-5 respectively. The licensing universe consists of 484 licenses and
146 license terminations.
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Table 6-4: Descriptive Statistics (LIC2LICTERM)
Variables N Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Mechanical 484 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.16
Chemical 484 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43
Pharma & Bio 484 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.50
Medical 484 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.32
Year Issued (1995-2003) 484 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.49
Patent References 484 0.00 29.00 5.93 4.18
Patent Quality 484 0.00 613.00 20.25 34.90
Patent Scope 484 0.00 19.00 3.12 3.01
Technology Age 484 0.00 72.97 13.29 12.42
Funded Research 484 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.28
Partnered Research 484 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.49
Invention Experience 484 0.00 202.00 40.74 41.32
Licensee Experience 484 0.00 146.00 31.08 32.70
Previous Technology Transfer Experience 484 0.00 136.00 32.89 31.64
Market Uncertainty 484 0.07 0.38 0.16 0.05
Technological Uncertainty 484 -7.59 0.00 -1.87 1.42
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Table 6-5: Correlation Matrix (LIC2LICTERM)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Mechanical 1.00
2. Chemical
-
0.09 1.00
3. Pharma & Bio
-
0.18
-
0.61 1.00
4. Medical
-
0.06
-
0.20
-
0.39 1.00
5. Year Issued (1995-2003) 0.04
-
0.07 0.02
-
0.01 1.00
6. Patent References
-
0.07
-
0.06 0.06 0.09 0.02 1.00
7. Patent Quality
-
0.04 0.01 0.01
-
0.01 0.08 0.14 1.00
8. Patent Scope
-
0.09
-
0.08 0.18 0.00
-
0.10 0.22 0.19 1.00
9. Technology Age 0.05 0.12
-
0.29 0.17
-
0.09
-
0.02
-
0.01 0.00 1.00
10. Funded Research
-
0.05
-
0.03 0.09
-
0.09 0.20 0.03
-
0.02
-
0.07
-
0.08
1.0
0
11. Partnered Research 0.04 0.14
-
0.10 0.00
-
0.04 0.03 0.05
-
0.01 0.07
0.1
7 1.00
12. Previous Inventions 0.02 0.19
-
0.07
-
0.01 0.10 0.06 0.02
-
0.05
-
0.06
0.1
0 0.09
1.0
0
13. Previous Licensee
-
0.05 0.12 0.02
-
0.03 0.10 0.12
-
0.02 0.02
-
0.09
0.0
9 0.03
0.9
3
1.0
0
14. Previous Technology Transfer Experience
-
0.03 0.07
-
0.10 0.07 0.23 0.06 0.11
-
0.07 0.04
0.0
2 0.04
0.5
0
0.4
3
1.0
0
15. Market Uncertainty
-
0.05
-
0.17
-
0.13 0.09 0.35
-
0.03 0.01
-
0.09 0.09
0.0
5
-
0.09
0.0
4
0.0
2
0.1
7 1.00
16 Technological Uncertainty 0.00
-
0.11 0.08 0.03 0.05
-
0.33 0.02 0.00
-
0.06
0.0
8
-
0.01
0.0
7
0.0
4
0.1
2
-
0.10
1.0
0
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Similar to the prelicensing phase in the previous chapter, Model 1 presents the
base model for the postlicensing phase and predicts the likelihood of termina-
tion. It includes the industry and time controlling variables and only the time
control is positively significant to the likelihood of terminating of a licensing
agreement.
Model 2 includes reports the baseline model with nine additional controls. The
inclusion of these control variables provides a good fitting model (chi-square =
107, p <0.001) and the significant variables are funded research (b = 0.84, p <
0.05) partnered research (b = -1.6, p < 0.001), invention experience (b = 0.018,
p < 0.05) and licensing experience (b = -0.014, p < 0.1). Partnering with an-
other institution (industry, PRO or university) seems to be a very good predic-
tor as expected and has a negative influence on terminating a license. Institu-
tions that partner with the inventors are clearer about the technology develop-
ment process as well as the commercialization potential making them less likely
to terminate a licensing contract. Further licensing experience has a negative
but not highly significant effect on license termination. An interesting finding is
that invention experience has a positive and significant effect on licensing ter-
mination. If it is considered that licensing termination indicated that the value
of the invention does not fulfil expectations this shows that pure research out-
put (measured by invention experience) by an institution does not guarantee
quality of research output. As was shown earlier, previous technology transfer
officer experience is positively correlated to license initiation. The same effect
can be observed for license termination leading to a question whether experi-
enced technology transfer officers are good at selling licenses that do not prove
to be of great commercial value in the market.
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Both of these findings link basic research and research output quantity with
commercial value and might provide an insight on the debate to what extent
university research should be commercialized.
Figure 6-2 Effects of Market Uncertainty on Licensing Termination
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Model 3 includes technological uncertainty and market uncertainty and their
squares as predictor variables and presents a good fitting model (chi-square =
119, p < 0.001). These results generally support hypotheses 4 and 5. Hypothesis
4 is confirmed by Model 3 which shows a significant nonmonotonic relationship
with license termination where increasing market uncertainty positively influ-
ences licensing termination until a saturation point at which market uncertainty
negatively influences it. Further as proposed by hypothesis 5, excessive techno-
logical uncertainty increases the likelihood license termination (b = 0.15, p <
0.05).
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Table 6-6: Cox Regression Analysis for the determinants of licensing
termination (LIC2LICTERM)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Mechanical -0.583 -0.314 -0.236
Chemical -0.494 -0.120 0.201
Pharma & Bio -0.115 0.001 0.103
Medical -0.197 0.065 -0.057
Year Issued (1995-2003) 0.894 *** 1.045 *** 1.229 ***
Patent References 0.015 0.034
Patent Quality -0.007 -0.009 †
Patent Scope -0.039 -0.064 †
Technology Age -0.004 -0.005
Funded Research 0.838 * 0.724 *
Partnered Research -1.632 *** -1.703 ***
Previous Inventions 0.018 * 0.020 **
Previous Licensee -0.014 † -0.018 *
Previous TT Experience -0.000 -0.001
Market Uncertainty 21.71 **
Market Uncertainty Square -56.57 *
Technological Uncertainty 0.150 *
N 484 484 484
Model 22.6 *** 107 *** 119 ***
-2 Log Likelihood 1540 *** 1451 *** 1433 ***
Note: The dataset includes 484 cases and 146 events and two-tailed tests for all variables
†     p < 0.1
*     p < 0.05
**    p < 0.01
***   p < 0.001
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6.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter we analyse data on the population of Max Planck inventions
over the 1990 – 2003 period and found that market as well as technological un-
certainty influences the likelihood that an invention will be licensed in the pre-
licensing phase and abandoned/ terminated in the post licensing phase. We
therefore present evidence that inventions have option like characteristics in dif-
ferent phases of their lifecycle. The empirical results provide strong support for
the view that the uncertainty regime the invention and license is found in is im-
portant for understanding the technology lifecycle.
In more detail we found that in the pre-licensing phase market uncertainty has
a positive effect on licensing whereas threat of preemption has a negative effect.
Unlike suggested in Hypothesis 2 technological uncertainty does not have a sig-
nificant negative relationship to licensing. In the post licensing phase we found
that both postulated hypotheses are significant, namely that high market uncer-
tainty has a negative impact on licensing termination whereas technological un-
certainty is positively influencing it.
Our methodological design resembles the design of Shane (2001b) and assures
the validity of the results due to following characteristics. In the analysis of the
pre-licensing phase as well as the post-licensing phase our design includes the
complete population of patents and licenses issued and therefore avoids sample
selection bias within the dataset.
Contributions to two streams of research are addressed, namely the innovation
and licensing literature as well as the real option literature. Previous empirical
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studies on technology licensing (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000) have analyzed
licensing events and the license contract structures and are generally extremely
rare in nature due to the difficult accessibility of data which makes contributes
to the fact that understanding of licensing is significantly further behind empiri-
cal understanding of other issues in contracting (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Ex-
isting studies are generally able to examine factors that influence the decision on
an aggregated level rather than on the invention level. Our study overcomes this
limitation by utilizing this specific dataset as well as studying different lifecycles
of the innovation.
We are therefore the first to examine empirically different forms of uncertainty
in the lifecycle of an invention and its effects on the licensing likelihood and li-
censing termination likelihood. Our results show significant but opposing effects
of endogenous and exogenous uncertainty when an invention is licensed and
when it is terminated/ abandoned. We demonstrate that commercialization and
termination of agreements changes with uncertain market conditions as well as
with the uncertainty regime the technological opportunity is found in. The dy-
namic nature of market uncertainty will affect the amount of licenses contracted
out.
The results of this study also suggest that option value can be firm specific e.g.
firms that have a higher licensing experience are more likely to license an inven-
tion. These firms are more familiar with the process of licensing and technology
transfer and more likely to be better able to evaluate external technologies. This
supports findings by Arora and Gambardella (1994) that their internal knowl-
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edge base allows firms to be more confident about their decision making in un-
certain environments and benefiting from their ‘absorptive capacity’.
Recently real option studies have analyzed and tried to explain a wide range of
phenomena especially in the range of strategic decisions (Amram and Kulati-
laka, 1999). Still very little empirical work has tested the predictions made by
real option theory on the value and optimal decision timing of option contracts
Ziedonis (2007). Our objective in this paper was therefore to understand how
managers use real options in the different phases of its lifecycle. Empirical justi-
fication of real option theory represents an important contribution to the litera-
ture as it gives evidence for the applicability of real option reasoning for a wide
range of phenomena.
6.5.1 Interaction Effects
The tests for the interaction effects for all dependent variables can be found in
chapter 9.4.6 for the licensing model whereas the chapter 9.4.8 contains the
analysis for the interaction effects of licensing failure.
The licensing model shows several statistically significant interaction effects
which are summarized in Table 6-7.
Table 6-7 Summary of interaction effects for the licensing model
Interactions Coefficient
Market Uncertainty * Patent Quality -0.598 **
Market Uncertainty Square * Patent Quality 1.879 **
Technological Uncertainty * Partnered Research -0.313 *
Technological Uncertainty * Invention Experience -1.858 †
Lifecycle of a License
174
Threat of Preemption * Technology Age 0.16 *
Threat of Preemption * Partnered Research 0.656 ***
Threat of Preemption * Invention Experience 0.003 †
Threat of Preemption * Licensing Experience 0.004 *
†     p < 0.1
*     p < 0.05
**    p < 0.01
***   p < 0.001
 In more certain markets patent quality attenuates the effect of market
uncertainty on licensing an invention whereas in uncertain markets pat-
ent quality accentuates the effects of market uncertainty on licensing
 Technologies that are more certain are more likely to be licensed when
they were developed in partnered research efforts whereas when technolo-
gies are uncertain they more likely to be licensed when they were not de-
veloped in partnered research efforts
 Technologies that are more certain are more likely to be licensed when
the invention experience is high whereas when technologies are uncertain
they more likely to be licensed when invention experience is low
 When threat of preemption is high, inventions whose technology age is
high are more likely to be licensed whereas when threat of preemption is
low, inventions are more likely to be licensed when their technology age
is low
 When threat of preemption is high inventions that were developed in
partnered research efforts are more likely to be licensed whereas when
Lifecycle of a License
175
threat of preemption is low inventions are more likely to be licensed
when their development was not developed in partnered research efforts
 When threat of preemption is high inventions are more likely to be li-
censed that were developed by highly experienced inventors whereas
when threat of preemption is low inventions are more likely to be li-
censed when they are developed by inventors with less experience
 When threat of preemption is high inventions are more likely to be li-
censed to licensees with high licensing experience whereas when threat of
preemption is low inventions are more likely to be licensed to licensees
with low licensing experience
The interaction effect model for licensing failure only has interaction effects
with technology transfer experience and technology age which can be seen in
Table 6-8.
Table 6-8 Summary of interaction effects for the licensing failure
model
Interactions Coefficient
Market Uncertainty * Patent Quality -0.59 *
Market Uncertainty Square * Patent Quality 1.49 *
Technological Uncertainty * TTO Experience -0.01 **
Technological Uncertainty * Technology Age -0.01 †
†     p < 0.1
*     p < 0.05
**    p < 0.01
***   p < 0.001
 In more certain markets patent quality attenuates the effect of market
uncertainty on licensing termination whereas in uncertain markets patent
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quality accentuates the effects of market uncertainty on licensing termi-
nation
 Technologies that are more certain are more likely to be terminated when
the technology transfer officer experience is high whereas when technolo-
gies are uncertain they more likely to be terminated when technology
transfer experience is low
 Technologies that are more certain are more likely to be terminated when
the technology age is high whereas when technologies are uncertain they
more likely to be terminated when technology age low
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6.6 Competing Risk Model
Competing risk models enable the comparison of survival models with mutually
exclusive outcomes for the dependent variables. The model starts for one obser-
vation at the same point in time and is observed until the first duration of the
first dependent variable occurs first. The most common models in econometrics
where competing risk models are used are the study of e.g. individual unem-
ployment durations. The individual in unemployment is observed until either
transition into employment occurs or into non participation. Other applications
include the modelling of the duration of marriage where one risk is the divorce
and the other the death of one of the spouses.
In our analysis one competing risk model is of particular interest, namely the
comparison between spinout and licensing. As we draw the data from the same
pool of inventions it would be interesting to understand if there are fundamen-
tal differences between these two competing risks and how the effect of inde-
pendent variables differs between the two risk modes.
Although we have postulated and proven in our previous hypotheses that mar-
ket uncertainty affects spinout and licensing differently we are including market
uncertainty into the competing risk model for the reason of completeness of the
model.
The results for the overall significance can be found in Table 6-9. In order to
compare the overall significances it is first required to estimate the log likeli-
hoods of the individual models and compare each individual model to the joint
occurrence of both events. Therefore I have constructed a third model that takes
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into account combined occurrences i.e. licensing and spinout and estimated it
and compared it against the individual risk modes. Table 6-9 shows that the
overall difference between the two modes of spinout formation and licensing is
highly statistically significant with a log likelihood of 76.6 and p<0.001 which
confirms the overall assumption that licensing an invention and creating a spin-
out is different compared to licensing an invention to an established company.
Table 6-9 Overall Significance for Competing Risk Model for Spin-
out formation vs. Licensing model
Dependent Variables -2 Log Likelihood Degrees of Freedom
Spinout and License 5981.745396 20
License 4742.959233 20
Spinout 1162.184141 20
Difference 76.60 *** 20
†     p < 0.1
*     p < 0.05
**    p < 0.01
***   p < 0.001
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Table 6-10 shows the competing risk model for each individual variable and
shows where the relationships differ significantly on individual covariate level.
Looking at the industry dummies it can be seen that only the medical industry
dummy is significantly different between spinouts and licenses. Although medi-
cal inventions have a positive relationship in both licensing and spinning out
models, they have a stronger statistically significant influence on firm formation
then on licensing. This leads to the conclusion that medical inventions are
around 10 times more likely to be exploited via a spinout then a license.
It was shown in previous analyses that on the individual model level the likeli-
hood of licensing or spinning out is affected differently across industries.  The
competing risk model shows on the other hand that across the competing risks
there is no statistically significant difference except for the previously mentioned
medical industry. This is somewhat surprising as one would expect e.g. less
capital intensive industries to prefer spinning out whereas licensing to occur in
more concentrated industries.
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Table 6-10 Competing Risk Model for Spinout formation vs. Licens-
ing model
Variables License(b1)
License
(StdErr)
Spinout
(b1)
Spinout
(StdErr)
Chi
Square P
Mechanical -0.403 0.366 1.418 1.100 2.47 0.116
Chemical 0.533 0.427 1.103 1.207 0.20 0.656
Pharma & Bio 0.001 0.536 1.327 1.349 0.83 0.361
Medical 0.294 * 0.403 3.016 1.143 5.04 0.025
Year Issued (1995-2000) 0.279 0.123 0.509 0.233 0.76 0.383
Patent References 0.023 0.013 -0.029 0.031 2.43 0.119
Patent Quality 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.70 0.403
Patent Scope 0.002 0.018 -0.004 0.036 0.03 0.874
Technology Age -0.005 * 0.005 -0.032 0.010 5.92 0.015
Funded Research -0.089 0.193 0.163 0.287 0.53 0.467
Partnered Research 0.994 0.109 0.838 0.220 0.40 0.526
Invention Experience 0.597 2.653 -6.080 5.064 1.36 0.243
Licensee Experience 0.007 0.003 0.012 0.006 0.73 0.393
Technology Transfer Ex-
perience 0.001 * 0.002 0.01 0.003 4.54 0.033
Firm Size 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.006 1.06 0.302
R&D Intensity -0.165 0.050 -0.203 0.133 0.07 0.790
Market Uncertainty
11.137
*** 5.026 -21.037 8.608 10.42 0.001
Market Uncertainty
Square
-26.298
*** 13.223 54.681 18.017 13.13 0.000
Technological Uncer-
tainty 0.059 * 0.049 0.401 0.153 4.54 0.033
Threat of Preemption -0.201 0.088 -0.013 0.191 0.79 0.373
Out of the other covariates only three statistically significant differences are ob-
served:
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 Technology Age (p<0.05)
 Technology Transfer Experience (p<0.05)
 Market Uncertainty (p<0.001)
 Market Uncertainty Square (p<0.001)
 Technological Uncertainty (p<0.05)
Higher technology age decreases the likelihood that an invention will lead to a
spinout or be licensed out but the effect of technology age on spinning out is
stronger than on licensing (blicense = -0.005 vs. bspinout = -0.03) showing that the
effect of technology age is 6 times stronger for spinning out an invention. This
finding shows that inventions that are spun out are much more sensitive to the
technology age then to the route of licensing. This finding extends Shane’s
(2001a) that younger and more radical technologies are leading to spinouts. In
his work Shane has only looked at the effects of technology age and radicalness
of technologies regarding spinning out. This finding builds on his work and ex-
tends it in such a way that the effect of technology age is much stronger for
spinning out inventions then on competing risks such as licensing.
Technology transfer experience has a similar effect on licensing and spinning out
in that it is a much stronger predictor on spinouts then on licenses (blicense =
0.001 vs. bspinout = 0.01). Inventions that are commercialized through a much
more experienced technology transfer officer are much more likely to be spun
out then licensed. Spinning out an invention rather than licensing is a much
more complex process from the technology transfer officer point of view and re-
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quire them to supervise the inventors through a completely different i.e. more
complex process. This finding can be understood that more experienced technol-
ogy transfer officers are more familiar with the complexity of the spinout proc-
ess and are more comfortable advising the founders in this direction. What
needs to be established is the answer comparing quantity vs. quality. Are the
larger amount of spinouts supervised by experienced technology transfer officers
as good performing as the other spinouts or even better? The answer to this
question could be an avenue for further research.
The entry decision is characterised by a tension between the option to defer and
the option to grow which was discussed by Folta and O’Brien (2004): “The op-
tion to defer obtains its value from the potential for a manager to defer the en-
try decision, which allows a firm to ‘keep its options open’ and avoid the oppor-
tunity costs associated with making an irreversible investment (McDonald and
Siegel, 1986). Factors that increase the value of the option to defer, such as
greater sunk costs associated with the investment, make entry less likely. Alter-
natively, the option to grow gains its value from the possibility that early in-
vestment will help the firm to develop a ‘capability’ that will allow it to take
better advantage of future growth opportunities in the industry (Kulatilaka and
Perotti, 1998). Accordingly, more valuable growth options encourage investment
and make entry more likely.”
In this dissertation, entry was analysed for both the spinout decision and licens-
ing decision and in both decisions the tensions between growth options and op-
tions to defer were discussed. Due to the presence of both options and the ten-
sion between these arising, the effect of uncertainty is non monotonic on entry
for the two competing risks of commercialising an invention.
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The different effects of uncertainty on entry of these competing risks can be ex-
plained due to the different exposures to growth and deferment options.
The decision maker who is planning to exploit an invention via the spinout
route is fully exposed to the effects of both growth and deferments options. On
the other hand when licensing the invention the decision maker has limited up-
side potential since the licensee captures it but there is as well very little down-
side risk. An alternative interpretation is that spinouts represent the purchase of
a call option whereas licensing represents the sale of a call option.
Figure 6-3 Effects of Market Uncertainty on Spinout formation and
Licensing
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Figure 6-3 shows the effects of market uncertainty on the likelihood of firm for-
mation and the likelihood of licensing. It is evident that the effects of market
uncertainty on both spinout formation and licensing are non monotonic but
with opposite signs. The red line shows a U-shaped curve suggesting that the
option to defer dominates at the lowest levels of market uncertainty (note the
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initially downward sloping line), but the option to grow dominates at higher
levels of uncertainty. This implies that high market uncertainty inspires the
technology holder to spinout in order to take advantage of the potentially high
upside potential.
The blue line on the other hand represents the influence of market uncertainty
on licensing. It is inverted to the spinout formation curve but its convexity is
around two times smaller8. This is expected since licensing an invention would
expose the decision maker to either the option to defer or the option to grow
much less compared to spinning out the invention.
The inversion of the blue line shows that at low levels of market uncertainty,
market uncertainty has a positive effect on licensing whereas at high levels of
uncertainty market uncertainty has a negative effect on licensing. As can be
seen an increased preference for licensing can be observed for market uncertain-
ties up until 22.5%. The reason is that because licensing provides a guaranteed
income (licensing fee and royalties) it is preferred as uncertainty gets higher.
However, at some high level of uncertainty the costs of developing the technol-
8 Equations used in the calculation of the influence of market uncertainty on spinout formation
and licensing:
INV2USO(σ) = -22.8σ + 59.9σ2
INV2LIC(σ) = 12.3σ – 27.9σ2
8.5526.1162 2
2
2
2   LICINVUSOINV
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ogy overwhelm the likelihood of extracting any license so it does not occur and
it requires a different mode of commercialization i.e. the spinout route.
The last statistically significant effect in the competing risk model is technologi-
cal uncertainty which is more than 6 times stronger for spinouts then for licens-
ing (blicense = 0.06 vs. bspinout = 0.4).
This indicates that endogenous uncertainty as measured by technological uncer-
tainty is much stronger affecting spinning out in a way that inventions that are
of high technological uncertainty are much more likely to be commercialized via
the spinout route then via the licensing route. The reason for this observation
could be that very high technological uncertainty comes along with a high
amount of tacit knowledge which is intrinsic to the technology developer i.e. the
inventors. Buyers therefore might lack confidence in a highly uncertain technol-
ogy which could lead the inventors only with one choice and this is to spinout
the invention themselves as the market for a highly uncertain technology is not
efficient and in some cases does not exist.
Overall the results indicate that the spinout model is much more sensitive to its
covariates then the licensing model indicating that extreme covariates lead to
the exploitation and commercialization of an invention via the spinout route.
Analyzing the exit decision a competing risk model is not needed since in the
spinout failure model the only independent variable that is common in both
models is market uncertainty and we have shown already that market uncer-
tainty has inverted influence in the spinout failure and the licensing termination
model.
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Figure 6-4 shows the effects of market uncertainty for the two models. Looking
at the exit we are interested in the option to abandon. This option gets its value
when there are sunk costs to entering (in this case R&D costs are sunk costs).
Figure 6-4 Effects of Market Uncertainty on Spinout failure and Li-
censing termination
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Real option theory implies that it is irrational to exit an investment if there is a
possibility that the profitability of the investment can increase over time which
can be due to the effects of market uncertainty (Dixit 1989). If market uncer-
tainty prevails the chances of a rapid improvement of conditions can quickly al-
ter the investment value positive. Especially with large sunk costs, managers
who decided to exit may very well regret that decision because the firm would
have to incur those sunk costs all over again in order to re-enter. This leads the
decision of the manager to include the significance of the sunk cost of the in-
vestment and the potential gain. Continuing the investment and not abandon-
ing it can therefore be profitable. On the other hand maintaining an abandon-
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ment option comes with a cost because to keep the investment active running
costs like e.g. keeping up a stream of cash flows to pay staff and persist in re-
search and development. Weighing the costs and benefits of the abandonment
option and the costs of maintaining it is critical in making the decision to exit
or persist with the investment.
This difference of a license and a spinout termination lies in the required cash
flow for continuation of the investment. The licensor has a relatively low cost of
maintaining the investment and can easily mothball the project if he reaps no
profits. The spinout holder has a much larger exposure to the required cash
flows and increasing market uncertainty (at moderate levels) would increase the
value of his growth options and at the same time limiting the cash flow risk
which is correlated to market uncertainty. As soon as volatility levels reach very
high values the spinout might be exposed to cash flow problems and might be
forced to shut operations whereas the licensor can mothball the project by still
keeping minimum payments to the licensor. This would be the optimal decision
for him as the option value increases and the costs are kept under control. The
owner of a spinout cannot operate under these extreme levels of uncertainty al-
though the growth options might be more valuable but the continuation of
business is in jeopardy. This leads to the opposite effect of market uncertainty
in the spinout failure and licensing termination scenarios.
As can be seen in Figure 6-4 holding a license and maintaining a spinout pro-
vides different exposures to the growth options that can come with persisting
the investments. The figure shows a much larger convexity implying that expo-
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sure to the growth options in spinouts is much more pronounced then in a li-
censing contract which is to be expected.
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7 Conclusion
7.1 Summary
University commercialization activities usually involve novel technologies that
are highly uncertain and the industries which they are evolving in are character-
ized by a volatile and a rapidly changing environment.  Further the technologies
are research intensive and exposed to uncertainty regarding their successful de-
velopment and functionality. On the other hand these technologies have to be
absorbed by volatile markets in order to be commercialized. These different
forms of uncertainty are of primary importance for decision makers but have
not been thoroughly studied in previous research on technology commercializa-
tion and put under one theoretical framework. The main focus of this thesis was
to comprehend the recently growing trend among universities and public re-
search organizations to commercialize their research activities from an empirical
and theoretical perspective. More particularly we have analysed the life cycle of
two main commercialization streams namely the entry and exit of university
spinouts, which are companies that evolve from intellectual property developed
within academic institutions as well as the licensing and licensing termination of
inventions. Our main focus of analysis therefore analyses market and techno-
logical uncertainty and explains the conditions under which spinout formation,
spinout failure, licensing and licensing failure occur by embracing real option
theory.
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The first part of this thesis analyses thoroughly the existing research streams on
the phenomenon of university spinouts from the empirical and theoretical point
of view and provides a detailed and structured literature review on this topic by
organising the studies under three broad headings (macro- meso- and micro-
level studies). Although previous research on spinouts has been mainly accumu-
lative and atheoretical, we show that recently a positive trend towards theory-
driven studies is evolving (increasing from 5% to 49% in the past four years)
and that the research on this topic is maturing. Further we expect future stud-
ies to focus more on analysing performance and to untangle if and where differ-
ences exist between spinouts and independent new technology based companies.
We claim that the complexity of the spinout phenomenon due to the different
parties, relationships and processes involved makes it an ideal context for test-
ing and extending theory and that there is plenty of scope for further work to
untangle and understand these processes thoroughly. Finally we conclude with
several research questions that are of strong interest for future theoretical devel-
opment and propose that the key for future work is to ask the most interesting
and practical phenomenon-specific questions but then tackle them with the most
theoretical explanations.
The next chapter continues with a detailed overview of the patenting process
and patent analysis as well as an introduction of the unique dataset used in this
study which contains information on invention disclosures, license agreements
and spinouts from the top German public research organization (Max Planck
Society) and its 78 research institutes. The contribution of this thesis purely
from the data perspective is that it is the first known study to utilize a detailed
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non American research institution dataset on licensing and spinout activity. The
contributions are straightforward since phenomena from prior research streams
could be tested and verified and therefore their geographical limitations allevi-
ated. One example finding that was confirmed was the significant influence of
technology age on the spinout likelihood, which was used as a control variable
in our models and was rigorously tested by Shane (2003).
In the following chapter real option theory was introduced and the justification
presented why it is used as an umbrella theory in this thesis. Different theories
used in the firm formation/ firm exit literature as well as licensing literature
such as transaction cost theory and neoclassical investment theory were pre-
sented and parallels and differences to the real option theory drawn. We found
that the main difference compared to transaction cost theory is that TCE em-
braces behavioural uncertainty rather than market and technological uncer-
tainty when explaining the formation and failure of governance structures.
Compared to neoclassical investment theory it was shown that unlike the neo-
classical investment theory, real option theory embraces uncertainty and gives
value to investments with optional characteristics.
Chapter 5 specifically focuses on the effects of market and technological uncer-
tainty on university spinout formation and spinout failure by using a Cox re-
gression to model firm formation and firm failure. We found that market uncer-
tainty is non monotonic in both, the firm formation as well as the firm failure
model and influences them with same signs which is consistent with the predic-
tions made by the real option theory. Further we have shown that technological
uncertainty increases the likelihood that an invention will be commercialized
through firm formation. It was previously discussed that the real option theory
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does not make any assumptions about the risk preferences of the decision mak-
ers i.e. entrepreneurs since it assumes rational decision makers’ behaviour. The
results in this study show that the decision makers understand the complexity
of risk as well as the exact timing when to act on opportunities in order to
maximize their value in entry and exit decisions. This makes the real option
theory in this context more parsimonious compared to entrepreneurial theories
that make assumptions about risk preferences of entrepreneurs. Furthermore,
the finding that inventions are more likely to be commercialized through the
creation of new firms when the technologies are more uncertain extends the
work of strategic management researchers (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) and
researchers of technological change (Henderson, 1993). These have argued that
new entrants are more likely than incumbents to commercialize radical tech-
nologies. This study shows that technological uncertainty also influences the de-
cisions of independent entrepreneurs to create new companies. While previous
theorizing on real options suggested that technological uncertainty influences
the likelihood and timing of an investment, this study is also the first to provide
empirical evidence to support this measure in the context of firm formation and
firm failure.
Further the study provides useful implications for the management of the proc-
ess of spinout creation and support mechanisms to reduce spinout failure.
Knowledge of the circumstances under which inventions are more likely to be
commercialized through the creation of new organizations and when they are
more likely to fail may prove useful in determining university policies toward
firm formation and mitigating firm failure. Especially capital availability has
been shown to mediate market uncertainty and spinout formation in such a way
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that in more uncertain markets larger capital availability accentuates spinout
formation. This finding could lead to an interesting avenue for future research
by better understanding the success of spinouts created in highly uncertain and
subsidized environments.
Chapter 6 focuses on the second possible commercialization lifecycle, namely
how market and technological uncertainty affect the licensing and licensing ter-
mination of an invention. Using a dataset on licensing of public research organi-
sation technologies, the objective of this chapter was to understand how manag-
ers use and value real options. The main findings were that market uncertainty
has a non monotonic effect on licensing and licensing termination. Although
technological uncertainty was not found to be statistically significant in the pre-
licensing phase, it was positively influencing the license termination decision.
Contributions to two streams of research are identified, namely the innovation
and licensing literature as well as the real option literature. The empirical con-
tribution to innovation literature on technology licensing is such that we identi-
fied several mediating effects on uncertainty that affects the likelihood of licens-
ing and licensing termination. This becomes especially important for policy
makers who are intending to design support mechanisms for the commercializa-
tion of research on both institutional and governmental level. Examples include
the mediating effects of technology transfer experience and partnered research
efforts which mediate the effects technological uncertainty. Technologies that
are uncertain are more likely to be terminated when technology transfer experi-
ence is low. The question whether inexperienced technology transfer officers are
selling ‘hot potatoes’ could be an interesting avenue for future research. Further
technologies that are more certain are more likely to be licensed when they were
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developed in partnered research efforts which show the importance of partnering
in research and thereby reducing uncertainty. This has a straightforward impli-
cation for practise in that policy makers and technology transfer officers should
support partnering efforts during the research lifecycle.
Further this research finds support for the theoretical underpinning of real op-
tion literature in that it is the first to examine empirically the effects of endoge-
nous and exogenous forms of uncertainty on the licensing and licensing termina-
tion likelihood. This empirical justification of real option theory in new areas of
research represents an important contribution to the literature as it gives evi-
dence for the applicability of real option reasoning for a wide range of phenom-
ena.
The results of this study also suggest that option value can be firm specific.
Firms that have a higher licensing experience and who are more familiar with
the process of licensing and technology transfer are more likely to license an in-
vention. This supports findings by Arora and Gambardella (1994) that their in-
ternal knowledge base allows firms to be more confident about their decision
making in uncertain environments and benefiting from their ‘absorptive capac-
ity’.
The implications of this research make a clear contribution to the literature by
being the first to empirically investigate different forms of uncertainty not only
on the entrance of new high technology firms but also on spinout failure. Fur-
ther it is the first to study the complete lifecycle of an invention and all its life
paths by putting it under one theoretical framework.
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7.2 Limitations and future research
Despite the rigorous research approach that was used in this research there are
also limitations to the study. Firstly it can be argued that the measure of mar-
ket uncertainty has its limitations. Previous studies that use market uncertainty
in their frameworks differ in the way how market uncertainty is measured,
which data is used for its calculation and what time window lengths are used to
calculate it. In this paper market uncertainty was calculated using a time win-
dowed measurement of the standard deviation of daily industry index price re-
turns. Previous research does not use a unanimous time window length and is
therefore inconclusive on this matter. Rather than looking for uniformity across
different research studies, each research study that uses this measure should de-
cide independently based on the average period the decision maker is influenced
by in their decision and the be corresponding measurement period should be
chosen accordingly. Time frames used in research have ranged from 26 week
windows to two year windows. To be exact a 52 week time window to measure
market uncertainty was implemented. To mitigate this issue, historical market
uncertainties were measured for different window lengths (26 weeks, 52 weeks
and 104 weeks) and it was found that the results are valid for all window
lengths but less significant for the other time windows.
Further the decision which underlying data to use for the measurement of mar-
ket uncertainty has been treated differently in previous research. Studies have
used industry or firm revenues and GDP data as basis for their volatility meas-
ures. This approach was not adopted because GDP and firm revenues are re-
ported in a relatively infrequent basis (usually quarterly). Since decision makers
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update their decision principles more frequently than once a quarter, more fre-
quent occurring data was required. Therefore it was decided to utilize a similar
data source to Folta (1998) who relies on daily stock index data since this data
is reliable and very frequent (daily).
The robustness of the market uncertainty measure was further validated by us-
ing a separate measure which was used as well by O’Brien et al. (2003). Namely
the GARCH(1,1) process was used and fitted to historical data to obtain the
market uncertainty measure. This measure was then used as an input to all the
models in then thesis and compared to the results obtained with the initial
market uncertainty measurement. The detailed results which can be found in
the Appendix confirm the stability of all models and do not alter the results for
any of the variables significantly. On the contrary for the invention to license
model the model constructed with the GARCH(1,1) volatility measure seems to
be even more robust when compared to using the historical uncertainty meas-
ure.
As already mentioned the thesis measures market uncertainty on an industry
level and theorizes that industry specific market uncertainty influences firm
formation, firm failure, licensing propensity and licensing failure as predicted by
the real option theory. It is known that volatility is clustered and correlated
across markets (Engle, 1982) and it would be interesting to understand if the
impact of uncertainty in the decision making process is really industry specific
or if the decision makers are influenced by the uncertainty of the market as a
whole. This would enable improved understanding if decision makers really con-
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sider cross sectional uncertainty when making their decisions or are influenced
only by their own industries’ uncertainty bubble.
It would as well be interesting to see future studies utilizing the technological
uncertainty measure constructed in this study by deploying it and applying it to
other phenomena.
An important avenue for future research is a better understanding of the miti-
gating effects on uncertainty. Do decision makers that have an advantage in ac-
cessing resources, superior experience in exercising an option and who receive
better support mechanisms, estimate the uncertainty in a dissimilar manner and
therefore value the option differently? Understanding this question would clarify
the question if the real option value is subjective to the decision maker and if
the decision makers’ perception of uncertainty can be moderated. Being able to
answer this question could bring the transaction cost theory which focuses on
transactional asset specificity a step closer to the real option framework by in-
troducing optional asset specificity that can have a real impact on real option
valuation. This finding would also have a direct impact on the policy makers
who are interested in encouraging entrepreneurship or commercialization of re-
search. By understanding how uncertainty can be mitigated, stimulation policies
could be designed accordingly.
A further limitation in the firm formation model is that the study recognizes
patents as the only source of opportunities and neglects other e.g. uncodified in-
novations or non patentable innovations as a source of opportunities that can
lead to firm formation. If the difference between coded (patents) and uncoded
technological opportunities is systematic, the study might not be generalizable
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to all technological innovations and how high technology firm formation can be
explained in the context that was presented in this study. Future research
might address this issue by analysing specifically the characteristics of patents
and other not codified innovations in order to understand if their characteristics
differ.
Further it was presumed that termination of licenses occurs due to market or
technological failure. However when property rights are week, licensees may de-
cide to abandon the license and invent around the invention which was also ob-
served by (Dechenaux et al., 2003). It was not possible to control for this sce-
nario in this thesis.
The study focuses only on patents and spinouts from one research institution
making patenting, licensing, firm formation and firm failure solely dependent on
the parent institution and the entrepreneurs that stem from the parent institu-
tion to commercialize the intellectual property in form of a spinout. Still, Max
Planck Society is a highly diverse research institution consisting of more than 50
independently operating institutes where the decision to file for a patent or form
a spinout is not solely driven by one and the same organizational entity. Still it
cannot be excluded that firm formation or failure rates for inventions that are
patented by MPS are different from those inventions patented by other univer-
sities or research institutions. If this systematic difference exists a generaliza-
tions may not be possible.
Future work should therefore try to validate these findings by extending the re-
search to different or a larger number of institutions to generalize the findings.
This research has primarily focused on the market-wide factors that influence
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the value of real options. An area for further research could be to investigate
factors on the institution-level that might influence the value of technological
options they plan to pursue. Such institution-level factors may help to under-
stand how different institutions are coping with exogenous and endogenous un-
certainty in order to optimize their technology commercialization outcomes.
Another interesting future research stream would be to better understand the
way option portfolios are constructed and held by licensees. Is the reason why
firms license patents in areas close to their patenting focus to strengthen their
option portfolio or to prevent competitors gaining deeper knowledge in their ar-
eas of expertise? Further it would be interesting to understand how firms go
about licensing patents in more technologically distant areas from their own
patent focus. Is it driven by reasons of exploration and thereby reducing techno-
logical uncertainty in this technological area by proactively investing in it and
learning about the technology? Or is it more about diversifying risk and market
uncertainty of their innovation base? Questions like this would provide great in-
sight in how licensees actively try to mitigate risk and how they are trying to
optimize their option portfolio.
Furthermore, in the post licensing phase it was not possible to track empirically
the event of first sale of a license since the data was not available at this point
in time but only data on the termination timing of licenses. It is believed that
the empirics would follow the theory and that market and technological uncer-
tainties would affect the first sale of a license in the same way as the licensing
study suggests. Further research could elaborate on this point empirically and
test these hypotheses.
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Despite the mentioned limitations, empirical evidence was provided that en-
dogenous and exogenous uncertainty affects the rate of firm formation and firm
failure rates as well as licensing and licensing termination rates. It has to be
noted that resemblance was found between this study and the results of other
studies that analyze spinout formation and firm failure and utilize similar data-
sets. Although the settings and location of this study is very different to the ex-
isting studies on spinout formation (mostly on US universities), the resemblance
brings confidence to the results of both studies.
Although there are certain limitations to this study evidence was provided that
different forms of uncertainty affect real options differently throughout their in-
novation lifecycle. The results contribute to the growing literature on commer-
cialization from public research organizations and universities (Djokovic and
Souitaris, 2008) and provide evidence on the commercialization efforts under di-
verse forms of uncertainty.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Robustness of Market Uncertainty Measure
Two different approaches were conducted to validate the robustness of the mar-
ket uncertainty measure. The first approach alternates the time window length
used in the calculation of historical market uncertainty and the second approach
calculates market uncertainty using a completely different method, namely fit-
ting a GARCH(1,1) model through the daily index return data.
The first approach is a rather trivial robustness check and validates the time
period used rather than the measure itself. Different time windows measure-
ments were used, namely 26 weeks, 52 weeks and 104 weeks. Table 9-1 shows
that using different time window lengths do not alter the model results signifi-
cantly. This leads to the conclusion that the model is rather insensitive to the
length time window used.
Table 9-1 Overall Model significances for different time window
lengths of the historical market uncertainty measure
Model 26 weeks 52 weeks 104 weeks
Invention to Spinout *** *** ***
Spinout to Spinout Termina-
tion *** *** ***
Invention to License *** *** ***
License to License Termina-
tion *** *** ***
†     p < 0.1
*     p < 0.05
**    p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
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The second approach to validate robustness is to construct a separate uncer-
tainty measure and compare the model fit with the existing measure (i.e. his-
torical volatility). A powerful time series technique to model volatility is the
GARCH(p,q) framework which will be used as the second measure of market
uncertainty. GARCH stands for Generalized Autoregres-
sive Conditional Heteroscedasticity and it allows the modelling of conditional
time varying volatility. Heteroscedasticity refers in statistics to random vari-
ables that have different variances across time. Conditional implies a depend-
ence on the observations of the immediate past, and autoregressive describes a
feedback mechanism that incorporates past observations into the present.
GARCH enables the statistician therefore to include past volatilities in the ex-
planation of future volatilities and in this way allows the modelling of serial de-
pendence of volatility. It can be represented in following way:
where ϵt denote the error terms and σt the standard deviation. The parameters α
and β are usually fitted using maximum likelihood estimation. In this study a
GARCH(1,1) model was used to fit the daily index returns which sets parame-
ters p = 1 and q = 1 in the model.
9.1.1 Model Comparison Historical vs. GARCH
The following tables compare all models used in this thesis for the historical
volatility measure and GARCH volatility estimation. It becomes clear that not
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one coefficient of the model inputs changes sign or significance level. The only
exception is in the ‘spinout to spinout termination’ model where the significance
of the market uncertainty measure drops but is still inside the 0.1 significance
level. On the other hand the GARCH uncertainty measure improves the ‘inven-
tion to license’ model in such way that the significance of market uncertainty
and squared market uncertainty increases. Overall this model comparison shows
that the current market uncertainty measure in itself is robust as well as the
models estimated in this thesis.
Table 9-2 Invention to Spinout Model Comparison (Historical vs.
GARCH)
Variables Historical Uncertainty GARCH Uncertainty
B Sig. B Sig.
Mechanical 1.776 0.133 1.558 0.179
Chemical 2.031 0.115 1.858 0.132
Pharma & Bio 1.972 0.155 1.793 0.172
Medical 3.648 0.004 3.322 0.009
Year Issued 0.653 0.003 0.559 0.010
Patent Quality 0.005 0.019 0.005 0.015
Patent Scope 0.003 0.934 0.001 0.980
Technology Age -0.033 0.001 -0.031 0.002
Firm Size 0.009 0.158 0.008 0.191
R&D Intensity -0.210 0.147 -0.207 0.148
Capital Availability 0.002 0.054 0.003 0.020
Market Uncertainty -22.803 0.013 -19.834 0.044
Market Uncertainty Square 59.978 0.002 50.036 0.006
Technological Uncertainty 0.451 0.001 0.448 0.002
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Table 9-3 Spinout to Spinout Termination Model Comparison (His-
torical vs. GARCH)
Variables Historical Uncertainty GARCH Uncertainty
B Sig. B Sig.
Mechanical 0.163 0.924 0.778 0.701
Chemical 2.142 0.534 3.121 0.389
Pharma & Bio 5.125 0.256 6.542 0.185
Medical -16.682 0.980 -16.339 0.981
Conceptual Support 0.786 0.207 0.708 0.251
Business Plan Support -0.433 0.638 -0.456 0.610
Financial Planning Support -0.044 0.960 0.043 0.961
Licence Support -0.561 0.534 -0.818 0.350
Equity Support 1.872 0.120 1.790 0.139
External Financing -2.924 0.004 -2.706 0.007
University Cooperation -3.447 0.012 -3.399 0.012
Industry Cooperation -3.091 0.007 -2.889 0.014
MPG Cooperation -0.301 0.660 -0.155 0.813
Firm Size -0.032 0.175 -0.036 0.148
R&D Intensity 1.021 0.025 1.057 0.021
Capital Intensity -0.005 0.718 -0.004 0.793
Capital Availability 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.011
Market Uncertainty -49.147 0.006 -36.892 0.079
Market Uncertainty Square 111.545 0.007 67.858 0.058
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Table 9-4 Invention to License Model Comparison (Historical vs.
GARCH)
Variables Historical Uncertainty GARCH Uncertainty
B Sig. B Sig.
Mechanical -0.280 0.433 -0.276 0.450
Chemical 0.192 0.425 0.269 0.296
Pharma & Bio 0.148 0.542 0.175 0.498
Medical 0.239 0.361 0.184 0.505
Patent References 0.026 0.049 0.026 0.046
Patent Quality 0.002 0.298 0.002 0.328
Patent Scope -0.005 0.774 -0.004 0.810
Technology Age -0.005 0.249 -0.005 0.228
Funded Research -0.017 0.928 -0.032 0.867
Partnered Research 0.999 0.000 1.001 0.000
Invention Experience 0.203 0.938 0.049 0.985
Licensee Experience 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.014
Tech. Trans. Experience 0.002 0.381 0.001 0.468
Market Uncertainty 12.361 0.012 14.759 0.003
Market Uncertainty Square -27.947 0.033 -23.239 0.011
Technological Uncertainty 0.054 0.269 0.057 0.247
Threat of Preemption -0.196 0.024 -0.197 0.024
Appendix
223
Table 9-5 License to License Termination Model Comparison (His-
torical vs. GARCH)
Variables Historical Uncertainty GARCH Uncertainty
B Sig. B Sig.
Mechanical -0.236 0.764 -0.070 0.929
Chemical 0.201 0.596 0.602 0.133
Pharma & Bio 0.104 0.750 0.603 0.087
Medical -0.057 0.882 0.253 0.521
Year Issued 1.229 0.000 1.220 0.000
Patent References 0.035 0.145 0.035 0.135
Patent Quality -0.010 0.078 -0.010 0.068
Patent Scope -0.065 0.073 -0.069 0.058
Technology Age -0.005 0.467 -0.005 0.472
Funded Research 0.724 0.034 0.686 0.045
Partnered Research -1.703 0.000 -1.701 0.000
Previous Inventions 0.020 0.010 0.022 0.006
Previous Licensee -0.018 0.041 -0.021 0.021
Previous TT Experience -0.001 0.727 -0.001 0.905
Market Uncertainty 21.710 0.009 14.550 0.007
Market Uncertainty Square -56.577 0.025 -21.318 0.031
Technological Uncertainty 0.151 0.036 0.151 0.036
9.1.2 Volatility Measurement Comparison across Indus-
tries
The following figures show the historical and GARCH market uncertainty
measures across time. It becomes evident that the pattern of both measures is
very similar for all industry sector estimations. One important observation is
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that the GARCH uncertainty measure is very sensitive compared to the histori-
cal uncertainty measure. This is because it is fitted on a daily basis and every
price spike in the underlying index leads to a volatility spike. To mitigate these
spikes a filter was used to smoothen the GARCH results. The reason for this
from an empirical perspective is that decision makers are not making entry and
exit decisions based on a daily volatility spike but rather consider longer term
uncertainty environments. Therefore a simple moving average was fitted to the
daily GARCH estimation to smoothen it. The period of the simple moving aver-
age was chosen to coincide with the period used to calculate the historical un-
certainty measure. It should be noted that the filtered GARCH volatilities
rather than the raw GARCH volatilities were used as an input into all models
discussed in the previous chapter.
Figure 9-1: Historical vs. GARCH Market Uncertainty (Electrical)
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Figure 9-2: Historical vs. GARCH Market Uncertainty (Mechani-
cal)
Figure 9-3: Historical vs. GARCH Market Uncertainty (Chemical)
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Figure 9-4: Historical vs. GARCH Market Uncertainty (Pharm-
aBio)
Figure 9-5: Historical vs. GARCH Market Uncertainty (Medical)
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9.2 Spinout Literature Classification
Table 9-6: Index list of the spinout papers identified
Primary Spinout Literature
T E QL The strength of strong ties: University spin-offs and the significance of historical relations Johansson et.al. 2005 The Journal of Technology Transfer
P C Entrepreneurship and university technology transfer Wright et.al. 2005 The Journal of Technology Transfer
T E QN R&D networks and product innovation patterns-academic and non-academic new technology-based firms on science parks Lindelöf and Löfsten 2005 Technovation
P E QN Assessment of proposals for new technology ventures in the UK: Characteristics of university spin-off companies De Coster 2005 Technovation
P E QL The process of transformation of scientific and technological knowledge into economic value conducted by biotechnology spin-offs Fontes 2005 Technovation
T C The creation of spin-off firms at public research institutions: Managerial and policy implications Lockett et.al. 2005 Research Policy
T E QN Resources, capabilities, risk capital and the creation of university spin-out companies Lockett and Wright 2005 Research Policy
T E QN Opening the ivory tower's door: An analysis of the determinants of the formation of U.S. university spin-off companies Link and Scott 2005 Research Policy
T E QN Entrepreneurial orientation, technology transfer and spin-off performance of U.S. universities O'Shea et.al. 2005 Research Policy
P E QL Academic entrepreneurship: Assessing preferences in nascent entrepreneurs Brennan et.al. 2005 J. of Small Business and Enterprise Development
T E QN University start-up formation and technology licensing with firms that go public: A resource-based view of academic entrepreneurship Powers and McDougall 2005 Journal of Business Venturing;
T E QN Academics' organizational characteristics and the generation of successful business ideas Grandi and Grimaldi 2005 Journal of Business Venturing
P E QL Growth inhibitors of entrepreneurial academic spin-offs Tahvanainen 2005 Int. J. of Innovation and Technology Management
P E QL Higher education excellence and local economic development: The Case of the entrepreneurial University of Twente Lazzeretti and Tavoletti 2005 European Planning Studies
P C University spin-off policies and economic development in less successful regions: Learning from two decades of policy practice Benneworth and Charles 2005 European Planning Studies
P E QN The evolution and performance of biotechnology regional systems of innovation Niosi and Banik 2005 Cambridge Journal of Economics
P C Universities and technology transfer: A review of academic entrepreneurship literature O'Shea et.al. 2005 Irish Management Journal
T E QL Maximising the potential of university spin-outs: The development of second order commercialisation activities Leitch and Harrison 2005 R & D Management
P E QL An empirical study of university spin-off development Gübeli and Doloreux 2005 European Journal of Innovation Management
T E QN Incubator firm failure or graduation? The role of university linkages Rothaermel and Thursby 2005 Research Policy
T E QL A process study of entrepreneurial team formation: The case of a research-based spin-off Clarysse and Moray 2004 Journal of Business Venturing
T E QL Critical junctures in the development of university high-tech spinout companies Vohora et.al. 2004 Research Policy
T E QL Do academic spin-outs differ and does it matter? Druilhe and Garnsey 2004 The Journal of Technology Transfer
P E QL Overcoming weak entrepreneurial infrastructures for academic spin-off ventures Degroof and Roberts 2004 The Journal of Technology Transfer
T E QN Proximity as a resource base for competitive advantage: University-industry links for technology transfer Lindelöf and Löfsten 2004 The Journal of Technology Transfer
P C The management of financial resources to sustain the academic incubators of entrepreneurial ideas Corti and Torello 2004 Int. J. of Entr. & Innovation Management
T C Academic networks in a trichotomous categorisation of university spinouts Nicolaou and Birley 2003 Journal of Business Venturing
P C Business model fashion and the academic spinout firm Bower 2003 R & D Management
T E QN Exploring the networking characteristics of new venture founding teams Grandi and Grimaldi 2003 Small Business Economics
T E QN Social networks in organizational emergence: The university spinout phenomenon Nicolaou and Birley 2003 Management Science
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9.3 MPS Dataset
9.3.1 Overview
The following table shows a detailed descriptive comparison between all variables
used in the models. Further the table depicts the number of cases and events that
each model entails. It is logical that the number of events (spinouts = 82) in the
invention to spinout model equals the number of cases (spinouts = 82) in the spin-
out to spinout termination model since the dataset for both models is complete. On
the other hand the number of cases (inventions = 950) in the invention to spinout
model does not equal the number of cases (inventions = 1123) in the invention to
license model. The reason is that an invention can be licensed to a number of dif-
ferent companies. So each invention can lead to multiple licenses. For the invention
to spinout model we only consider one invention as being valid to be absorbed by a
spinout and therefore disregard the multiple cases in this model. This reduces the
number of cases from 1123 to 950 in the invention to spinout model.
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Table 9-7: Descriptive Statistics of Models
Invention to Spinout Spinout to Spinout Termination Invention to License License to License Termina-tion
Number of Cases 950 82 1123 484
Number of Events 82 26 383 146
Min Max Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev
Mechanical 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.16
Chemical 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43
Pharma & Bio 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.50
Medical 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.32
Year Issued 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.49
Patent Quality 0.00 613.00 18.82 26.39 0.00 613.00 18.48 25.32 0.00 613.00 20.25 34.90
Patent Scope 0.00 19.00 2.55 2.75 0.00 19.00 2.63 2.77 0.00 19.00 3.12 3.01
Technology Age 0.00 77.33 16.57 13.13 0.00 77.33 15.96 13.06 0.00 72.97 13.29 12.42
Firm Size 71.00 502.00 343.41 118.03 71.02 479.05 363.63 103.04
R&D Intensity 250 10884 4573 2785 6116 190539 95374 47723
Capital Availability 0.00 352.44 47.42 92.91 0.00 352.44 96.94 125.76
Threat of Preemption 0.77 6.12 2.62 0.76
Market Uncertainty 0.10 0.49 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.36 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.37 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.38 0.16 0.05
Technological Uncertainty -9.13 0.00 -1.20 1.33 -9.13 0.00 -1.15 1.28 -7.59 0.00 -1.87 1.42
Conceptual Support 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50
Business Plan Support 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50
Financial Planning Support 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.48
Licence Support 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46
Equity Support 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46
External Financing 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49
University Cooperation 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.48
Industry Cooperation 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47
MPG Cooperation 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.28
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9.3.2 Event Frequency Summary
Figure 9-6: Spinout and Spinout Termination Event Frequency Histo-
gram
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Figure 9-7: License and License Termination Event Frequency Histo-
gram
9.3.3 Description
The dataset entails described in the following section only contains and describes
data that has been used in this research. Additional data that was not used in the
study can be found in the created database.
Variable FLG_INV2USO
Model used INV2USO
Source Calculated from Max Planck database
Description Dataset filter for testing hypothesis relating invention to spinout. The filter ig-
nores patents granted to the USPTO and inventions that are disclosed outside
the time frame from 1990 to 2003. Firm formation (spinout) is defined as oc-
curring in a given year, if the invention was licensed to a for-profit firm that
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did not exist as a legal entity in the previous year. If the patent is licensed to
an established firm, this is defined as licensing. If a spinout that is already es-
tablished comes to get another license form the university in a later year, this
occurrence will be defined as licensing to an established company. Only patents
that are licensed in the year of formation will be considered as leading to firm
formation.
Time n/A
Variable FLG_INV2LIC
Model used INV2LIC
Source Calculated from Max Planck database
Description Dataset filter for testing hypothesis relating invention to license. The filter ig-
nores patents granted to the USPTO and inventions that are disclosed outside
the time frame from 1990 to 2003. Further, any invention that has been li-
censed to an established firm (but not to a spinout) is defined as licensing
event. It should be noted that every invention can be involved in multiple
commercialization activities e.g. one patent can be licensed to multiple parties.
Time n/A
Variable FLG_LIC2LICTERM
Model used LIC2LICTERM
Source Calculated from Max Planck database
Description Dataset filter for testing hypothesis relating invention to license termination.
The filter ignores patents granted to the USPTO and inventions that are dis-
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closed outside the time frame from 1990 to 2003. Licensing termination occurs
if the licensee decides to terminate the license agreement either by not paying
licensing fees or formally cancelling the contract.
Variable FLG_USO2TERM
Model used USO2TERM
Source Calculated from Max Planck database
Description Dataset filter for testing hypothesis relating invention to spinout failure. Spin-
out failure event is defined if a spinout ceases to exist on any given day. The
date of occurrence is recorded by Max Planck and equates to the date the
company was deregistered in the commercial registry.
Time n/A
Variable TIME_USO
Model used INV2USO
Source Calculated from Max Planck database
Description Time in days from invention disclosure to spinout formation. Both dates are
provided in the Max Planck database.
Time n/A
Variable TIME_L
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Model used INV2LIC
Source Calculated from Max Planck database
Description Time in days from invention disclosure to spinout formation. Both dates are
provided in the Max Planck database.
Variable TIME_LT
Model used LIC2LICTERM
Source Calculated from Max Planck database
Description Time in days from licensing initiation to licensing termination. Both dates are
provided in the Max Planck database.
Time n/A
Variable TIME_UT
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Calculated from Max Planck database
Description Time in days from spinout formation until spinout termination. Both dates are
provided in the Max Planck database.
Time n/A
Variable DUMMY_MEDICAL, DUMMY_ELEC, DUMMY_BIOPHARM,
DUMMY_MECH, DUMMY_CHEM
Model used INV2USO, INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM, USO2USOTERM
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Source Max Planck database, and own classification
Description The industry control variable needs to control cross industry differences. The
problem from the data collection perspective arises since data variables are col-
lected from different sources which can have different industry classifications.
Therefore an overreaching classification needs to be chosen that can function
as a common denominator. A similar classification was previously used by
Shane (2001b) to classify industries. I have therefore classified the inventions
into following subgroups
 Mechanical
 Chemical
 Bio/ Pharmaceuticals
 Electrical
 Medical
This was done for following reasons:
1. The Max Planck database contained their own classification which
could be easily slotted into these 5 classifications.
2. Market uncertainty variables are calculated from stock index prices
which explicitly exist for the previously mentioned industry groups
3. Industry variables such as employees per company or investment fig-
ures could be gathered for the previously mentioned industry groups
The process for classifying the data was done in following way. It should be
noted that the classification existing in the Max Planck database was only ca.
40% classified. Therefore the first step was to use the existing Max Planck
classifications. For inventions that did not have a Max Planck classification
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the inventions needed to be classified manually. Since each invention contained
the International Patent Classification (IPC) this code was used to fit the in-
ventions into industries. The patent offices contain a concordance table be-
tween the IPC codes and the Standard Industrial Code (SIC) which classifica-
tions used in this study can be slotted into. Still the concordance table does
not comprehensively cover all IPC codes. The remaining ones were either clas-
sified using common sense and/ or with help of Max Planck technology trans-
fer officers.
Time invariant
Variable DUMMY_95_00
Model used INV2USO, INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM
Source Calculated from Max Planck database
Description Defines whether invention is disclosed between 1995 and 2000
Time Invariant
Variable NUM_CLAIMS
Model used INV2USO, INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM
Source Patent Database
Description Number of patent claims
Time Invariant
Variable IPC_NUM
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Model used INV2USO, INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM
Source Patent Database
Description Number of International Patent Classification codes
Time Invariant
Variable TECH_AGE
Model used INV2USO, INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM
Source Patent Database
Description Each patent is classified into one or multiple IPC codes by the patent office.
The date of the first patent issued in a 7 digit IPC classification is defined as
the first IPC classification date for the IPC class. Technology Age is therefore
defined as the age in days between the first IPC classification date and the in-
vention disclosure date. If multiple IPC classifications dates exist for a patent,
the earliest is considered.
Time Invariant
Variable MU10_INV, MU10_INV_SQ
Model used INV2USO, INV2LIC
Source Calculated from DataStream database
Description The volatilities for each invention were calculated by computing the standard
deviation of the industry clusters’ daily stock returns. Since the invention dis-
closure dates were different across inventions the market volatilities for each
invention needed to be calculated separately.
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As previously mentioned the volatilities needed to be industry specific covering
the 5 industries chosen as controls for the analysis. For this reason I have used
the FTSE Eurotop300 Indexes that follow the stock prices of these 5 technol-
ogy clusters for public European companies since 1987 and calculated the vola-
tilities of the stock composite indexes using daily data obtained from Data-
Stream. The formula used for calculation is:
2
1
)(1 xxN
N
i
i  
Where xi is the return at time i, x bar the mean return and N the number of
returns. To calculate realized volatility the history of 1 year worth of data was
considered. It should be noted that different time window lengths (e.g. 0.5 to 2
years) were used to calculate volatility and all produced consistent results.
Time variant
Variable MU10_LIC
Model used LIC2LICTERM
Source Calculated from DataStream database
Description Same as MU10_INV just that the date of calculation is not invention disclo-
sure date but licensing date.
Time Variant
Variable MU10_USO, MU10_USO_SQ
Model used USO2USOTERM
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Source Calculated from DataStream database
Description Same as MU10_INV just that the date of calculation is not invention disclo-
sure date but spinout creation date.
Time Variant
Variable TU_AGG_INV
Model used INV2USO, INV2LIC
Source Patent Database
Description The patent specific technological uncertainty (TU) for each patent is measured
as the average age of the cited patents (PCj) and cited non patent literature
(NPLi), where j is the number of the cited patents and i is the number of cited
non patent literature entries. For the reference date to calculate the average
age of patents the invention disclosure date is used.
2
n
NPL
m
PC
TU
n
i
i
m
j
j  
The average age of cited patents and cited non patent literature is calculated
as follows. Each patent has contains none or more patent citations and non
patent literature citations e.g. journals. For each of these citations the date of
publication needs to be gathered. Once collected the difference between inven-
tion disclosure date and average age of patent citations or non patent litera-
ture citations is calculated.
Time Invariant
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Variable TU_AGG_LIC
Model used LIC2LICTERM
Source Patent Database
Description Same as TU_AGG_INV just that instead of invention disclosure date, the li-
censing date is used.
Time Invariant
Variable TC_MULTI_INV
Model used INV2LIC
Source Patent Database
Description TCit is the patent concentration of rivals in patent subclass i in year t indi-
cated by the sum of patent shares PSikt for companies k=1 to n. We define
patent share (PSikt) as the number of patents (Pikt) in a subclass i company k
has issued in a given year t divided by the total number of patents (TPit) is-
sued in this sub-class i.
 nk iktit PSTC 1 2
it
ikt
ikt TP
PPS 
Time Variant
Variable NUM_TOTAL_REF
Model used INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM
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Source Patent Database
Description Sum of journal, patent and total references a patent cites.
Time Invariant
Variable INV_PROJECT
Model used INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if the invention was a project invention
Time Invariant
Variable INV_PARTNER
Model used INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if the invention was a partnered invention
Time Invariant
Variable NUM_PREV_INV
Model used INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Number of previous inventions an institute has disclosed at time of invention
disclosure
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Time Invariant
Variable NUM_PREV_LIC
Model used INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Number of previous licenses the licensee has contracted with MPG at time of
invention disclosure
Time Invariant
Variable NUM_PREV_TTO
Model used INV2LIC, LIC2LICTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Number of previous inventions a technology transfer officer has disclosed at
time of invention disclosure
Time n/A
Variable FLG_SUPP_CONC
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if TTO gives conceptual support to founders of spinout
Time Invariant
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Variable FLG_SUPP_BUSP
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if TTO gives founders business planning support
Time Invariant
Variable FLG_SUPP_FINP
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if TTO gives financial planning support to spinout founders
Time Invariant
Variable FLG_SUPP_LICC
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if TTO gives licensing support to spinout founders
Time Invariant
Variable FLG_SUPP_EQTY
Model used USO2USOTERM
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Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if TTO takes equity holding in spinout
Time Invariant
Variable FLG_FINANCING
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if spinout has received external financing like e.g. venture capital
Time Invariant
Variable COOP_UNI
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if spinout is founded with other university cooperation
Time Invariant
Variable COOP_INDUSTRY
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if spinout is founded with industry cooperation
Time Invariant
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Variable COOP_MPG
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Max Planck database
Description Defines if spinout is founded in cooperation with another MPS institute
Time Invariant
Variable REV_PER_COMP
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Calculated from Statistisches Bundesamt database (www.destatis.de)
Description Data is based on German company data. Average revenue per company (RCij)
was calculated as the total revenue for industry i in year j (Rij) divided by
number of companies in industry i and year j (Cij)
ij
ij
ij C
RRC 
Time Variant
Variable EMP_PER_COMP
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Calculated from Statistisches Bundesamt database (www.destatis.de)
Description Data is based on German company data. Average employees per company
(ECij) was calculated as the total employees in industry i in year j (Eij) divided
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by number of companies in industry i and year j (Cij)
ij
ij
ij C
EEC 
Time Variant
Variable INV_PER_COMP
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Calculated from Statistisches Bundesamt database (www.destatis.de)
Description Data is based on German company data. Average R&D investment per com-
pany (RDCij) was calculated as the total R&D investment in industry i in year
j (RDij) divided by number of companies in industry i and year j (Cij)
ij
ij
ij C
RDRDC 
Time Variant
Variable VC_IND_REV
Model used USO2USOTERM
Source Venture Economics database
Description Data is based on venture capital investment in Germany. Total venture capital
revenue in one of the specified industry sectors i in year j.
Time Variant
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9.4 Statistical Results
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9.4.1 Invention to spinout (INV2USO)
Table 9-8: Model 1 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO)
1246.957 42.213 5 .000 43.411 5 .000 43.411 5 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Table 9-9: Model 1 Variables in the Equation (INV2USO)
Table 9-10: Model 2 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO)
1223.184 74.089 11 .000 23.773 6 .001 23.773 6 .001
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.148 .837 .031 1 .859 .862
DUMMY_CHEM .488 .521 .875 1 .350 1.628
DUMMY_BIOPHARM 1.645 .464 12.584 1 .000 5.183
DUMMY_MED 1.042 .570 3.337 1 .068 2.834
DUMMY_95_00 .449 .209 4.626 1 .031 1.566
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Table 9-11: Model 2 Variables in the Equation (INV2USO)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.029 .851 .001 1 .973 .972
DUMMY_CHEM .614 .866 .503 1 .478 1.848
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .748 .966 .599 1 .439 2.112
DUMMY_MED 1.168 .919 1.615 1 .204 3.215
DUMMY_95_00 .485 .216 5.050 1 .025 1.624
NUM_CLAIMS .005 .002 5.796 1 .016 1.005
IPC_NUM .003 .037 .009 1 .926 1.003
TECH_AGE -.034 .010 12.072 1 .001 .966
T_EMP_PER_COMP .004 .006 .502 1 .479 1.004
T_INV_PER_COMP_1000 -.160 .135 1.408 1 .235 .852
T_VC_IND_REV .003 .001 8.814 1 .003 1.003
Table 9-12: Model 3 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO)
1193.005 90.006 14 .000 30.179 3 .000 30.179 3 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Table 9-13: Model 3 Variables in the Equation (INV2USO)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH 1.776 1.183 2.256 1 .133 5.907
DUMMY_CHEM 2.031 1.288 2.486 1 .115 7.618
DUMMY_BIOPHARM 1.972 1.388 2.019 1 .155 7.185
DUMMY_MED 3.648 1.276 8.167 1 .004 38.381
DUMMY_95_00 .653 .221 8.697 1 .003 1.921
NUM_CLAIMS .005 .002 5.513 1 .019 1.005
IPC_NUM .003 .035 .007 1 .934 1.003
TECH_AGE -.033 .010 11.148 1 .001 .967
T_EMP_PER_COMP .009 .006 1.996 1 .158 1.009
T_INV_PER_COMP_1000 -.210 .145 2.102 1 .147 .810
T_VC_IND_REV .002 .001 3.711 1 .054 1.002
T_MU_INV -22.803 9.181 6.169 1 .013 .000
T_MU_INV_SQ 59.978 19.223 9.736 1 .002 1.1E+26
TU_AGG_1000_INV .451 .142 10.123 1 .001 1.570
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Table 9-14: Model of Nonlinear Technological Uncertainty (INV2USO)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH 1,783 1,181 2,277 1 ,131 5,946
DUMMY_CHEM 2,027 1,288 2,476 1 ,116 7,594
DUMMY_BIOPHARM 1,984 1,388 2,042 1 ,153 7,272
DUMMY_MED 3,677 1,275 8,311 1 ,004 39,518
DUMMY_95_00 ,667 ,222 9,024 1 ,003 1,948
NUM_CLAIMS ,005 ,002 5,680 1 ,017 1,005
IPC_NUM ,003 ,035 ,006 1 ,939 1,003
TECH_AGE -,033 ,010 11,176 1 ,001 ,967
T_EMP_PER_COMP ,009 ,006 2,014 1 ,156 1,009
T_INV_PER_COMP_10
00
-,210 ,145 2,107 1 ,147 ,810
T_VC_IND_REV ,002 ,001 3,759 1 ,053 1,002
T_MU_INV -22,977 9,181 6,263 1 ,012 ,000
T_MU_INV_SQ 60,469 19,229 9,889 1 ,002 1.8E+26
TU ,624 ,224 7,763 1 ,005 1,866
TU_SQ ,053 ,047 1,232 1 ,267 1,054
9.4.2 Invention to spinout interaction effects (INV2USO)
For interaction effects I only report the last valid model and not individual model
steps since they are identical to the model steps reported in Chapter 9.4.1. Further
only significant relationships are reported.
Table 9-15: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO, Interaction of
MU_INV)
1189.975 96.243 16 .000 100.393 16 .000 100.393 16 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-16: Variables in the Equation (INV2USO, Interaction of
MU_INV and VC_IND_REV)
B SE Wald d
f
Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH 1.789 1.201 2.220 1 .136 5.983
DUMMY_CHEM 2.127 1.305 2.656 1 .103 8.393
DUMMY_BIOPHARM 2.094 1.400 2.236 1 .135 8.119
DUMMY_MED 3.510 1.287 7.438 1 .006 33.448
DUMMY_95_00 .578 .226 6.528 1 .011 1.782
NUM_CLAIMS .005 .002 4.749 1 .029 1.005
IPC_NUM .005 .036 .022 1 .881 1.005
TECH_AGE -.034 .010 11.655 1 .001 .966
T_EMP_PER_COMP .008 .006 1.624 1 .203 1.008
T_INV_PER_COMP_1000 -.185 .144 1.662 1 .197 .831
T_VC_IND_REV .047 .024 3.786 1 .052 1.048
TU_AGG_1000_INV .435 .141 9.451 1 .002 1.544
T_MU_INV -13.308 11.007 1.462 1 .227 .000
T_MU_INV_SQ 37.623 24.199 2.417 1 .120 2.18 E+26
T_MU_INV*T_VC_IND_REV -.378 .204 3.425 1 .064 .685
T_MU_INV_SQ*T_VC_IND_REV .779 .428 3.317 1 .069 2.179
9.4.3 Spinout to spinout termination (USO2USOTERM)
Table 9-17: Model 1 Test of Model Coefficients (USO2USOTERM)
202.367 4.931 4 .294 6.733 4 .151 6.733 4 .151
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Table 9-18: Model 1 Variables in the Equation (USO2USOTERM)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.825 1.134 .529 1 .467 .438
DUMMY_CHEM -1.331 1.120 1.411 1 .235 .264
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .220 .550 .160 1 .689 1.246
DUMMY_MED -12.193 423.718 .001 1 .977 .000
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Table 9-19: Model 2 Test of Model Coefficients (USO2USOTERM)
144.752 60.424 17 .000 57.616 13 .000 57.616 13 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-20: Model 2 Variables in the Equation (USO2USOTERM)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.178 1.402 .016 1 .899 .837
DUMMY_CHEM 2.530 3.213 .620 1 .431 12.548
DUMMY_BIOPHARM 5.771 4.610 1.567 1 .211 320.843
DUMMY_MED -17.654 657.830 .001 1 .979 .000
FLG_SUPP_CONC .821 .613 1.792 1 .181 2.272
FLG_SUPP_BUSP -.641 .888 .521 1 .470 .527
FLG_SUPP_FINP .288 .890 .105 1 .746 1.334
FLG_SUPP_LICC -.766 .873 .770 1 .380 .465
FLG_SUPP_EQTY 1.152 1.201 .920 1 .338 3.164
FLG_FINANCING -2.090 1.024 4.167 1 .041 .124
COOP_UNI -3.085 1.289 5.730 1 .017 .046
COOP_INDUSTRY -2.595 1.101 5.554 1 .018 .075
COOP_MPG -.199 .655 .092 1 .762 .820
T_EMP_PER_COMP -.037 .024 2.332 1 .127 .963
T_INV_PER_COMP_1000 .981 .440 4.985 1 .026 2.668
T_REV_PER_COMP -.005 .015 .111 1 .739 .995
T_VC_IND_REV .006 .003 6.041 1 .014 1.006
Table 9-21: Model 3 Test of Model Coefficients (USO2USOTERM)
137.031 64.611 19 .000 7.721 2 .021 7.721 2 .021
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-22: Model 3 Variables in the Equation (USO2USOTERM)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH .163 1.706 .009 1 .924 1.177
DUMMY_CHEM 2.142 3.443 .387 1 .534 8.514
DUMMY_BIOPHARM 5.125 4.507 1.293 1 .256 168.128
DUMMY_MED -16.682 679.718 .001 1 .980 .000
FLG_SUPP_CONC .786 .623 1.592 1 .207 2.195
FLG_SUPP_BUSP -.433 .919 .222 1 .638 .649
FLG_SUPP_FINP -.044 .894 .002 1 .960 .957
FLG_SUPP_LICC -.561 .902 .386 1 .534 .571
FLG_SUPP_EQTY 1.872 1.204 2.415 1 .120 6.500
FLG_FINANCING -2.924 1.009 8.394 1 .004 .054
COOP_UNI -3.447 1.379 6.245 1 .012 .032
COOP_INDUSTRY -3.091 1.150 7.227 1 .007 .045
COOP_MPG -.301 .685 .193 1 .660 .740
T_EMP_PER_COMP -.032 .024 1.835 1 .175 .968
T_INV_PER_COMP_1000 1.021 .455 5.035 1 .025 2.776
T_REV_PER_COMP -.005 .014 .130 1 .718 .995
T_VC_IND_REV .008 .003 7.166 1 .007 1.008
T_MU_USO -49.147 17.810 7.615 1 .006 .000
T_MU_USO_SQ 111.545 41.168 7.341 1 .007 2.77E+048
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9.4.4 Spinout to spinout termination interaction effects
(USO2USOTERM)
For interaction effects I only report the last valid model and not individual model
steps since they are identical to the model steps reported in Chapter 9.4.1. Further
only significant relationships are reported.
Table 9-23: Test of Model Coefficients (USO2USOTERM, Interaction
of MU_INV and FLG_SUPP_BSP)
127.181 67.324 21 .000 81.920 21 .000 81.920 21 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-24: Variables in the Equation (INV2USO, Interaction of
MU_INV and FLG_SUPP_BSP)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -1.132 2.225 .259 1 .611 .322
DUMMY_CHEM 5.278 4.293 1.511 1 .219 195.896
DUMMY_BIOPHARM 8.934 6.211 2.069 1 .150 7584.919
DUMMY_MED -20.270 657.225 .001 1 .975 .000
FLG_SUPP_CONC .858 .723 1.406 1 .236 2.358
FLG_SUPP_BUSP -42.615 23.292 3.348 1 .067 .000
FLG_SUPP_FINP 1.508 1.195 1.592 1 .207 4.518
FLG_SUPP_LICC -.331 .995 .111 1 .739 .718
FLG_SUPP_EQTY 1.490 1.695 .773 1 .379 4.438
FLG_FINANCING -4.607 1.596 8.333 1 .004 .010
COOP_UNI -4.503 1.528 8.685 1 .003 .011
COOP_INDUSTRY -2.679 1.382 3.758 1 .053 .069
COOP_MPG .026 .785 .001 1 .973 1.026
T_EMP_PER_COMP -.054 .032 2.828 1 .093 .948
T_INV_PER_COMP_1000 1.020 .477 4.566 1 .033 2.772
T_REV_PER_COMP .000 .015 .000 1 .998 1.000
T_VC_IND_REV .008 .003 4.771 1 .029 1.008
T_MU_USO 39.132 42.318 .855 1 .355 9.88E+16
T_MU_USO_SQ -72.618 111.450 .425 1 .515 .000
T_MU_USO*FLG_SUPP_BUSP 541.293 285.372 3.598 1 .058 1.2E+235
T_MU_USO_SQ*FLG_SUPP_BUSP -1671.147 852.599 3.842 1 .050 .000
Table 9-25: Test of Model Coefficients (USO2USOTERM, Interaction
of MU_INV and FLG_SUPP_BSP)
121.989 70.753 21 .000 87.112 21 .000 87.112 21 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-26: Variables in the Equation (INV2USO, Interaction of
MU_INV and FLG_SUPP_BSP)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -5.954 2.475 5.785 1 .016 .003
DUMMY_CHEM 9.995 5.468 3.342 1 .068 21923.354
DUMMY_BIOPHARM 16.059 7.576 4.494 1 .034 9427915
DUMMY_MED -29.971 720.644 .002 1 .967 .000
FLG_SUPP_CONC .673 .749 .806 1 .369 1.960
FLG_SUPP_BUSP -.148 1.039 .020 1 .887 .862
FLG_SUPP_FINP -.638 1.034 .380 1 .537 .529
FLG_SUPP_LICC -1.233 1.066 1.338 1 .247 .291
FLG_SUPP_EQTY 3.298 1.685 3.830 1 .050 27.051
FLG_FINANCING -3.354 1.127 8.852 1 .003 .035
COOP_UNI -5.244 1.640 10.231 1 .001 .005
COOP_INDUSTRY -4.681 1.711 7.481 1 .006 .009
COOP_MPG .492 .804 .374 1 .541 1.635
T_EMP_PER_COMP -.102 .038 7.267 1 .007 .903
T_INV_PER_COMP_1000 1.294 .481 7.227 1 .007 3.647
T_REV_PER_COMP .006 .015 .179 1 .672 1.006
T_VC_IND_REV .220 .076 8.383 1 .004 1.246
T_MU_USO 233.797 72.639 10.359 1 .001 3.44E+101
T_MU_USO_SQ -593 186.552 10.128 1 .001 .000
T_MU_USO*T_VC_IND_REV -2.097 .811 6.682 1 .010 .123
T_MU_USO_SQ*T_VC_IND_REV 5.217 2.215 5.546 1 .019 184.300
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9.4.5 Invention to license (INV2LIC)
Table 9-27: Model 1 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC)
4930.933 31.283 4 .000 35.350 4 .000 35.350 4 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Table 9-28: Model 1 Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.055 .337 .027 1 .869 .946
DUMMY_CHEM .668 .200 11.125 1 .001 1.951
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .850 .189 20.193 1 .000 2.339
DUMMY_MED .925 .226 16.714 1 .000 2.522
Table 9-29: Model 2 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC)
4776.192 213.860 13 .000 154.741 9 .000 154.741 9 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Table 9-30: Model 2 Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.153 .341 .202 1 .653 .858
DUMMY_CHEM .292 .206 2.015 1 .156 1.339
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .437 .199 4.809 1 .028 1.548
DUMMY_MED .533 .231 5.308 1 .021 1.704
NUM_TOTAL_REF .023 .012 3.511 1 .061 1.024
NUM_CLAIMS .003 .002 1.779 1 .182 1.003
IPC_NUM -.007 .018 .136 1 .712 .993
TECH_AGE -.006 .005 1.684 1 .194 .994
INV_PROJECT .032 .189 .028 1 .867 1.032
INV_PARTNER .999 .109 84.146 1 .000 2.716
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 .400 2.491 .026 1 .873 1.491
NUM_PREV_LIC .008 .003 8.325 1 .004 1.008
NUM_PREV_TTO .003 .002 1.645 1 .200 1.003
Appendix
261
Table 9-31: Model 3 Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC)
4762.277 224.786 17 .000 13.916 4 .008 13.916 4 .008
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Table 9-32: Model 3 Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.280 .357 .614 1 .433 .756
DUMMY_CHEM .192 .240 .637 1 .425 1.211
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .148 .242 .371 1 .542 1.159
DUMMY_MED .239 .262 .836 1 .361 1.270
NUM_TOTAL_REF .026 .013 3.888 1 .049 1.026
NUM_CLAIMS .002 .002 1.085 1 .298 1.002
IPC_NUM -.005 .018 .083 1 .774 .995
TECH_AGE -.005 .005 1.331 1 .249 .995
INV_PROJECT -.017 .191 .008 1 .928 .983
INV_PARTNER .999 .109 84.001 1 .000 2.715
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 .203 2.627 .006 1 .938 1.225
NUM_PREV_LIC .007 .003 6.009 1 .014 1.007
NUM_PREV_TTO .002 .002 .768 1 .381 1.002
T_MU_INV 12.361 4.916 6.323 1 .012 233626
T_MU_INV_SQ -27.947 13.104 4.549 1 .033 .000
TU_AGG_1000_INV .054 .049 1.220 1 .269 1.056
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -.196 .087 5.063 1 .024 .822
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Table 9-33: Model of Nonlinear Technological Uncertainty (INV2LIC)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -,280 ,357 ,613 1 ,434 ,756
DUMMY_CHEM ,187 ,240 ,604 1 ,437 1,205
DUMMY_BIOPHARM ,143 ,242 ,347 1 ,556 1,154
DUMMY_MED ,239 ,262 ,832 1 ,362 1,270
NUM_TOTAL_REF ,028 ,013 4,291 1 ,038 1,028
NUM_CLAIMS ,002 ,002 1,083 1 ,298 1,002
IPC_NUM -,006 ,018 ,094 1 ,759 ,994
TECH_AGE -,005 ,005 1,330 1 ,249 ,995
INV_PROJECT -,014 ,191 ,005 1 ,941 ,986
INV_PARTNER ,998 ,109 83,870 1 ,000 2,714
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 ,145 2,632 ,003 1 ,956 1,157
NUM_PREV_LIC ,007 ,003 6,151 1 ,013 1,007
NUM_PREV_TTO ,002 ,002 ,732 1 ,392 1,002
T_MU_INV 12,377 4,917 6,336 1 ,012 237398
T_MU_INV_SQ -27,921 13,109 4,536 1 ,033 ,000
TU ,114 ,106 1,152 1 ,283 1,120
TU_SQ ,013 ,020 ,414 1 ,520 1,013
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -,197 ,087 5,145 1 ,023 ,821
9.4.6 Invention to license interaction effects (INV2LIC)
For interaction effects I only report the last valid model and not individual model
steps since they are identical to the model steps reported in Chapter 9.4.5. Further
only significant relationships are reported.
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Table 9-34: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, MU_INV and
NUM_CLAIMS)
4753.821 230.806 19 .000 212.462 19 .000 212.462 19 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Table 9-35: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, MU_INV and
NUM_CLAIMS)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.301 .357 .709 1 .400 .740
DUMMY_CHEM .159 .240 .441 1 .507 1.173
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .120 .242 .245 1 .621 1.127
DUMMY_MED .206 .262 .619 1 .431 1.229
NUM_TOTAL_REF .024 .013 3.531 1 .060 1.025
NUM_CLAIMS .046 .019 6.001 1 .014 1.047
IPC_NUM .000 .018 .000 1 .988 1.000
TECH_AGE -.006 .005 1.470 1 .225 .994
INV_PROJECT -.014 .191 .005 1 .943 .986
INV_PARTNER 1.003 .109 84.803 1 .000 2.726
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 -.137 2.682 .003 1 .959 .872
NUM_PREV_LIC .007 .003 6.202 1 .013 1.007
NUM_PREV_TTO .002 .002 .870 1 .351 1.002
T_MU_INV 23.386 6.858 11.628 1 .001 1.43E+10
T_MU_INV_SQ -62.660 18.915 10.974 1 .001 .000
TU_AGG_1000_INV .052 .049 1.099 1 .295 1.053
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -.202 .087 5.352 1 .021 .817
T_MU_INV*NUM_CLAIMS -.598 .227 6.962 1 .008 .550
T_MU_INV_SQ*NUM_CLAIMS 1.879 .632 8.826 1 .003 6.544
Table 9-36: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_INV and INV_PARTNER)
4751.934 233.630 18 .000 214.349 18 .000 214.349 18 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-37: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_INV and INV_PARTNER)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.250 .357 .491 1 .483 .779
DUMMY_CHEM .187 .240 .605 1 .437 1.206
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .138 .241 .329 1 .566 1.148
DUMMY_MED .226 .261 .746 1 .388 1.253
NUM_TOTAL_REF .026 .013 4.142 1 .042 1.027
NUM_CLAIMS .003 .002 1.348 1 .246 1.003
IPC_NUM -.008 .018 .204 1 .652 .992
TECH_AGE -.005 .005 1.349 1 .246 .995
INV_PROJECT -.015 .190 .006 1 .938 .985
INV_PARTNER .680 .147 21.473 1 .000 1.975
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 -.230 2.725 .007 1 .933 .795
NUM_PREV_LIC .007 .003 6.043 1 .014 1.007
NUM_PREV_TTO .002 .002 1.005 1 .316 1.002
T_MU_INV 11.933 4.908 5.911 1 .015 152162
T_MU_INV_SQ -26.84 13.072 4.219 1 .040 .000
TU_AGG_1000_INV .246 .085 8.376 1 .004 1.279
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -.187 .086 4.747 1 .029 .829
TU_AGG_1000_INV*INV_PARTNER -.313 .100 9.738 1 .002 .731
Table 9-38: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_INV and NUM_PREV_INV)
4759.227 227.774 18 .000 207.056 18 .000 207.056 18 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-39: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_INV)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.295 .357 .681 1 .409 .745
DUMMY_CHEM .194 .240 .654 1 .419 1.215
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .144 .242 .355 1 .552 1.155
DUMMY_MED .238 .262 .830 1 .362 1.269
NUM_TOTAL_REF .026 .013 3.854 1 .050 1.026
NUM_CLAIMS .003 .002 1.340 1 .247 1.003
IPC_NUM -.009 .018 .235 1 .628 .991
TECH_AGE -.005 .005 1.430 1 .232 .995
INV_PROJECT -.020 .191 .011 1 .916 .980
INV_PARTNER .995 .109 83.176 1 .000 2.704
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 -2.288 3.003 .581 1 .446 .101
NUM_PREV_LIC .007 .003 6.645 1 .010 1.007
NUM_PREV_TTO .002 .002 .961 1 .327 1.002
T_MU_INV 12.265 4.918 6.218 1 .013 212039
T_MU_INV_SQ -27.49 13.099 4.405 1 .036 .000
TU_AGG_1000_INV .137 .070 3.799 1 .051 1.147
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -.197 .087 5.138 1 .023 .821
TU_AGG_1000_INV*NUM_PREV_INV_1000 -1.858 1.030 3.258 1 .071 .156
Table 9-40: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and TECH_AGE)
4756.211 230.193 18 .000 210.072 18 .000 210.072 18 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-41: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and TECH_AGE)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.297 .357 .692 1 .406 .743
DUMMY_CHEM .143 .241 .350 1 .554 1.153
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .125 .243 .265 1 .607 1.133
DUMMY_MED .231 .262 .777 1 .378 1.260
NUM_TOTAL_REF .027 .013 4.281 1 .039 1.027
NUM_CLAIMS .002 .002 .957 1 .328 1.002
IPC_NUM -.005 .018 .075 1 .784 .995
TECH_AGE -.047 .017 7.252 1 .007 .954
INV_PROJECT -.017 .191 .008 1 .931 .984
INV_PARTNER 1.004 .109 84.717 1 .000 2.729
NUM_PREV_INV .001 .003 .041 1 .839 1.001
NUM_PREV_LIC .007 .003 6.332 1 .012 1.007
NUM_PREV_TTO .002 .002 .757 1 .384 1.002
T_MU_INV 12.63 4.922 6.587 1 .010 306092
T_MU_INV_SQ -28.7 13.120 4.797 1 .029 .000
TU_AGG_1000_INV .055 .049 1.264 1 .261 1.057
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -.455 .138 10.874 1 .001 .634
TC_MULTI_INV_LN*TECH_AGE .016 .006 6.323 1 .012 1.016
Table 9-42: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and INV_PARTNER)
4745.927 227.540 18 .000 220.356 18 .000 220.356 18 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-43: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and INV_PARTNER)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.486 .361 1.811 1 .178 .615
DUMMY_CHEM .022 .242 .008 1 .928 1.022
DUMMY_BIOPHARM -.036 .244 .022 1 .883 .965
DUMMY_MED .057 .264 .046 1 .830 1.058
NUM_TOTAL_REF .029 .013 4.924 1 .026 1.029
NUM_CLAIMS .003 .002 1.554 1 .213 1.003
IPC_NUM -.005 .018 .070 1 .791 .995
TECH_AGE -.005 .005 1.235 1 .267 .995
INV_PROJECT .011 .191 .004 1 .953 1.011
INV_PARTNER -.625 .421 2.206 1 .137 .535
NUM_PREV_INV .000 .003 .014 1 .907 1.000
NUM_PREV_LIC .008 .003 8.011 1 .005 1.008
NUM_PREV_TTO .001 .002 .405 1 .525 1.001
T_MU_INV 12.74 4.902 6.761 1 .009 343448
T_MU_INV_SQ -29.06 13.066 4.947 1 .026 .000
TU_AGG_1000_INV .051 .049 1.086 1 .297 1.052
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -.604 .143 17.884 1 .000 .547
TC_MULTI_INV_LN*INV_PARTNER .666 .168 15.666 1 .000 1.946
Table 9-44: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and NUM_PREV_INV)
4759.290 225.244 18 .000 206.993 18 .000 206.993 18 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-45: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and NUM_PREV_INV)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.314 .358 .770 1 .380 .730
DUMMY_CHEM .167 .241 .481 1 .488 1.182
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .122 .243 .253 1 .615 1.130
DUMMY_MED .216 .263 .677 1 .410 1.241
NUM_TOTAL_REF .025 .013 3.733 1 .053 1.026
NUM_CLAIMS .002 .002 1.239 1 .266 1.002
IPC_NUM -.006 .018 .120 1 .729 .994
TECH_AGE -.005 .005 1.354 1 .245 .995
INV_PROJECT -.011 .191 .003 1 .954 .989
INV_PARTNER 1.010 .109 85.705 1 .000 2.746
NUM_PREV_INV -.009 .006 2.392 1 .122 .991
NUM_PREV_LIC .008 .003 7.109 1 .008 1.008
NUM_PREV_TTO .002 .002 1.024 1 .312 1.002
T_MU_INV 12.54 4.919 6.501 1 .011 279795
T_MU_INV_SQ -28.8 13.127 4.834 1 .028 .000
TU_AGG_1000_INV .053 .049 1.150 1 .284 1.054
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -.307 .109 7.862 1 .005 .736
TC_MULTI_INV_LN*NUM_PREV_INV .003 .002 3.264 1 .071 1.003
Table 9-46: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and NUM_PREV_LIC)
4758.576 225.446 18 .000 207.708 18 .000 207.708 18 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-47: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC, Interaction of
TC_MULTI_INV_LN and NUM_PREV_LIC)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.283 .357 .628 1 .428 .753
DUMMY_CHEM .168 .241 .490 1 .484 1.183
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .119 .242 .243 1 .622 1.127
DUMMY_MED .211 .262 .646 1 .422 1.235
NUM_TOTAL_REF .026 .013 4.042 1 .044 1.027
NUM_CLAIMS .003 .002 1.300 1 .254 1.003
IPC_NUM -.005 .018 .075 1 .783 .995
TECH_AGE -.005 .005 1.281 1 .258 .995
INV_PROJECT -.013 .191 .005 1 .944 .987
INV_PARTNER 1.023 .110 86.921 1 .000 2.781
NUM_PREV_INV .001 .003 .267 1 .606 1.001
NUM_PREV_LIC -.005 .007 .593 1 .441 .995
NUM_PREV_TTO .002 .002 .761 1 .383 1.002
T_MU_INV 12.649 4.913 6.628 1 .010 311420
T_MU_INV_SQ -29.08 13.111 4.922 1 .027 .000
TU_AGG_1000_INV .053 .049 1.188 1 .276 1.055
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -.304 .105 8.360 1 .004 .738
TC_MULTI_INV_LN*NUM_PREV_LIC .004 .002 3.974 1 .046 1.004
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9.4.7 License to license termination (LIC2LICTERM)
Table 9-48: Model 1 Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM)
1540.887 22.674 5 .000 24.033 5 .000 24.033 5 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Table 9-49: Model 1 Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.583 .758 .593 1 .441 .558
DUMMY_CHEM -.495 .338 2.149 1 .143 .610
DUMMY_BIOPHARM -.116 .289 .160 1 .689 .891
DUMMY_MED -.197 .362 .297 1 .586 .821
DUMMY_95_00 .895 .208 18.547 1 .000 2.446
Table 9-50: Model 2 Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM)
1451.149 107.214 14 .000 89.738 9 .000 89.738 9 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-51: Model 2 Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.314 .785 .160 1 .689 .730
DUMMY_CHEM -.120 .367 .107 1 .744 .887
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .002 .315 .000 1 .996 1.002
DUMMY_MED .065 .380 .029 1 .864 1.067
DUMMY_95_00 1.045 .250 17.510 1 .000 2.843
NUM_TOTAL_REF .015 .023 .463 1 .496 1.016
NUM_CLAIMS -.008 .005 2.183 1 .140 .992
IPC_NUM -.039 .034 1.291 1 .256 .962
TECH_AGE -.005 .007 .420 1 .517 .995
INV_PROJECT .838 .339 6.105 1 .013 2.313
INV_PARTNER -1.633 .207 62.013 1 .000 .195
NUM_PREV_INV .018 .008 5.727 1 .017 1.019
NUM_PREV_LIC -.015 .009 2.823 1 .093 .985
NUM_PREV_TTO -.001 .004 .033 1 .855 .999
Table 9-52: Model 3 Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM)
1433.347 119.057 17 .000 17.802 3 .000 17.802 3 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-53: Model 3 Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.236 .787 .090 1 .764 .789
DUMMY_CHEM .201 .380 .281 1 .596 1.223
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .104 .325 .102 1 .750 1.109
DUMMY_MED -.057 .387 .022 1 .882 .944
DUMMY_94_03 1.229 .256 23.069 1 .000 3.419
NUM_TOTAL_REF .035 .024 2.119 1 .145 1.035
NUM_CLAIMS -.010 .006 3.113 1 .078 .990
IPC_NUM -.065 .036 3.220 1 .073 .937
TECH_AGE -.005 .007 .529 1 .467 .995
INV_PROJECT .724 .341 4.513 1 .034 2.063
INV_PARTNER -1.703 .211 64.914 1 .000 .182
NUM_PREV_INV .020 .008 6.656 1 .010 1.020
NUM_PREV_LIC -.018 .009 4.158 1 .041 .982
NUM_PREV_TTO -.001 .004 .122 1 .727 .999
T_MU_LIC 21.710 8.347 6.765 1 .009 2.684E+09
T_MU_LIC_SQ -56.577 25.190 5.045 1 .025 .000
TU_AGG_1000_LIC .151 .072 4.389 1 .036 1.163
Table 9-54: Model of Nonlinear Technological Uncertainty
(LIC2LICTERM)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -,250 ,786 ,101 1 ,751 ,779
DUMMY_CHEM ,144 ,385 ,139 1 ,709 1,154
DUMMY_BIOPHARM ,083 ,326 ,065 1 ,798 1,087
DUMMY_MED -,095 ,390 ,059 1 ,808 ,909
DUMMY_94_03 1,204 ,257 21,876 1 ,000 3,333
NUM_TOTAL_REF ,037 ,024 2,477 1 ,115 1,038
NUM_CLAIMS -,010 ,006 3,020 1 ,082 ,990
IPC_NUM -,064 ,036 3,129 1 ,077 ,938
TECH_AGE -,005 ,007 ,546 1 ,460 ,995
INV_PROJECT ,739 ,342 4,674 1 ,031 2,093
INV_PARTNER -1,702 ,212 64,706 1 ,000 ,182
NUM_PREV_INV ,021 ,008 7,049 1 ,008 1,021
NUM_PREV_LIC -,019 ,009 4,588 1 ,032 ,981
NUM_PREV_TTO -,001 ,004 ,091 1 ,763 ,999
T_MU_LIC 21,642 8,310 6,782 1 ,009 2.5E+09
T_MU_LIC_SQ -56,470 25,057 5,079 1 ,024 ,000
TU ,315 ,181 3,011 1 ,083 1,370
TU_SQ ,034 ,035 ,992 1 ,319 1,035
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9.4.8 License to license termination interaction effects
(LIC2LICTERM)
For interaction effects I only report the last valid model and not individual model
steps. Further only significant relationships are reported.
Table 9-55: Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of
MU_ LIC with NUM_CLAIMS )
1429.425 119.756 19 .000 135.495 19 .000 135.495 19 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-56: Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of
MU_LIC with NUM_CLAIMS)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.270 .787 .118 1 .732 .763
DUMMY_CHEM .204 .381 .285 1 .593 1.226
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .107 .324 .110 1 .741 1.113
DUMMY_MED -.054 .388 .020 1 .889 .947
DUMMY_94_03 1.252 .256 23.974 1 .000 3.497
NUM_TOTAL_REF .033 .024 1.907 1 .167 1.033
NUM_CLAIMS .037 .021 3.151 1 .076 1.038
IPC_NUM -.066 .036 3.411 1 .065 .936
TECH_AGE -.006 .007 .588 1 .443 .994
INV_PROJECT .750 .342 4.809 1 .028 2.117
INV_PARTNER -1.727 .213 65.836 1 .000 .178
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 19.627 7.823 6.294 1 .012 3.3E+08
NUM_PREV_LIC -.018 .009 4.039 1 .044 .982
NUM_PREV_TTO -.001 .004 .064 1 .800 .999
T_MU_LIC 31.653 10.325 9.398 1 .002 5.6E+13
T_MU_LIC_SQ -82.963 31.723 6.839 1 .009 .000
TU_AGG_1000_LIC .151 .071 4.459 1 .035 1.163
T_MU_LIC*NUM_CLAIMS -.596 .281 4.506 1 .034 .551
T_MU_LIC_SQ*NUM_CLAIMS 1.492 .748 3.976 1 .046 4.446
Table 9-57: Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_LIC with NUM_PREV_TTO )
1422.794 125.239 18 .000 142.127 18 .000 142.127 18 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-58: Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_LIC with NUM_PREV_TTO)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.324 .785 .170 1 .680 .723
DUMMY_CHEM .478 .385 1.539 1 .215 1.612
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .255 .325 .615 1 .433 1.290
DUMMY_MED .014 .386 .001 1 .970 1.014
DUMMY_94_03 1.198 .257 21.697 1 .000 3.313
NUM_TOTAL_REF .016 .024 .436 1 .509 1.016
NUM_CLAIMS -.010 .006 3.137 1 .077 .990
IPC_NUM -.060 .036 2.775 1 .096 .942
TECH_AGE -.006 .007 .742 1 .389 .994
INV_PROJECT .740 .343 4.637 1 .031 2.095
INV_PARTNER -1.791 .216 68.498 1 .000 .167
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 24.480 7.838 9.754 1 .002 4.28E+10
NUM_PREV_LIC -.022 .009 6.349 1 .012 .978
NUM_PREV_TTO -.018 .007 6.887 1 .009 .982
T_MU_LIC 20.585 8.226 6.263 1 .012 8.71E+08
T_MU_LIC_SQ -53.78 24.775 4.712 1 .030 .000
TU_AGG_1000_LIC .396 .105 14.108 1 .000 1.486
TU_AGG_1000_LIC*NUM
_PREV_TTO
-.010 .003 11.537 1 .001 .990
Table 9-59: Test of Model Coefficients (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_LIC)
1414.359 134.222 18 .000 150.562 18 .000 150.562 18 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-60: Variables in the Equation (LIC2LICTERM, Interaction of
TU_AGG_1000_LIC with TECH_AGE)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.558 .805 .480 1 .488 .572
DUMMY_CHEM .061 .384 .026 1 .873 1.063
DUMMY_BIOPHARM -.016 .328 .002 1 .962 .985
DUMMY_MED -.168 .388 .186 1 .666 .846
DUMMY_94_03 1.305 .260 25.167 1 .000 3.689
NUM_TOTAL_REF .034 .023 2.140 1 .143 1.035
NUM_CLAIMS -.011 .006 3.706 1 .054 .989
IPC_NUM -.063 .036 3.030 1 .082 .939
TECH_AGE -.027 .014 3.764 1 .052 .973
INV_PROJECT .665 .342 3.782 1 .052 1.944
INV_PARTNER -1.704 .212 64.541 1 .000 .182
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 22.712 8.096 7.870 1 .005 7.30E+09
NUM_PREV_LIC -.020 .009 4.856 1 .028 .980
NUM_PREV_TTO -.003 .004 .426 1 .514 .997
T_MU_LIC 21.321 8.270 6.647 1 .010 1.81E+09
T_MU_LIC_SQ -55.79 24.930 5.009 1 .025 .000
TU_AGG_1000_LIC .284 .102 7.682 1 .006 1.328
TU_AGG_1000_LIC*TECH_AGE -.011 .006 3.542 1 .060 .989
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9.4.9 Competing Risk Model between Spinout and Licens-
ing (USOvsLIC)
The following results present the raw data used to calculate the tests be-
tween covariants for the competing risk analysis.
Table 9-61: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO + INV2LIC)
5981.850 345.978 19 .000 12.670 2 .002 12.670 2 .002
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Table 9-62: Variables in the Equation (INV2USO + INV2LIC)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.300 .334 .806 1 .369 .741
DUMMY_CHEM .716 .403 3.154 1 .076 2.046
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .366 .492 .554 1 .457 1.442
DUMMY_MED .360 .367 .961 1 .327 1.434
DUMMY_95_00 .418 .110 14.541 1 .000 1.519
NUM_TOTAL_REF .015 .012 1.569 1 .210 1.015
NUM_CLAIMS .003 .002 2.586 1 .108 1.003
IPC_NUM .002 .015 .010 1 .920 1.002
TECH_AGE -.011 .004 6.701 1 .010 .989
INV_PROJECT -.122 .168 .526 1 .468 .885
INV_PARTNER .965 .097 99.503 1 .000 2.624
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 -.955 2.384 .160 1 .689 .385
NUM_PREV_LIC .007 .003 8.456 1 .004 1.007
NUM_PREV_TTO .004 .002 5.507 1 .019 1.004
T_EMP_PER_COMP .002 .003 .430 1 .512 1.002
T_INV_PER_COMP_1000 -.149 .046 10.332 1 .001 .862
T_VC_IND_REV .001 .000 4.828 1 .028 1.001
TU_AGG_1000_INV .115 .047 5.871 1 .015 1.122
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -.211 .081 6.868 1 .009 .810
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Table 9-63: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2USO)
1176.039 122.304 19 .000 8.178 2 .017 8.178 2 .017
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Table 9-64: Variables in the Equation (INV2USO)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.112 .856 .017 1 .896 .894
DUMMY_CHEM .112 .891 .016 1 .900 1.118
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .218 1.044 .043 1 .835 1.243
DUMMY_MED 1.057 .921 1.317 1 .251 2.876
DUMMY_95_00 .399 .226 3.113 1 .078 1.491
NUM_TOTAL_REF -.034 .031 1.211 1 .271 .966
NUM_CLAIMS .005 .002 4.186 1 .041 1.005
IPC_NUM -.007 .036 .038 1 .845 .993
TECH_AGE -.031 .010 9.590 1 .002 .970
INV_PROJECT .151 .286 .278 1 .598 1.163
INV_PARTNER .852 .221 14.866 1 .000 2.343
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 -4.84 5.323 .828 1 .363 .008
NUM_PREV_LIC .012 .006 3.476 1 .062 1.012
NUM_PREV_TTO .009 .003 7.382 1 .007 1.009
T_EMP_PER_COMP .006 .006 1.172 1 .279 1.006
T_INV_PER_COMP_1000 -.221 .134 2.705 1 .100 .802
T_VC_IND_REV .001 .001 1.666 1 .197 1.001
TU_AGG_1000_INV .371 .147 6.371 1 .012 1.450
TC_MULTI_INV_LN .068 .183 .141 1 .708 1.071
Table 9-65: Test of Model Coefficients (INV2LIC)
4749.658 240.750 18 .000 6.104 2 .047 6.104 2 .047
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
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Table 9-66: Variables in the Equation (INV2LIC)
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
DUMMY_MECH -.334 .349 .919 1 .338 .716
DUMMY_CHEM 1.020 .425 5.761 1 .016 2.772
DUMMY_BIOPHARM .475 .518 .843 1 .359 1.609
DUMMY_MED .097 .395 .061 1 .805 1.102
NUM_TOTAL_REF .025 .013 3.676 1 .055 1.025
NUM_CLAIMS .002 .002 .900 1 .343 1.002
IPC_NUM -.004 .018 .053 1 .818 .996
TECH_AGE -.005 .005 1.414 1 .234 .995
INV_PROJECT .001 .190 .000 1 .994 1.001
INV_PARTNER 1.001 .109 84.787 1 .000 2.722
NUM_PREV_INV_1000 -.227 2.572 .008 1 .930 .797
NUM_PREV_LIC .007 .003 7.266 1 .007 1.007
NUM_PREV_TTO .002 .002 .851 1 .356 1.002
T_EMP_PER_COMP .000 .003 .001 1 .977 1.000
T_INV_PER_COMP_1000 -.160 .051 9.843 1 .002 .852
T_VC_IND_REV .002 .001 7.470 1 .006 1.002
TU_AGG_1000_INV .052 .049 1.127 1 .288 1.053
TC_MULTI_INV_LN -.195 .087 5.019 1 .025 .823
